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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent developments in applied time series analysis 
emphasize the importance of stationary time series and 
testing for the existence of long-run relationships, or, 
equivalently, testing for co-integration. In econometric 
empirical research, stationarity in a variable is an 
important property for several reasons. First, stationarity 
guarantees that the effects of a random disturbance on a 
variable will die out over time. Second, the regression 
estimators of a regression with nonstationary variables will 
not be consistent. And third, it is important to determine 
if variables are stationary when estimating or testing for 
statistical, stable long-run or equilibrium relationships 
among key variables. The issue here is that applied modern 
econometrics emphasizes the utilization of stationary time 
series, i.e., time series with no unit roots. 
Traditionally, when a set of variables appeared to be 
nonstationary, in some instances, their nonstationarity was 
removed by taking first or second differences of such 
series. One down side of that approach is that if the time 
series involved observed a long-run or equilibrium 
relationship, or if their nonstationarity arose from the 
same common source (i.e., they shared a common stochastic 
trend), then they should be modeled as co-integrated 
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variables and not as differenced variables. Co-integration 
among a set of variables means that even though each 
specific variable is nonstationary by itself, a particular 
linear combination with others is stationary. Co-
integration theory argues against differencing because 
differencing removes much of the long-run characteristics of 
the data. Furthermore, modeling co-integrated data in 
differences will result in specification error, while 
modeling that data in levels will overlook important 
statistical relationships or constraints. In this case, the 
modern time series approach suggests modeling co-integrated 
variables as an error-correction model. Such a model 
consists of a long-run error-correction term together with 
the first difference of the variables under study, which 
allows for the short-run dynamics of the model. 
Studies that test for co-integration using Mexico's 
data are uncommon. In this research, co-integration and 
vector autoregressions techniques are used to test for 
statistical evidence of long-run or equilibrium 
relationships among time series of Mexico's balance of 
payments, exchange rates and monetary aggregates. The 
results obtained are reported in chapters three through 
five. 
The second chapter of this dissertation presents a 
discussion of Mexico's macroeconomic performance and trade 
3 
policy and industrialization during the period 1957-1991. 
Chapter three presents an analysis of Mexico's balance 
of payments and the exchange rate during the period 1971-
1988. In the context of the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments, this chapter provides statistical 
evidence that, despite the presence of nonstationarity in 
Mexico's data, a long-run relationship seems to exist 
between changes in international reserves and the exchange 
rate and changes in domestic credit, i.e., these variables 
seem to be co-integrated. In addition, multivariate Granger 
causality tests and innovation accounting support a negative 
bidirectional causality between these variables which do not 
support the unidirectional causality of the monetary 
approach, or its assumption that domestic credit is 
exogenous. The bidirectional causality also indicates that 
Mexico's monetary authorities adjust domestic assets to 
sterilize exogenous balance-of-payments deficits on the 
monetary base in an attempt to control its monetary policy. 
In chapter four, once again, co-integration and vector 
autoregressions techniques are applied to Mexico's data to 
test whether purchasing power parity holds during the period 
1960-1988. The null hypothesis of non co-integration (e.g. 
purchasing power parity does not hold) was rejected in favor 
of accepting purchasing power parity. An estimated error-
correction model suggests that Mexican prices and/or the 
4 
peso price of a U.S. dollar adjusted to maintain purchasing 
power parity during that period. Furthermore, innovation 
accounting and Granger causality tests derived from the 
estimated vector autoregressions also support the finding 
that Mexican prices and/or nominal exchange rate adjust to 
maintain purchasing power parity. 
In chapter five, co-integration techniques are again 
applied to Mexico's data to determine whether there exists 
statistical evidence of a long-run or equilibrium money 
demand specification during the period 1969 to 1991. 
Although three definitions of money supply are used, only 
the monetary aggregate M3 seems to observe a long-run 
relationship with income and the rate of inflation. 
In chapter six, the overall conclusions are presented. 
Finally, two appendices contain the results of testing for 
unit roots under structural breaks, and the data set 
utilized in this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF MEXICO'S MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
AND TRADE POLICY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION DURING 
THE PERIOD 1957-1991 
Overview of Mexico's Macroeconomic Performance 
During the Period 1957-1991 
In this section, a description of Mexico's post-war 
economic performance is presented in several stages: the 
"Stabilizing Development" that covers the years 1957-1970, 
the "Shared Development" that ran from 1971-1977, the "Oil 
Boom" comprising the years 1978-1982, and the period of 
"Fiscal Correction and Stabilization" that started in 1983 
and continues to the present (November 1993). 
Stabilizing development. 1957-1970 
During the "Stabilizing Development" from 1957 to 1970, 
the Mexican economy grew at a rate of 7.2 percent, while 
inflation averaged 3.6 percent in an environment of moderate 
fiscal and monetary policies.^ The average 1957-1970 growth 
rate in money supply (currency plus demand deposits) was 
10.8 percent while the average 1960-1970 public sector 
^Antonio Ortiz Mena, Secretary of Mexico's Treasury from 
1959 to 1970, called the period 1957-1970 "Stabilizing 
Development" in 1969 and thereafter it was commonly referred 
to as such, see Antonio Ortiz Mena (1969). 
Table 2.1. Mexico's Macroeconomic Variables, Period Averages 
Concepts 1957-1970 1971-1977 1978-1982 1983-1988 1989-1991 
GDP Growth Rate 7.2 5.6 7.1 0.2 3 .8 
Inflation Rate 3.6 15.7 35.9 83.4 22 .7 
a 
Public Deficit as a Percent of GDP -1.5 —6.4 -10.4 -11.8 -2 .6 
Current Account as a Percent of GDP -2.7 —3.3 -4.3 1.1 -3 .5 
Ml Growth Rate 10.8 21.9 26.1 67.5 71 .3 
Source: Banco de México, Indicadores Econômicos; and INEGI, Cuentas Nacionales. 
Notes: GDP = Real Gross Domestic Product; Inflation Rate = Percentage change in 
the end-of-period Consumer Price Index; Public Deficit = Public Sector's Financial 
Requirements; and Ml = Currency plus Demand Deposits. 
a 
Refers to the period 1960-1970. Data for previous years are not available. 
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financial requirements relative to GDP was -1.5 percent (see 
Table 2.1). 
According to Zabludovsky (1989), the combination of 
high growth and low inflation during the period 1957-1970 
appeared to be the result of mainly three policies: (1) low 
public sector deficits relative to GDP, (2) stable money 
supply growth, and (3) positive real interest rates. 
Zabludovsky (1989) also noted that positive real interest 
rates were important to the extent that they resulted in 
increasing financial savings during that period. The 
combination of positive interest rates and relatively low 
public sector deficits, Zabludovsky noted, allowed the 
Mexican government to finance its public sector deficits 
without much debt monetizing or foreign borrowing. 
Mexico's macroeconomic performance can also be 
described by dividing the period we are interested in into 
six-year periods that coincide with each new administration. 
In most cases these six-year periods, that correspond to the 
presidential political cycle, also coincide with Mexico's 
business cycle. For the most part, a typical Mexican 
administration period would be characterized by a first year 
of restrictive fiscal and monetary policies and a last year 
of strong expansionary aggregate demand, as government 
spending would be increased in the last year to finish 
public investment programs, (see Beltrân del Rio (1973), and 
Table 2.2. GDP Per Capita, Inflation and Real Minimum Wage in Mexico 
Growth Rates Expressed as Period Averages in Percentage 
Period President GDP Per Capita Inflation Real Minimum Wage 
1935-40 Lâzeiro Cârdenas 2.8 5.9 -2.0 
1941-46 Manuel Avila Caimacho 3.5 17.7 -7.3 
1947-52 Miguel Alemân Valdéz 3.1 11.2 3.8 
1953-58 Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 3.5 6.7 0.5 
1959-64 Adolfo L6pez Mateos 3.3 2.3 11.1 
1965-70 Gustavo Diaz Ordaz 3.4 3.6 4.0 
1971-76 Luis Echeverria Alvarez 2.7 14.1 2.3 
1977-82 José Luis L6pez Portillo 3.1 30.5 —3.3 
1983-88 Miguel De La Madrid -1.8 83.4 -8.8 
1989-91 Carlos Salinas De Gortari 1.8 22.7 -7.1 
Source; Eliana A. Cardoso and Santiago Levy (1988); Banco de México, 
Annual Reports and Comisidn de Salarios Minimos. Updated by the author from 1983-1991. 
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Cardoso and Levy (1988)). 
During the administrations that comprised the 
"Stabilizing Development" (the period from 1957-1970), GDP 
per capita averaged more than 3.3 percent; average inflation 
was between 2.3 and 6.7 percent; and average real minimum 
wage rate grew at positive rates, reaching 11.1 percent 
during the Lôpez Mateos administration (see Table 2.2). 
Such rates of growth seem to suggest that the Mexican 
"Stabilizing Development" was successful in achieving 
relatively high economic growth, low inflation and some 
gains in real wages. However, the stabilizing development 
model led to significant government intervention in Mexico, 
making its economy highly dependent on imported inputs and 
capital goods from abroad. This intervention also led to a 
highly distorted price system that resulted in an industry 
that was inefficient with low productivity and low quality, 
producing mostly for the domestic market.% 
Shared development. 1971-1977 
During 1971, the first year of the Echeverrla 
administration, economic policies were somehow conservative. 
However, by his second year in office fiscal and monetary 
^The Mexican "Stabilizing Development" corresponds to 
the model of development described in the literature as 
Import Substitution Industrialization. See the section on 
trade and industrialization. 
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policies became very expansionary. Clearly, the moderate 
policies that Mexico followed under the "stabilizing 
development" had been abandoned. For one thing, relative to 
GDP, the public sector deficit almost doubled to -4.5 
percent in 1972 from -2.3 percent in 1971. Second, the 
growth in money supply (demand deposits plus currency in the 
hands of the public) increased from 7.7 percent in 1971 to 
21.2 percent in 1972. By year-end 1972 GDP growth reached 
8.2 percent and inflation increased slightly to a 5.7 
percent rate from 5.0 percent of the previous year (see 
Table 2.3). 
With these results in mind—expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies resulting in higher GDP growth and 
relatively low inflation—and in spite of the acceleration 
of inflation in 1972, the Echeverria administration adopted 
a more active government involvement in the economy 
throughout his mandate. By 1976 this "public-expenditure-
led growth model" resulted in a rate of inflation of 27.2 
percent, and a GDP growth rate of 4.4 percent; both of which 
did not fare well when compared to the average 1960-1970 
values of 2.8 percent in inflation and 6.6 percent in GDP 
growth. Also, the public sector deficits continued to 
increase sharply, reaching -9.1 percent relative to GDP in 
1976; a figure that is much higher than the average 1960-
1970 of -1.5 percent. In addition, both the deterioration 
a 
Table 2.3. Mexico's Macroeconomic Indicators 
Annual Percentage Change in; Real 
Interest 
Year GDP CPI Ml Investment Rate 
1960 8.1 4.9 9.4 14.9 
1961 4.3 -2.0 4.9 0.9 4.7 
1962 4.5 2.1 13.0 2.2 4.3 
1963 7.5 -0.1 15.7 13.2 5.6 
1964 11.0 3.5 16.3 21.7 1.4 
1965 6.1 4.5 6.2 4.0 4.4 
1966 6.1 3.8 11.0 9.8 4.4 
1967 5.9 3.1 7.6 11.6 3.7 
1968 9.4 1.8 12.7 9.8 4.2 
1969 3.4 2.6 10.6 6.9 3.9 
1970 6.5 7.1 10.4 8.1 1.2 
1971 3.8 5.0 7.7 -1.7 0.9 
1972 8.2 5.7 21.2 12.2 2.3 
1973 7.9 21.3 26.7 14.7 —3.6 
1974 5.8 20.6 20.1 7.9 -9.9 
1975 5.7 11.3 21.1 9.3 -2.4 
1976 4.4 27.2 35.7 0.4 -3.0 
1977 3.4 20.7 26.3 -6.7 -12.2 
1978 9.0 16.2 31.6 15.2 -3.3 
1979 9.7 20.0 33.7 20.5 -2.0 
1980 9.2 29.8 33.4 14.7 -2.5 
1981 8.8 28.7 33.3 16.2 3.2 
1982 —0.6 98.9 54.1 -16.8 —8.0 
1983 -4.2 80.8 41.4 -28.3 -20.4 
1984 3.6 59.2 62.3 6.4 -8.9 
1985 2.6 63.7 53.8 7.9 1.1 
1986 -3.8 105.7 72.1 -11.8 0.4 
1987 1.7 159.2 129.7 -0.1 -15.4 
1988 1.2 51.7 58.1 5.8 -29.6 
1989 3.3 19.7 40.7 6.3 10.1 
1990 4.4 29.9 62.6 13.2 2.6 
1991 3.7 18.8 118.6 8.5 -3.6 
Source: Banco de Mexico, Annual Reports; and Secretaria de 
a 
GDP=Gross Domestic Product; CPI=End-of-Period Consumer Price 
Investment; Interest Rate=3-Month T-Bill (CETES); Real Wage Index 
implies Peso Depreciation; Nominal Exhange Rate refers to Period 
November 11, 1991; Public Sector Deficit as a Percentage of GDP; 
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Financial Real Real Nominal Terms of 
Requirements Wage Exchange Rate Exchange Rate Trade 
of Public Index Index Pesos per U.S. Index 
Sector 1971=100 1971=100 Dollar 1971=100 
-1.4 68.1 100.8 12.5 87.2 
-1.2 66.5 100.3 12.5 88.2 
-0.8 72.7 100.2 12.5 82.1 
-1.2 81.9 100.8 12.5 88.2 
-0.6 84.4 99.8 12.5 84.6 
-0.8 89.6 98.0 12.5 83.6 
-1.1 91.2 96.8 12.5 85.5 
-2.1 94.7 96.6 12.5 84.0 
-1.9 96.6 98.4 12.5 91.1 
-2.0 100.2 100.3 12.5 92.2 
-3.4 99.5 101.0 12.5 100.1 
-2.3 100.0 100.0 12.5 100.0 
-4.5 105.9 98.4 12.5 101.7 
-6.3 103.0 93.3 12.5 120.8 
-6.7 105.6 83.7 12.5 81.5 
-9.3 110.1 79.3 12.5 73.6 
-9.1 122.1 89.2 20.5 119.7 
-6.3 124.5 108.0 22.6 123.6 
-6.2 121.2 99.7 22.7 113.9 
-7.1 119.3 93.9 22.8 94.3 
-7.5 114.1 85.1 23.0 112.8 
-14.1 125.0 78.3 24.5 126.8 
-16.9 123.4 116.0 57.4 86.1 
—8.6 83.8 131.2 120.2 69.4 
-8.5 76.9 115.6 167.8 70.8 
-9.6 80.8 116.0 257.0 72.4 
-15.9 74.3 150.4 611.4 52.9 
-16.0 72.8 151.6 1366.7 67.0 
-13.0 72.7 122.2 2250.3 60.4 
-5.6 81.0 115.6 2453.2 64.5 
-3.9 83.4 109.9 2807.3 73.9 
-1.5 87.8 100.2 3006.8 64.0 
Hacienda y Crédite Publico, Annual Reports. 
Index; Ml=Currency + Demand Deposits; Investment^Gross Domestic 
of Manufacturing Sector; An increase in Real Exchange Rate 
Average of the Controlled Rate from December 20, 1982 to 
It excludes privatizations. (-) means deficit. 
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of the public sector finances and fixed nominal interest 
were accompanied by a continued declining in total fixed 
investment. By 1976, total fixed investment grew by only 0.4 
percent with respect to the previous year (see Table 2.3). 
Throughout most of the Echeverrla administration, the 
Mexican economy endured a combination of a fixed exchange 
rate and inflation rates that were higher than those of the 
U.S., Mexico's main trading country.^ such a combination 
was accompanied by a continuous real appreciation of the 
Mexican currency together with considerable increasing 
current account deficits. Current account deficits which 
had averaged about -.5 billion dollars in the period 1960-
1970, expanded to about -.9 billion dollars by 1971. 
Thereafter, they rose rapidly, reaching -3.7 billion by 
1976. 
The increasingly larger deficits in Mexico's current 
account were accompanied by an even higher accumulation of 
external debt. That is, the increase in external debt was 
far greater than what was required by the current account 
alone. For instance, the 1971-1976 average of the current 
account deficit was -2.5 billion dollars as compared to the 
Spor the most part, Mexico's trade is with the U.S. For 
instance in 1991 Mexico exported to the U.S. about 79.5 
percent of its total exports, while its imports amounted to 
about 73.7 percent, (The Mexican Economy, 1993, Banco de 
Mexico). 
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same period's average of net flow of total external debt of 
3.3 billion dollars. Moreover, the item Other Capital Flows 
and Errors and Omissions showed some negative increasing 
values, particularly since 1973, suggesting some capital 
flight (see Table 2.4). Furthermore, the country's stock of 
total external debt—which includes foreign debt of the 
public sector, commercial banks, and the private sector— 
reached 27.3 billion dollars by the end of 1976, from 7.9 
billion in 1971. 
During 1976, a year of presidential elections in 
Mexico, capital flight rose substantially, reaching levels 
not observed in this country during the previous fifteen 
years. This capital flight appeared to be supported by 
borrowing abroad and by the depletion of Mexico's 
international reserves held at the central bank (see Table 
2.4). On the eve of the last presidential address—on 
August 31 of 1976—President Echeverrla announced that the 
exchange rate would be depreciated from 12.50 Pesos per U.S. 
Dollar to 20.50 Pesos per U.S. Dollar effective September 1, 
1976. That increase in the exchange rate was equivalent to 
a 64 percent nominal depreciation. The nominal exchange 
rate had been maintained fixed at 12.50 Pesos per Dollar 
during 22 years since April of 1954. By mid-September 1976, 
as capital flight continued at a faster rate, Mexico signed 
a three-year stand-by agreement with the International 
Table 2.4. Mexico' S Balance of Payments in Millions Of Dollars 
net Flow of other 
Total Direct Special Capital Flows Change in 
Year Current External Foreign Drawing and Errors International 
Account Debt Investment Rights and Omissions Reserves 
1960 -419.7 -48.6 0.0 —8.6 
1961 -343.7 169.6 94.1 0.0 58.5 -21.5 
1962 -249.6 190.3 90.3 0.0 -14.1 16.9 
1963 -226.1 198.7 81.4 0.0 55.7 109.7 
1964 -444.7 518.0 112.1 0.0 -153.8 31.6 
1965 -442.9 171.9 152.6 0.0 97.4 -21.0 
1966 -477.8 382.7 90.7 0.0 10.5 6.1 
1967 -603.0 584.6 6.0 0.0 52.2 39.8 
1968 -775.4 443.1 107.7 0.0 273.6 49.0 
1969 -708.4 520.2 181.4 0.0 54.7 47.9 
1970 -1187.9 474.8 184.6 45.4 585.2 102.1 
1971 -928.9 487.8 173.0 39.6 428.5 200.0 
1972. -1005.7 415.9 146.2 39.2 669.1 264.7 
1973 -1528.8 2488.0 199.5 0.0 -1036.4 122.3 
1974 -3226.0 4031.7 288.8 0.0 -1057.6 36.9 
1975 -4442.6 5865.9 168.2 0.0 -1426.4 165.1 
1976 -3683.3 6680.9 199.8 0.0 -4201.4 -1004.0 
1977 -1596.4 3287.3 326.0 0.0 -1359.8 657.1 
1978 -2693.0 2988.8 364.5 0.0 -226.2 434.1 
1979 -4870.5 6634.7 742.6 70.0 -2157.9 418.9 
1980 -10739.7 10515.5 2145.5 73.5 -976.3 1018.5 
1981 -16052.1 23283.3 3835.8 69.6 -10124.4 1012.2 
1982 -6221.0 12676.0 1657.5 0.0 -11297.3 -3184.8 
1983 5418.4 3095.0 460.5 0.0 -5873.1 3100.8 
1984 4238.5 6601.0 391.1 0.0 -8029.7 3200.9 
1985 713.5 138.0 490.5 0.0 -3670.4 -2328.4 
1986 -1644.2 4425.0 1521.9 0.0 -3317.7 985.0 
1987 3752.5 6479.0 3247.6 0.0 -6554.7 6924.4 
1988 -2520.6 -7086.0 2594.6 0.0 -115.0 -7127.0 
1989 -6050.6 -5270.0 3036.9 0.0 8555.2 271.5 
1990 -7113.9 4621.0 2633.2 0.0 3274.0 3414.3 
1991 -13282.8 4390.0 4761.5 0.0 11952.8 7821.5 
Source: Banco de México, Indlcadores Econâmlcos; and Annual Reports. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The year 1977, the first year of the new administration 
of Lôpez Portillo, has been characterized as a period of 
adjustment, in part to slow down the economy and in part to 
comply with the IMF stand-by agreement signed a year 
earlier. At the end of 1977, the growth in GDP (3.4 
percent) was the lowest since the beginning of the decade; 
inflation also declined from 27.2 percent to 20.7 percent; 
and the current account balance of -1.6 billion dollars was 
about half of its 1976 level of -3.7 billion dollars (see 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4). 
This adjustment year seemed to be the result of the 
implementation of less expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies by the Mexican authorities. In 1977, the public 
sector deficit relative to GDP of -6.3 percent was lower 
than the -9.1 figure of the previous year. Also, the growth 
rate in the money supply (currency plus demand deposits) 
declined from 35.7 percent in 1976 to 26.3 percent in 1977 
(see Table 2.3). These restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies would not last much longer as the Mexican 
government announced that Mexico's oil reserves were much 
larger than previously estimated. The "oil-boom" years are 
discussed next. 
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Oil boom. 1978-1982 
By 1978, the second year of the new administration of 
Lôpez Portillo, the three-year adjustment program supported 
by the stand-by agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund was abandoned. The Mexican authorities had decided to 
change their policies due in part to the new discoveries of 
crude oil and to their plans to export it (Zedillo (1986)). 
Once again, the Mexican authorities undertook expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies that seemed to have brought 
about a four-year oil boom that began in 1978 and ended in 
1981. 
Oil reserves, including crude oil and natural gas, 
proved to be much larger than previously estimated. Also, 
they were continuously revised upwards. As Table 2.5 shows, 
oil reserves that were only 6.3 billion barrels in 1975, 
suddenly increased to 11.2 billion barrels by end-1976 and 
to 16.0 billion barrels by end-1977. By 1982, the last year 
of the Lôpez Portillo administration, total oil and natural 
gas reserves stood at 72.0 billion barrels. Interestingly 
enough, as illustrated by Table 2.5, this newly found oil 
wealth of Mexico coincided with increases in world prices 
that more than doubled from 1975 to 1982 in nominal terms. 
As oil reserves continued to increase so did oil 
production. As shown in Table 2.5, in 1975 daily crude oil 
production stood at 0.7 million barrels while in 1982 it 
Table 2.5. Mexico's Oil Reserves, Crude Production and Exports, and World Price of Oil 
_ g Price ox OlJL 
Oil and Natural Crude Oil Oil and Natural Gas Exports Dollars Per Barrel 
Year Gas Millions of % of Merchandise 
Reserves Production Exports Dollars % Exports Nominal % 
1960 4.8 0.271 0.003 17.0 - 2.3 - -
1961 5.0 0.293 0.018 20.0 17.7 2.5 1.73 -
1962 5.0 0.306 0.020 23.1 15.7 2.6 1.73 0.0 
1963 5.2 0.315 0.020 37.1 60.6 4.0 1.73 0.0 
1964 5.2 0.316 0.021 36.1 -2.7 3.6 1.73 0.0 
1965 5.1 0.323 0.013 39.6 9.7 3.6 1.73 0.0 
1966 5.4 0.332 - 42.1 6.2 3.6 1.73 0.0 
1967 5.5 0.365 - 45.2 7.4 4.1 1.73 0.0 
1968 5.5 0.389 - 40.8 -9.8 3.5 1.73 0.0 
1969 5.6 0.411 - 40.3 -1.3 3.0 1.73 0.0 
1970 5.6 0.429 - 38.0 -5.6 2.9 1.73 0.0 
1971 5.4 0.427 - 31.0 -18.4 2.3 2.21 27.7 
1972 5.4 0.441 - 21.0 -32.3 1.3 2.37 7.2 
1973 5.4 0.452 - 25.0 19.0 1.2 3.56 50.2 
1974 5.8 0.575 0.016 123.0 392.0 4.3 10.24 187.6 
1975 6.3 0.717 0.094 460.0 274.0 15.0 10.89 6.3 
1976 11.2 0.801 0.094 562.9 22.4 15.4 11.28 3.6 
1977 16.0 0.981 0.202 1037.3 84.3 22.3 12.42 10.1 
1978 40.2 1.213 0.365 1863.2 79.6 30.7 12.42 0.0 
1979 45.8 1.471 0.533 3975.0 113.3 45.1 16.77 35.0 
1980 60.0 1.941 0.830 10441.3 162.7 67.3 27.60 64.6 
1981 72.0 2.312 1.098 14574.0 39.6 72.5 32.03 16.1 
1982 72.0 2.746 1.492 16454.1 12.9 77.5 32.03 0.0 
1983 72.5 2.666 1.537 16017.2 -2.7 71.8 28.05 -12.4 
1984 71.8 2.685 1.529 16337.6 2.0 67.5 27.03 -3.6 
1985 69.2 2.630 1.434 14529.8 -11.1 67.1 26.44 -2.2 
1986 70.0 2.428 1.290 6104.1 -58.0 38.1 11.60 -56.1 
1987 69.0 2.541 1.345 8468.9 38.7 41.0 16.65 43.5 
1988 67.6 2.506 1.307 6507.8 -23.2 31.6 12.65 -24.0 
1989 66.5 2.513 1.278 7842.8 20.5 34.3 15.02 18.8 
1990 65.5 2.548 1.277 10103.7 28.8 37.6 19.58 30.3 
1991 65.0 2.676 1.369 8166.4 -19.2 30.1 15.83 -19.2 
Source: PEMEX, Memoriae de Labores; Banco de México, The Mexican Economy, 1993. 
^Billions of Barrels, end-of-period. 
Millions of Barrels, Daily Average. 
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reached 2.7 million barrels. Moreover, crude oil exports 
followed such upward trend in production. In 1975, crude 
oil exports were about 0,1 million barrels a day, while in 
1982 they were 1.5 million barrels a day. 
During the years 1978 to 1981 of the Lôpez Portillo 
administration, commonly referred to as the four "oil-boom" 
years, GDP averaged 9.2 percent. Furthermore, total gross 
fixed investment in real terms not only increased at an 
average rate of 16.7 percent during the period 1978-1981, 
but its participation in GDP also increased by 26.5 percent 
during the same years. Moreover, real gross domestic 
investment of the public sector was very dynamic during the 
four-year period averaging about 22.0 percent. In addition, 
its participation in Mexico's GDP increased to an average of 
10.5 percent in the same four years. That average was 
larger than the average of 7.9 percent of the previous six 
years of the Echeverria administration, and also larger than 
the average of 6.5 percent of the decade 1960-1970. 
Moreover, Table 2.3 shows that the four "oil-boom" 
years brought about not only higher economic growth but also 
higher inflation rates. During that period, inflation 
increased from 16.2 percent in 1978 to 28.7 percent in 1981. 
The "public-expenditure-led" growth model applied to Mexico 
in Echeverria's administration was being implemented again 
by the Lôpez Portillo administration, only this time with 
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greater public sector spending. According to Table 2.3, the 
overall public sector deficit or financial requirements of 
the public sector as a proportion of GDP more than doubled 
during those four years, from -6.2 percent in 1978 to -14.1 
in 1981. According to Zedillo (1986), the Lôpez Portillo 
administration argued that the government would finance its 
heavy spending in a non-inflationary fashion with the newly 
discovered oil wealth. Furthermore, the Mexican authorities 
announced that to avoid the problems of the earlier years, a 
new set of policies with new policy instruments would be 
implemented as well. To that extent, a financial reform 
that aimed at maintaining an interest rate policy with 
flexible interest rates that reflected domestic and 
international market conditions was implemented in 1978. 
The chief instruments of this reform were the newly 
introduced government securities known as Treasury 
Certificates (CETES). The idea behind the introduction of 
CETES was to use these government securities as an open 
market operations tool to primarily finance the public 
sector deficits. Another reform consisted of implementing a 
value-added tax during the same year. In addition, the 
Mexican authorities also attempted to eliminate some 
restrictions on imports during the period 1978-1980. 
Furthermore, Mexico's money supply during those four 
years also revealed the effect expansionary policies and of 
21 
larger public sector deficits. From Table 2.3 we can infer 
that money supply (currency plus demand deposits) grew at a 
four-year average of 33.0 percent during the period 1978-
1981. That growth average was higher than the previous 
administration's 1971-1976 average of 22.1 percent. 
Finally, Table 2.4 shows that during the oil-boom years 
the current account continued to deteriorate, from a deficit 
of 2.7 billion dollars in 1978 to a deficit of 16.1 billion 
dollars in 1981. The deterioration of Mexico's current 
account during those years took place in spite of the very 
impressive performance of the oil exporting sector. Crude 
oil and natural gas exports increased from 1.9 billion 
dollars in 1978 to 14.6 billion dollars in 1981. Also, as a 
share of total merchandise exports, oil exports also 
increased from 30.7 percent in 1978 to 72.5 percent in 1981 
(see Table 2.5). 
By year-end 1982, the last year of the Lopez Portillo 
Administration, Mexico's GDP had fallen 0.6 percent, 
inflation had reached 98.9 percent, money supply had grown 
54.1 percent and the deficit of the public sector had 
reached -16.9 percent of GDP (see Table 2.3). Also, as 
Table 2.4 suggests, capital flight had become a serious 
problem in 1981 and in 1982. The Figures of the Other 
Capital Flows and Errors and Omissions item of Table 2.4 
show that Mexico experienced capital flight of about -10.1 
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billion dollars and -11.3 billion dollars during 1981 and 
1982 respectively. Moreover, it would appear that in the 
early 1980s, the combination of the current account 
deficits, the capital flight, and the depletion of 
international reserves held at the central bank during the 
same period, were accompanied by a significant increase in 
Mexico's external debt. By year-end 1982 the stock of total 
external debt stood at 86.7 billion dollars, or about 48 
percent of GDP, compared to 27.3 billion dollars in 1976, 
equivalent to 31 percent of GDP (see Table 2.6). 
Moreover, by year-end 1982, international reserves at 
the central bank fell by 3.2 billion dollars. At that 
point, external lending became increasingly difficult to 
obtain, particularly during the first half of 1982.* Facing 
this severe situation, the Mexican authorities undertook 
some drastic measures designed to slow down the flight of 
capital beginning with the introduction of a dual exchange 
rate regime on August 5, 1982. During the second week of 
August 1982, the Mexican authorities decided to make all 
dollar-denominated deposits in the Mexican banking system 
payable only in domestic currency. At the same time, all 
commercial banks were instructed to suspend all transactions 
^Ernesto Cedillo (1986) noted that by mid-1982 "Mexico's 
creditworthiness had completely deteriorated" as only 75 
international banks out of 650 that were invited to subscribe 
a new emergency loan agreed to new lending. 
Table 2 . 6. Stock of Mexico's External Debt End-of-Period 
Millions of Dollars Total Debt as a % of: Public Debt as a % of : 
Total Public Current Current 
Year External External GDP Account Merchandise GDP Account Merchandise 
Debt Debt Income Exports Exports 
1960 3722.3 3250.0 30.9 257.8 503.9 27.0 225.1 440.0 
1961 3891.9 3440.0 29.8 258.0 484.4 26.3 228.0 428.1 
1962 4082.2 3550.0 29.0 251.0 450.3 25.2 218.3 391.6 
1963 4280.9 3740.0 27.3 237.3 453.4 23.8 207.3 396.1 
1964 4798.9 4130.0 25.9 248.6 467.7 22.3 214.0 402.5 
1965 4970.8 4180.0 24.6 241.0 441.3 20.7 202.7 371.1 
1966 5353.5 4420.0 23.9 238.8 457.6 19.7 197.2 377.8 
1967 5938.1 4960.0 24.2 257.1 538.4 20.2 214.7 449.7 
1968 6381.2 5330.0 23.5 251.5 547.7 19.6 210.1 457.5 
1969 6901.4 5812.1 23.0 241.9 514.3 19.4 203.7 433.2 
1970 7376.2 6255.5 20.7 226.6 572.0 17.6 192.2 485.1 
1971 7864.0 6666.7 20.0 222.7 575.9 17.0 188.8 488.2 
1972 8279.9 6820.9 18.3 193.4 496.9 15.1 159.4 409.3 
1973 10767.9 8448.8 19.5 199.2 519.8 15.3 156.3 407.8 
1974 14799.6 11373.8 20.5 216.4 518.7 15.8 166.3 398.6 
1975 20665.5 15705.1 23.5 289.6 674.8 17.8 220.1 512.8 
1976 27346.4 20846.4 30.7 330.4 748.1 23.4 251.9 570.3 
1977 30633.7 23833.7 37.4 333.8 658.8 29.1 259.7 512.6 
1978 33622.5 26422.5 32.7 288.5 554.5 25.7 226.7 435.8 
1979 40257.2 29757.2 29.8 247.5 456.5 22.1 183.0 337.5 
1980 50772.7 33872.7 26.0 226.6 327.3 17.4 151.2 218.4 
1981 74056.0 52156.0 29.6 264.4 368.4 20.8 186.2 259.5 
1982 86732 .0 58874.0 48.1 309.7 408.5 32.6 210.2 277.3 
1983 89827.0 62556.0 60.3 310.3 402.6 42.0 216.1 280.4 
1984 96428.0 69378.0 54.9 293.1 398.5 39.5 210.9 286.7 
1985 96566.0 72080.0 52.3 305.9 445.7 39.0 228.3 332.7 
1986 100990.9 75351.0 77.5 400.8 625.0 57.8 299.0 466.3 
1987 107469.0 81407.0 76.3 341.9 524.4 57.8 259.0 397.2 
1988 100914.3 81003.0 58.9 297.8 491.2 47.3 239.0 .394.3 
1989 96448.2 76059.0 47.1 253.2 422.2 37.2 199.7 333.0 
1990 101859.3 77770.0 42.2 226.0 379.5 32.2 172.6 289.8 
1991 104827.8 79988.0 37.1 228.9 386.5 28.3 174.7 294.9 
Source: Banco de México, Annual Reports, and The Mexican Economy 1993. 
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in foreign currency. Furthermore, on August 2 0 ,  the 
Secretary of Finance, Jesus Silva Herzog, requested a three-
month moratorium on payments of principal of Mexico's 
external debt, as well as the formation of an "advisory 
group" of creditors to negotiate the restructuring of 
Mexico's foreign debt. Finally, on September 1, 1982, 
President Lôpez Portillo in his last presidential address 
announced that all private commercial banks were being 
nationalized and that foreign exchange controls had been 
implemented. 
For the most part, the Mexican "oil-boom" years were 
characterized by heavy government spending in a way similar 
to that of the "public-expentiture-led growth model" of the 
previous administration but with government spending that 
was much heavier as it relied on future revenues from oil 
exports and on heavy external borrowing. Moreover, the 
combination of fiscal deficits of unprecedented proportions, 
the increasingly larger capital flight that reached 
historical levels, together with external borrowing coming 
to a halt, resulted in one of the most severe economic 
crises in Mexico's history. 
Fiscal correction and stabilization. 1983-1991 
During the last four months of 1982, Mexico paid only 
the interest due on its foreign external debt and a very 
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small percentage of its principal. As for its private 
external debt all payments had been suspended. Furthermore, 
the incoming administration of Miguel De La Madrid, that 
took office in December of 1982, faced an economy with heavy 
government spending, increasing government intervention and 
large barriers to foreign trade. 
As the OECD Economic Survey of Mexico indicates, (OECD 
1992, pp. 25) the main economic distortions and imbalances 
the Mexican economy experienced at the outset of 1983 
consisted of: (1) high fiscal deficits together with a large 
number of loss-making enterprises owned by the public 
sector; (2) an inflation rate that reached an annual rate of 
almost 100 percent by the end of 1982; (3) large current 
account deficits that developed in spite of significant 
increases in oil exports making the export sector largely 
dependent on oil; (4) foreign banks unwilling to extend 
further credits; (5) large transfer of resources abroad to 
service the external debt under conditions of historically 
high interest rates; (6) an internal price structure heavily 
distorted by direct government intervention and controls; 
(7) a mostly inefficient, under-productive and low-quality 
industry supplying a highly protected domestic market, with 
few incentives to export; and (8) a private sector hostile 
to the government and doubtful of its ability to manage the 
economy. 
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To address these issues, the De La Madrid 
administration undertook a three-year adjustment program 
called "Immediate Programme for Economic Reordering" (PIRE 
in its Spanish acronym), that covered the period from 1983 
to 1985. The main objectives of the PIRE were three; to 
address the external debt crisis, to stabilize the economy 
and to restore the private sector's confidence in the 
Mexican government. To achieve these objectives, the PIRE 
relied on the following: first, to correct the public sector 
imbalance; second, to replace the exchange rate controls; 
third, to restructure Mexico's external debt; and fourth, to 
ratify the stand-by agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund agreed upon in mid-November of 1982. 
The Mexican authorities established that at the center 
of the PIRE was the reduction of the public sector imbalance 
and decided to set targets for the public sector's deficit 
as a percentage of GDP of 8.5 percent, 4.5 percent and 3.5 
percent for 1983, 1984 and 1985 respectively. In addition, 
the authorities expected to reduce the inflation rate to 40 
percent, 30 percent and 18 percent during the same years. 
Next, the authorities expected the growth rates in Mexico's 
GDP during the years 1983, 1984 and 1985 to be 0 percent, 3 
percent and 6 percent, respectively (Lustig (1992)). 
To achieve the targets set for the public sector 
deficits, the Mexican authorities followed a tight fiscal 
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policy. On the one hand, reducing public spending in 1983 
entailed across-the-board cuts in real current and capital 
expenditures. On average, the federal government current 
expenditures in wages and salaries, goods and services, and 
capital expenditures decreased by almost 25 percent in real 
terms during 1983 (see Table 2.7). 
On the other hand, revenue enhancing measures consisted 
of increasing both indirect and direct taxes as well as 
raising prices of some goods produced by public enterprises 
such as the prices of gasoline and electricity. As Table 2.7 
shows, during 1983 federal government revenues from value 
added tax (VAT) rose by 31.4 percent, while gasoline tax 
revenues increased by 25.4 percent in real terms. 
As for the second element of the PIRE, the new 
administration of De La Madrid decided to devaluate the 
controlled exchange rate by about 90 percent in December 
1982 and to eliminate the exchange rate controls that were 
imposed by the outgoing Lôpez Portillo's administration on 
September 1, 1982, while maintaining the dual exchange rate 
system. The dual exchange rate system consisted of a 
controlled rate and a free rate. The controlled rate was to 
be used in business transactions involving all current 
account transactions (except factor payments) and foreign 
related capital flows. This rate followed a crawling-peg 
rule with a rate of depreciation of 13 Peso-cents per day. 
Table 2.7. Mexico's Federal Government Revenues and Expenditures 
Annual Percentage Change in Constant Prices of 1980 
Concept 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Total Revenue 8. 6 1. 7 9. ,0 -1. .7 2. ,5 —8. 7 8. ,7 -0, .4 9. ,9 1. ,1 24, ,6 
Tax Revenue 7. 8 0. 5 10. 4 -0. .6 1. ,9 -9. 5 8, .5 -1, .4 3. 6 3. ,3 4, .4 
Direct Taxes 10. 6 0. 1 8. 0 -3. 3 1. 9 -21. .6 17. 3 -7, .4 6, .4 4. 2 3, .5 
PEMEX 13. 2 21, .6 34. 2 -8, .3 2. 4 -37. 4 42. 5 -33. ,7 6, .7 12, .4 -1. ,9 
Income Tax 8. ,9 -14. 8 -17. ,9 4, .9 1. 1 0. 8 —4. 9 27, .5 6, .2 -1, .4 7, .8 
Indirect Taxes 3. 0 1. 2 14. 9 4, ,1 1. 9 9. 8 -1. 7 6, .7 0, .3 2, ,1 5. 5 
VAT 5. 1 -15. 2 31. 4 9, .2 -0. 0 -2. 7 4, .8 12. 2 -3. 1 21. 2 3. 7 
Excise taxes 4. ,1 74. 6 27. 0 -2, .8 -1. 4 23. 1 -7. .1 12, .3 -7. 4 -31. ,3 — 8. 6 
Gasoline -2. 0 243. 3 25. 4 2, .1 -3. 9 27. 2 —8. 5 11. 3 -12, ,4 -49. .9 8. 1 
Other 7. 5 -9. 7 30. 0 -11. 8 3. 8 15. 2 -4. 0 14. 2 2. 6 0, .7 -22, .8 
Import Duties 20. 8 -23. 0 -48. ,1 8. 1 36. 6 20, .5 -2. 7 -40. ,7 72. 1 28, .6 29. 2 
Other Taxes -39. ,0 -19. 2 —3. 1 2. 1 -9. 2 24, .5 -17, .5 25. 5 5. 3 1, .8 33. 5 
Non-Tax Revenue 22. 4 22. 0 -9. 4 -20. 7 14. 1 7. 1 13. 3 14. 3 90, .5 -14. ,5 194, .2 
Total Expenditure 29. 6 25. 6 -9. 8 -3. 7 3. 9 14. 5 9. 7 -14. ,3 -10, .6 —8 < .3 -12, .4 
Current Expenditure 23. 2 44. 7 —6. 6 -2. 2 1. 3 20. 8 10, .5 -11. 4 -11, .8 -13, ,0 -12, ,0 
Wages and Salaries 12. 3 10. 2 -23. ,7 8, ,3 -1. 1 -7. 4 5. 9 -11. ,7 10, .4 —6. 2 18. 3 
Goods and Services 53. 4 20. 0 -25, .9 27. 3 9. 7 32. 8 -30, .5 8, .8 8. 4 -2. 4 37. 6 
Interest 79. 3 218. 2 -6. 0 -14, ,9 24. 6 52. 5 28. 9 1 W
 
.7 -19. 6 -22, ,3 -40, ,3 
Tranfers 1. 9 8. 4 3, .9 -16, .8 3. 6 -11, .5 -19, .1 -12, .9 —8, .4 -16, .8 24. 2 
Other 35. 9 -2. 3 -0. 8 35. 0 -33. 0 5, .8 -13, .9 -0. 2 -0, .9 18. 2 7. 6 
Capital Expenditure 48. 9 -22. ,5 -24, .8 -12. ,1 20. 3 -19. 8 3. 7 -39, .1 5. 2 42. 4 — 15, .0 
Investment 3. 9 0. 2 -39, .8 -3. 9 9. 4 9, .8 -9, .4 -40, .1 5. 1 52. 4 19, .5 
Capital Transfers 87. ,5 —36. ,3 -13, ,3 -16. .8 27. 2 -18. ,7 15. 4 -41, .1 5. 5 35. 3 —33, ,0 
Other 24. 3 3. 1 -32, .7 -7. 0 14. 2 -74. 6 -52, .1 38. 4 2. 4 78. 7 -9, .1 
Source: Banco de México, Indicadores Econômicos and The Mexican Economy 1992. 
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The free market exchange rate was to be used in all 
remaining transactions (Zedillo (1988) , and Banco de Mexico 
(1984)) . 
The results of the PIRE turned out to be encouraging. 
By year-end 1983 the target set for the public sector 
deficit relative to GDP of 8.5 percent was practically 
achieved, however, bringing the economy to a negative growth 
rate of 4.2 percent (see Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1). During 
the period 1984-85 the fiscal deficits decreased to. about 
half the level of 1982. In addition, economic growth 
resumed to an average rate of 3 percent while inflation fell 
a few percentage points during the same period (see Table 
2.3 and Figures 2.1 and 2.2). In spite of major earthquakes 
in September 1985, that caused several billion dollars in 
damage to Mexico City, Mexico's outlook began to look 
promising—however very dependent on oil exports. 
The fall in the world price of oil that started in late 
1985 further exacerbated during 1986. As Table 2.5 shows, 
by year-end 1986 Mexico's oil and natural gas exports had 
fallen by 58.0 percent from the previous year. Furthermore, 
the loss in foreign exchange earnings from Mexico's oil 
exports in that year amounted to about 8.4 billion dollars. 
Its impact on the government's revenues was substantial. As 
illustrated by Table 2.7, the federal government tax 
revenues from PEMEX, the government's oil monopoly, fell by 
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37.4 percent in 1986. 
The Mexican authorities reacted to this oil price shock 
by tightening fiscal policy which meant, once again, 
increasing fiscal revenues while decreasing fiscal 
expenditures in real terms. To raise real fiscal revenues, 
the authorities increased domestic petroleum prices and 
excise taxes which rose by about 23.1 percent. On the real 
expenditures side, tight fiscal policy meant to reduce the 
federal government's real capital expenditures by 19.8 
percent in 1986 (see Table 2.7). In spite of those 
tightening measures the public sector's deficit relative to 
GDP reached -15.9 percent in that year (see Table 2.3). 
Another measure that the Mexican authorities took as a 
result of the deterioration of the terms of trade, was to 
depreciate the Peso at a faster rate throughout 1986. Table 
2.3 shows that real depreciation amounted to about 30 
percent during that year. Furthermore, the current account 
balance turned negative during the same year after four 
years of positive balances. As Table 2.4 illustrates, the 
current account deficit reached -1.6 billion dollars in 
1986, while capital flight (measured by the Other Capital 
Flows and Errors and Omissions item) continued at a rate of 
3.3 billion dollars during that year. 
After a 3.8 percent decline in GDP growth in 1986, the 
Mexican authorities allowed for some economic recovery by 
33 
pursuing conservative policies rather than further fiscal 
tightening. By year-end 1987 economic growth recuperated 
slightly (1.7 percent), while inflation reached almost 160 
percent (see Table 2.3 and Figures 2.1 and 2.2). At the 
same time, the Mexican Peso was depreciated in nominal terms 
by about 125 percent from 1986 to 1987. Also, Table 2.4 
shows that the current account turned, once more, to a 
positive balance of 3.8 billion dollars while international 
reserves increased by almost 7.0 billion dollars. 
Next, the Mexican economy that had been subject to two 
major shocks, the fall in oil price in 1985-86 and the 
earthquakes in 1985, was about to endure another shock. 
Perhaps as a widespread effect of the crisis in stock 
markets in most of the world during October 1987, the 
Mexican stock market also experienced a significant fall in 
that year as the stock market index showed a decline of 99.7 
percent in November of 1987 (The Mexican Economy, 1992, p. 
231). 
At this point the Mexican authorities decided to 
accelerate the depreciation of the Peso, as international 
reserves holdings at the central bank started to fall and 
large amounts of capital flight were reported in Mexico's 
balance of payments accounts. This is illustrated in Table 
2.4 by the errors and omissions data that show an outflow of 
6.6 billion dollars in 1987. Furthermore, in December 1987 
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alone, the Peso was depreciated by 20 percent bringing about 
a sharp increase in the expected rate of inflation for the 
months ahead as the Peso depreciation was to be incorporated 
into Mexican Peso prices. 
With that in mind, by the end of November 1987, the 
Mexican authorities declared that the government's highest 
priority was to reduce inflation and decided to undertake a 
stabilization program similar to the programs implemented by 
Argentina, Brazil and Israel. On December 16, 1987, a 
stabilization program, known as the Economic Solidarity Pact 
(or PSE in its Spanish acronym), was signed by 
representatives of the government, labor and the private 
sectors. The PSE's main objective was to reduce inflation 
without bringing about a severe recession in the Mexican 
economy that would result from implementing further 
restrictive macroeconomic policies. It comprised four 
elements; tightened fiscal policy, restrictive monetary 
policy, greater opening of the economy, and the commitment 
by all sectors of society to moderate price increases. 
Prior to implementing the PSE the authorities decided 
to account for some distortions in the relative price 
system. Thus, a day before signing the PSE, the authorities 
increased prices and tariffs of public sector goods and 
services substantially. For instance, the price of gasoline 
increased by 85 percent, electricity by 89 percent. 
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fertilizers by 82 percent and airfare by 26 percent, (The 
Mexican Economy 1989, p.8). Those price increases pushed 
upward the producer price index of public enterprises by 20 
percent and 25 percent in November and December of 1987, 
respectively (see Figure 2.3). In addition, the minimum 
wage was raised by 15 percent on December 14 and by 20 
percent on January 1, 1988. 
Under the PSE, the authorities undertook the following 
measures. First, on December 15, 1987, the controlled 
exchange rate was depreciated by 22 percent. Next, official 
prices of imports (used as a reference for import duty) were 
eliminated together with most of the import permits. 
Finally, the maximum import tariffs were reduced from 40 
percent to 20 percent (Mercado de Valores, Num. 22, November 
15, 1991, p.15). These trade liberalization policies, the 
authorities argued, would eventually help bring down 
inflation as the domestic producers faced lower-priced 
imported goods. 
The end-1987 price increases of goods produced by the 
public sector were thought of as an important step toward 
eliminating distortions in the relative price system as well 
as decreasing government spending. Had these prices not 
been increased, substantial government subsidies would have 
been needed, which in turn would have created pressures on 
36 
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Mexico's public finances.® 
During 1988, the PSE was signed again by 
representatives of the government, labor, and the private 
sector on five more occasions: on February 28, on March 27, 
on May 28, on August 14, and on October 16. On each 
occasion the PSE's four original guidelines were maintained 
as the central elements of the new strategy. To begin the 
new PSE strategy, on February 28, 1988, the exchange rate, 
minimum wage and energy prices were fixed throughout the 
rest of that year after increasing the prices of energy (85 
percent), nominal exchange rate (22 percent) and minimum 
wage rate (35 percent). 
Fiscal policy in Mexico during 1988 was kept on the 
restrictive side to comply with the PSE agreement. On the 
expenditure side. Table 2.7 shows that the federal 
government's total expenditure in real terms decreased by 
14.3 percent in that year. Of that reduction, capital 
expenditures decreased the most (-39.1 percent) not 
withstanding the substantial decrease in current 
expenditures (-11.4 percent). 
On the revenues side. Table 2.7 also shows that 
^Francisco Gil Diaz (1984) estimated that if subsidies on 
oil, electricity and railway had been eliminated from 1965-
1980, with the exception of 1975 and 1976, Mexico's public 
sector would have shown a budget surplus of as much as 3 
percent of GDP throughout the period. 
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Mexico's federal total revenues in real terms diminished by 
about .4 percent in 1988, mainly as a result of a 
substantial fall in both taxes paid by PEMEX and tax 
collections from import duties. Direct taxes paid by PEMEX, 
the government's oil monopoly, decreased by 33.7 percent as 
a result of a reduction of its oil exports in that year (see 
Table 2.5). Moreover, Table 2.7 shows that revenues from 
import duties also decreased by a substantial amount (-40.7 
percent), reflecting, in part, Mexico's new trade policy 
toward a more open economy. Overall, as Table 2.3 
illustrates, the public sector borrowing requirements as a 
proportion of GDP declined to -12.4 percent in 1988 from 
-16.0 percent the previous year. 
To comply with the PSE, Mexico's monetary policy was 
also kept on the restrictive side during 1988. On the one 
hand, domestic credit was restricted by the Central Bank 
through credit ceilings imposed on the Mexican financial 
system. Effective January 1988, total outstanding bank 
credit to the private sector was set at 90 percent of its 
average daily balance of December 1987. On February 1 of 
the same year, that ceiling was lowered even further to 85 
percent. On the other hand, private demand for credit 
surged beginning May of 1988 as a result of a seasonal 
increase in output, increase in private investment and 
perhaps more importantly, increase in payments of the 
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private external debt as world interest rates moved upwards 
(The Mexican Economy 1989, p. 16). 
In spite of that excess demand for credit, Mexican 
interest rates were kept almost entirely fixed at an average 
of about 40 percent from May 1988 through November 1988. 
Not surprisingly, that excess demand for credit in Mexico's 
financial system was accompanied by the development of an 
informal credit market. This market, according to the 
central bank, grew steadily beginning in July 1988, and by 
November it had reached a considerable size. As the 
informal market grew in size and importance it began to 
lessen the effectiveness of the restrictive monetary policy 
adopted by the authorities under the PSE. In response, by 
late October and early November, the monetary authorities 
implemented several measures aimed at attracting resources 
back to the commercial banks of the formal sector. The idea 
was to allow commercial banks to subscribe highly 
competitive financial instruments so that financial 
resources voluntarily left the informal market of credit. 
According to Banco de Mexico (The Mexican Economy 1989, 
p. 18), the relevant elements of that policy consisted of 
the following. First, commercial banks were authorized to 
subscribe bankers' acceptances and to grant guarantees on 
commercial paper without any limits of value and interest 
paid on such instruments. Consequently, interest rates and 
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maturities of these instruments were freely determined by 
market conditions. Second, commercial banks were authorized 
to trade bankers' acceptances. Finally, liabilities 
resulting from bankers' acceptances and guarantees on 
commercial paper would be required to have a counterpart of 
no less than 30 percent in government securities or in 
interest bearing deposits at Banco de Mexico, a requirement 
known as the liquidity coefficient. Bankers' acceptances 
were not subject to other legal requirements applied to 
traditional instruments. 
These measures appeared to have the desired effect of 
transferring funds from the informal market to the formal 
commercial banking system as suggested by the increase in 
the amount of bankers' acceptances relative to total 
deposits in real terms from 1.8 percent in September of 1988 
to 48.7 percent in December of the same year. Moreover, as 
a result of this increase in bank deposits, commercial 
banks' credit to the private sector in real terms increased 
by 31.7 percent during the period September-December. That 
surge in the money supply did not conform to the tight 
monetary policy agreed upon under the PSE. To offset that 
expansion of domestic credit, the monetary authorities sold 
large quantities of government securities (CETES) to the 
public. Thus, government securities in the hands of the 
public in real terms increased by 46.7 percent from October 
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to December 1988. 
The new financial instruments introduced into the 
Mexican banking system, together with the credit policies of 
the October-November 1988 period, marked a turning point in 
monetary policy management in Mexico. They strengthened the 
role of open market operations as the main instrument of 
monetary policy and source of financing to the public 
sector. 
As for the foreign sector. Table 2.4 shows a negative 
balance in Mexico's current account of -2.5 billion dollars 
during 1988, in contrast to the positive current account 
balance of 3.7 billion dollars in 1987. In addition, 
international reserves declined substantially at a rate of 
7.1 billion dollars during the same year. These 
developments, as the OECD survey (p. 35) suggests, appeared 
to be the "result of the rapid increase in imports that 
followed the acceleration of trade liberalization, the high 
and increasing burden of servicing the foreign debt and the 
resumption of capital flight." 
By year-end 1988, the last year of the De La Madrid 
administration, Mexico's inflation, had fallen to 51.7 
percent from 159.2 percent of the year before. 
Interestingly enough, the 1988 fall in inflation was not 
accompanied by a severe drop in Mexico's economic growth as 
GDP showed an increase of 1.2 percent in 1988 (see Table 2.3 
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and Figures 2.1 and 2.2). 
The deterioration of Mexico's balance of payments 
accounts together with the low growth of 1988, appeared to 
indicate to the authorities that it would be very difficult 
for Mexico to make substantial investments needed to achieve 
higher sustainable economic growth with lower inflation in 
the years to come, while at the same time transferring 
resources abroad at an average rate of 8.5 percent of GDP to 
service the external debt (see Table 2.8). 
The incoming new administration of Salinas de Gortari 
considered Mexico's transfer of financial resources abroad a 
central issue to deal with in his economic agenda. On 
December 12, 1988, President Salinas announced the second 
phase of Mexico's stabilization program denominated Pact for 
Stability and Economic Growth (PECE), and instructed the 
Secretariat of Finance to initiate negotiations with the 
international financial community to renegotiate Mexico's 
external debt. The purpose of those negotiations was to 
reduce the transfer abroad of net financial sources. 
The new PECE pact, that was designed and negotiated 
within the same framework as the previous PSE pact, 
attempted to consolidate the gains made in reducing 
inflation. Both pacts emphasized the government's 
commitment to a strict control of public finances and to 
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PECE included some moderate increases in public goods 
prices, along with an increase in the minimum wage rate of 8 
percent. In addition, the Mexican authorities changed the 
nominal exchange rate policy from a fixed rate to a 
crawling-peg rate that depreciated at a pre-announced rate 
of 1 Peso per day amounting to an annual nominal 
depreciation of about 16 percent. 
The PECE has been renewed seven times since it was 
first signed in December 1988, with the last renewal in 
October 1993 to expire in December 1994. The adjustment 
program appears to have succeeded in bringing down Mexico's 
inflation while re-establishing its economic growth. The 
end-of-period consumer price index inflation fell to 19.7 
percent in 1989, rose to 29.9 percent in 1990, fell to 18.8 
percent in 1991 and dropped further to 11.2 percent in 1992. 
Moreover, Mexico's GDP has grown at positive rates of 3.3, 
4.4, 3.6 and 2.6 percent respectively during those years. 
The PECE has been accompanied by a significant 
reduction of net external resources transferred abroad since 
1989 which resulted from a negotiated reduction of Mexico's 
external debt, the decline in international interest rates, 
and the surge of private capital inflows. 
Mexico's external debt negotiations with the foreign 
financial community started in April 1989 and concluded in 
March 1990. According to Ortiz (1991), the savings that 
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resulted from the Mexican external debt negotiations 
amounted to about 2.3 billion dollars in 1990 and to an 
average of 1.5 billion dollars per year during the period 
1991-1994. Moreover, as Table 2.8 shows, the debt service 
on Mexico's total external debt as a percentage of GDP 
decreased from an average of 8.5 percent during the period 
1983-1988 to an average of 5.7 percent in the period 1989-
1991. 
Falling foreign interest rates also helped to decrease 
Mexico's net transfers of financial resources abroad, as the 
London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) fell to 6.0 percent by 
1991. Consequently, as Table 2.9 shows, interest payments 
on Mexico's total external debt as a proportion of GDP fell 
to 3.8 percent in the period 1989-1991 from an average of 
6.0 percent in the period 1983-1988. Finally, the surge in 
private capital flows to Mexico has increased significantly 
in the last few years. As Table 2.4 shows, other capital 
flows and errors and omissions shows a positive balance of 
8.6 billion dollars in 1989, 3.3 billion in 1990 and 12.0 
billion dollars in 1991. Next, let us discuss Mexico's 
trade policy and industrialization. 
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Table 2.9» Interest Payments on Mexico's External Debt 
Interest Payments in Interest Payments on Total Interest Payments on Foreign 
Millions U.S. Dollars External Debt as a Percentage of: Public Debt as a Percentage of: 
Year Total Foreign Current Current 
External Public GDP Account Merchandise GDP Account Merchandise 
Debt Debt Income Exports Income Exports 
1960 67.4 36.2 0.6 4.7 9.1 0.3 2.5 4.9 
1961 78.1 42.2 0.6 5.2 9.7 0.3 2.8 5.3 
1962 93.4 64.3 0.7 5.7 10.3 0.5 4.0 7.1 
1963 101.8 67.0 0.6 5.6 10.8 0.4 3.7 7.1 
1964 114.8 74.6 0.6 5.9 11.2 0.4 3.9 7.3 
1965 128.8 93.1 0.6 6.2 11.4 0.5 4.5 8.3 
1966 171.3 125.6 0.8 7.6 14.6 0.6 5.6 10.7 
1967 216.4 148.1 0.9 9.4 19.6 0.6 6.4 13.4 
1968 280.4 199.3 1.0 11.1 24.1 0.7 7.9 17.1 
1969 329.7 221.1 1.1 11.6 24.6 0.7 7.7 16.5 
1970 417.0 290.3 1.2 12.8 32.3 0.8 8.9 22.5 
1971 442.5 306.2 1.1 12.5 32.4 0.8 8.7 22.4 
1972 481.5 321.4 1.1 11.2 28.9 0.7 7.5 19.3 
1973 647.7 442.1 1.2 12.0 31.3 0.8 8.2 21.3 
1974 973.3 707.1 1.4 14.2 34.1 1.0 10.3 24.8 
1975 1436.6 1031.5 1.6 20.1 46.9 1.2 14.5 33.7 
1976 1723.8 1318.7 1.9 20.8 47.2 1.5 15.9 36.1 
1977 1973.9 1542.3 2.4 21.5 42.5 1.9 16.8 33.2 
1978 2571.6 2023.1 2.5 22.1 42.4 2.0 17.4 33.4 
1979 3709.3 2888.4 2.8 22.8 42.1 2.1 17.8 32.8 
1980 6146.9 2397.7 3.2 27.4 39.6 1.2 10.7 15.5 
1981 9485.3 3601.8 3.8 33.9 47.2 1.4 12.9 17.9 
1982 12203.0 4921.3 6.8 43.6 57.5 2.7 17.6 23.2 
1983 10102.9 4197.1 6.8 34.9 45.3 2.8 14.5 18.8 
1984 11715.5 5063.2 6.7 35.6 48.4 2.9 15.4 20.9 
1985 10155.9 4544.9 5.5 32.2 46.9 2.5 14.4 21.0 
1986 8342.0 3682.9 6.4 33.1 51.6 2.8 14.6 22.8 
1987 8096.7 3501.3 5.8 25.8 39.5 2.5 11.1 17.1 
1988 8638.7 4365.2 5.0 25.5 42.0 2.5 12.9 21.2 
1989 9277.6 4882.2 4.5 24.4 40.6 2.4 12.8 21.4 
1990 9194.6 4559.4 3.8 20.4 34.3 1.9 10.1 17.0 
1991 8387.7 4279.3 3.0 18.3 30.9 1.5 9.3 15.8 
Source: Banco de Héxico, Annual Reports, and The Mexican Economy 1993. 
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Trade Policy and Industrialization, 1957-1991 
In 1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) was established as a mechanism to negotiate and to 
monitor multilateral tariff reduction. At that point Mexico 
decided against becoming a member of GATT and participating 
in a freer trade system. Instead, Mexico adopted an inward-
oriented growth model that appeared to be the result of both 
world and domestic conditions. As World War II increased 
the demand for primary products and reduced the supply of 
manufactured goods to developing countries, Mexican firms 
found it attractive to produce for the domestic market. 
Internally, Mexico had been implementing 
nationalization policies that helped the government to 
increase its participation in the economy since the late 
1930s. For instance, Lâzaro Cârdenas, the president of 
Mexico from 1934-1940, nationalized foreign-owned oil 
companies and created Petrôleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the 
government-owned oil monopoly. Lôpez Mateos, Mexico's 
president from 1959-1964, nationalized the electric power 
industry and a large steel mill. By the time Mr. De La 
Madrid became Mexico's president (end of 1982), there were 
about 1,155 firms nationalized, including the nation's 
telegraph and telephone service, the banking system, 
airports, shipping firms, and others. 
48 
By the early 1950s, Mexico had adopted an 
industrialization policy denominated Import-Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) that was based upon the thinking of 
both the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal (winner of the 
Nobel prize in 1974) and the Argentine economist Raûl 
Prebisch. The ISI arguments of Myrdal and Prebisch were so 
influential that economists from the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA) were recommending, during the 1950s and 
1960s, that Latin American countries adopt such an ISI 
strategy for economic development. 
The ISI strategy called for protection from foreign 
competition for domestic manufacturers, so that by keeping 
out foreign manufactured goods, domestically produced goods 
would be substituted for such goods, thus encouraging long-
run growth. In other words, the ISI strategy assumed that 
the developed countries were net exporters of manufactured 
goods while the less developed countries were net exporters 
of primary goods. It also assumed that the income 
elasticity of demand was greater for manufactured goods than 
for primary goods. Thus as world income rose, the price of 
manufactured goods would increase relative to that of 
primary goods, which in turn would benefit the developed 
countries exporting manufactured goods. 
Therefore, to avoid pervasive terms of trade changes 
against primary goods, the ISI strategy discouraged the 
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Table 2.10. Mexico's Exports of Merchandise, 1957-1991 
Percentage of Total Merchandise Exports 
Merchandise Petroleum Non- Petroleum 
Year Exports Primary Extrac- Manu-
Total Total Total Products tive factures 
1957 100.0 5.5 94.5 51.1 25.5 18.0 
1958 100.0 3.6 96.4 58.0 18.8 19.6 
1959 100.0 4.0 96.0 57.3 18.2 20.5 
1960 100.0 2.3 97.7 52.7 19.0 26.0 
1961 100.0 2.5 97.5 48.5 18.3 30.7 
1962 100.0 2.6 97.4 52.4 16.3 28.8 
1963 100.0 3.9 96.1 46.0 14.5 35.5 
1964 100.0 3.5 96.5 47.7 14.2 34.5 
1965 100.0 3.5 96.5 51.5 12.9 32.0 
1966 100.0 3.6 96.4 52.4 13.1 30.9 
1967 100.0 4.1 95.9 52.8 14.7 28.4 
1968 100.0 3.5 96.5 51.2 15.3 30.1 
1969 100.0 3.0 97.0 49.9 14.1 33.0 
1970 100.0 2.9 97.1 47.7 13.8 35.5 
1971 100.0 2.3 97.7 45.8 11.5 40.5 
1972 100.0 1.3 98.7 46.9 10.9 41.0 
1973 100.0 1.2 98.8 43.6 8.8 46.4 
1974 100.0 4.3 95.7 28.1 12.0 55.6 
1975 100.0 15.0 85.0 26.6 10.3 48.1 
1976 100.0 15.4 84.6 32.1 5.7 46.7 
1977 100.0 22.3 77.7 28.2 4.7 44.8 
1978 100.0 30.7 69.3 24.8 3.5 41.0 
1979 100.0 45.1 54.9 20.2 3.8 30.9 
1980 100.0 67.3 32.7 9.8 3.3 19.5 
1981 100.0 72.5 27,5 7.4 3.4 16.7 
1982 100.0 77.5 22.5 5.8 2.4 14.3 
1983 100.0 71.8 28.2 5.3 2.3 20.5 
1984 100.0 67.5 32.5 6.0 2.2 24.2 
1985 100.0 67.1 32.9 6.5 2.4 24.1 
1986 100.0 37.8 62.2 14.2 3.2 44.8 
1987 100.0 41.3 58.7 8.3 2.8 47.6 
1988 100.0 31.7 68.3 9.1 3.2 56.0 
1989 100.0 34.3 65.7 7.8 2.6 55.2 
1990 100.0 37.6 62.4 8.1 2.3 52.0 
1991 100.0 30.1 69.9 8.7 2.0 59.1 
Source: Banco de México, Indicadores Econômicos. 
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import of manufactured goods (intermediate and capital 
goods) while at the same time encouraged their production 
domestically. 
During the early 1950s, Mexican policy makers, who 
found this ISI strategy very persuasive and counted on the 
government's control of key inputs such as oil and 
electricity, adopted a series of measures to promote 
Mexico's industrialization in accordance with the ISI 
strategy (Balassa (1983), Cardoso and Levy (1988), 
Zabludovsky (1989), and Ten Kate (1992)). At that time, 
both Mexico and ECLA agreed with the Myrdal-Prebisch 
argument that the income elasticity for primary goods was 
lower than the income elasticity for manufactured goods. In 
addition, Mexico was considered a net exporter of primary 
goods until 1973 (see Table 2.10). 
To promote Mexico's inward industrialization in line 
with the ISI strategy, the authorities used trade policy as 
their chief policy tool. To protect the domestic industry 
from foreign goods, the Mexican authorities restricted 
imports by using three instruments: (a) an ad valorem 
import tariff system, (b) official minimum prices for 
customs valuations, and (c) a system of quantity 
restrictions either in the form of quotas or in the form of 
import licensing. Of all these three instruments, import 
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Table 2 .11. Merchandise Imports and Import Licensing 
Merchandise Imports Imports Licensing 
Years Millions of Millions of Percent of 
Dollars Dollars Merchandise Imports 
1957 1155.2 405.5 35.1 
1958 1128.7 479.8 42.5 
1959 1006.6 434.8 43.2 
1960 1186.4 448.4 37.8 
1961 1138.6 612.5 53.8 
1962 1143.0 600.0 52.5 
1963 1239.7 787.2 63.5 
1965 1559.6 935.7 60.0 
1966 1602.0 993.2 62.0 
1967 1736.8 1132.3 65.2 
1968 1917.3 1234.7 64.4 
1969 1988.8 1294.7 65.1 
1970 2328.3 1590.2 68.3 
1971 2255.5 1526.9 67.7 
1972 2762.1 1831.2 66.3 
1973 3892.5 2709.1 69.6 
1974 6148.6 5041.8 82.0 
1975 6699.4 4582.3 68.4 
1976 6299.9 5695.1 90.4 
1977 5704.5 5134.0 90.0 
1978 7917.5 6041.1 76.3 
1979 11979.7 8385.8 70.0 
1980 18896.6 11337.9 60.0 
1981 23948.4 20475.9 85.5 
1982 14437.0 14437.0 100.0 
1983 8550.9 8550.9 100.0 
1984 11254.3 9341.1 83.0 
1985 13212.2 4637.5 35.1 
1986 12432.5 3356.8 27.0 
1987 13305.5 3592.5 27.0 
1988 20273.7 4298.0 21.2 
1989 25437.9 4680.6 18.4 
1990 31271.9 4378.1 14.0 
Source: Jaime Zabludovsky (1988), Table 2, page 442, for 1957-1983; 
Pedro Aspe (1992), Table 1, page 323, for 1984-1990. 
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permits played the most important role (Cardoso and Levy (p. 
355 (1988)). 
During the period of "stabilizing development" (from 
1957 to 1970), the percentage of imports controlled through 
import licensing increased steadily. As shown by Table 
2.11, the percentage of merchandise imports subject to 
licensing increased from 35.1 percent in 1957 to 68.3 
percent in 1970. 
In addition, to continue with the authorities' 
protective measures, tariffs on competing import products 
were raised in 1956, in 1960 with the unification of customs 
classification, in 1962, and finally in 1965 (Balassa 
(1983)). Moreover, under the Law of Promotion of New and 
Necessary Industries, Balassa (1983) noted, Mexico's tariff 
system provided tariff exemptions on imports of machinery 
and imported inputs to new and necessary industries. 
The effect of Mexico's tariff system on competing 
imported products and imported inputs has been reported by 
Arellano-Cadeno (1990). The various estimated effective 
rates of protection (ERP) for 1960, 1970 and 1980 are 
reported in Table 2.12. The ERP of Agriculture, Fishing and 
Forestry that was 3.0 percent in 1960 turned to a negative 
rate of -1.4 percent by 1970, perhaps as a result of lower 
protection and higher import prices (mostly fertilizer). 
This is important since Mexico was a net exporter of primary 
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Table 2.12. Effective Rates of Protection in Mexico 
Years 
Economic Activity 






Capital Goods and Durable 
Consumer Goods 
Non-Durable Consumer Goods 
3.0 -1.4 18.0 
—0.3 —12.4 —2.0 
13.2 16.8 43.0 
64.6 77.2 128.0 
13.2 31.6 9.0 
Source: Rogelio Arellano-Cadena (1990), Table VI.2, p. 171. 
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goods during that period. 
In addition, agriculture exports also faced a 
government's price policy that consisted of setting some 
domestic prices above world market levels. This price 
policy made it less attractive for Mexican producers to sell 
abroad since they received a higher price by selling in the 
domestic market rather than by selling abroad. That price 
policy was introduced in 1961 with the establishment of 
CONASUPO (CompaRia Nacional de Subsistencias Populares). 
Moreover, according to Table 2.12, Mining's ERP became 
more negative in 1970 with a rate of -12.4 percent compared 
to a rate of -0.3 percent in 1960; mostly as a result of 
taxes levied on the export sector. Furthermore, Mexican 
exports also faced a continuous real appreciation of the 
Peso as prices increased relatively more in Mexico than in 
the U.S., while the nominal exchange rate remained fixed as 
it had been since 1954. 
Consequently, Mexico's tariff structure, its export tax 
policy, its export price policy, and its exchange rate 
regime strongly discriminated against Mexican exports during 
the "stabilizing development" or Import Substitution 
Industrialization. This combination of policies against 
exports has been commonly referred to as anti-export bias. 
In contrast, the ERP on intermediate and capital goods 
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Figure 2.4. Mexico's Real Exchange Rate, 1957=1.0 
Source: Banco de Mexico, Annual Reports. Real Exchange 
Rate = U.S. WPI*E/Mexico's WPI. WPI = Wholesale Price Index 
and E = Peso price of a U.S. Dollar. 
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of Table 2.12 show that the Mexican tariffs and subsidies 
system of the 1960s and 1970s provided strong incentives for 
domestic firms to direct their production towards Mexico's 
domestic market following the ISI strategy. Particularly, 
capital goods and durable consumer goods enjoyed an ERP of 
64.6 percent in 1960 and 77.2 percent in 1970. In addition, 
the authorities supported the Mexican manufacturing sector 
by maintaining the nominal exchange rate fixed, resulting in 
a real appreciation of the Peso, that made imports of 
equipment and inputs less costly (see Figure 2.4). The real 
exchange rate is defined as the product of the Peso price of 
a U.S. dollar times the U.S. wholesale price index, divided 
by Mexico's wholesale price index. In other words, the real 
exchange rate Q = (E * P^®)/p™GX where E = the amount of 
Mexican Pesos per U.S. Dollar, P"® = U.S. wholesale price 
index, and p®®* = Mexico's wholesale price index. 
In spite of the anti-export bias against Mexico's 
exporting sector, merchandise exports grew at an average 
annual rate of 4.9 percent during the period 1957-1970 (see 
Table 2.13). The positive growth in Mexico's merchandise 
exports, Arellano-Cadena (1990) noted, was due to two 
external factors; the U.S. tariff reduction on Mexican goods 
during the Kennedy administration and to the sustained 
economic growth of the U.S. economy during the 1960s. 
Nevertheless, Balassa (1983) found that Mexico's share of 
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Table 2.13. Mexico's Exports of Merchandise, 1957-1991 
Percentage Change from Previous Year 
Merchandise Petroleum Non- Petroleum 
Year Exports 







1958 0.4 -33.6 2.4 14.1 -25.8 9.2 




CM 1 4.0 -6.1 6.9 29.7 
1961 8.8 17.7 8.6 0.1 4.7 28.4 
1962 12.8 15.7 12.7 21.8 0.3 5.9 
1963 4.1 60.6 2.7 -8.5 -7.0 28.4 
1964 8.7 -2.7 9.2 12.7 6.5 5.8 
1965 9.7 9.7 9.7 18.5 -0.6 1.8 
1966 3.9 6.2 3.8 5.5 5.8 0.1 
1967 -5.7 7.4 —6.2 -4.9 5.4 -13.3 
1968 5.6 -9.8 6.3 2.3 9.9 11.8 
1969 15.2 -1.3 15.8 12.3 6.2 26.6 
1970 -3.9 -5.6 -3.8 -8.1 -5.8 3.4 
1971 5.9 -18.4 6.6 1.7 -12.0 20.6 
1972 22.0 -32.3 23.3 25.0 15.3 23.7 
1973 24.3 19.0 24.4 15.7 0.7 40.6 
1974 37.7 392.0 33.4 -11.2 87.7 65.0 
1975 7.3 274.0 -4.7 1.5 -7.9 -7.1 
1976 19.4 22.4 18.8 44.2 -33.6 16.0 
1977 27.2 84.3 16.8 11.7 3.7 21.9 
1978 30.4 79.6 16.3 14.4 -1.9 19.3 
1979 45.4 113.3 15.3 18.4 58.7 9.7 
1980 75.9 162.7 4.7 -14.1 51.7 11.2 
1981 29.6 39.6 9.0 -3.0 33.9 10.9 
1982 5.6 12.9 -13.6 -16.8 -26.9 -9.5 
1983 5.1 -2.7 31.8 -3.6 4.4 50.7 
1984 8.4 2.0 24.8 22.9 2.9 27.8 
1985 -10.5 -11.1 -9.2 -3.6 -5.3 -11.0 
1986 -25.4 -58.0 40.9 63.4 -0.1 38.9 
1987 26.8 38.7 19.6 -26.0 13.0 34.6 
1988 0.3 -23.2 16.7 10.0 14.6 18.0 
1989 11.2 20.5 6.8 —4.6 -8.4 9.6 
1990 17.5 28.8 11.6 21.0 2.0 10.7 
1991 1.0 -19.2 13.3 9.7 -11.4 14.9 
Source: Banco de México, Indicadores Econômicos. 
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the world markets of cotton, beef, coffee, silver, lead and 
copper fell during the same period. Also, as Table 2.10 
shows, the share of primary goods in Mexico's merchandise 
exports fell from 51.1 percent in 1957 to 47.7 percent in 
1970 while the manufactures share increased from 18.0 
percent in 1957 to 35.5 percent in the same period. 
During the Echeverrla administration, the authorities 
decided to reduce the bias against exports by implementing a 
series of measures. In March 1971 the authorities 
introduced the certificates of tax deduction, CEDI, 
(Certificados de Devoluciôn de Impuestos) to be applied to 
exports. Moreover, to assist the exporting sector, several 
institutions were created, e.g., FOMEX (Fondo para el 
Fomento de la Exportaciôn de Productos Manufacturados) was 
created to increase the amount of credit available to the 
export sector; IMCE (Institute Mexicano de Comercio 
Exterior) had as a chief objective to broaden Mexico's 
export markets by increasing its efforts in export 
promotion; and FONEI (Fondo Nacional de Eguipamiento 
Industrial) had the objective of financing export-oriented 
and import-substituting projects. Additionally, in 1971 
industries operating in the border areas that imported parts 
and components free of duty, assembled them and re-exported 
the final product mostly to the U.S., were formalized in 
Legislation. These industries that paid duty only on value 
59 
added, commonly referred to as in-bond industries or 
maquiladoras, have steadily increased their share in 
Mexico's exports to the U.S. 
During the early 1970s, the exporting sector improved, 
perhaps as a result of those policies against anti-export 
bias. As Table 2.13 shows, non-petroleum exports increased 
at a rate of 22 percent during the first four years of the 
Echeverria administration (1971-1974). However, by late 
1975, as the U.S. economy went into a recession (see Table 
2.14), and as the real exchange rate continued to appreciate 
(see Figure 2.4), Mexico's non-oil exports fell by almost 
5.0 percent. 
In the early years of the Echeverria administration, 
import permits were granted to support his nationalization 
policy that resulted in the creation of 108 new public 
enterprises. To that end, the authorities decreased import 
licensing in 1971 and 1972 (see Table 2.11). However, as 
the real exchange rate continued to appreciate and the 
current account worsened, import permits became the main 
policy instruments to correct balance of payments 
imbalances. By year-end 1976, the last year of the 
Echeverria administration, import licensing reached 90.4 
percent. Notice, however, that increasing import licensing 
did not help the deterioration of the current account 
deficits (see Table 2.4). 
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a 
Table 2.14. International Indicators 
Percentage Change in U.S. Nominal Real 
Interest Interest 
Year GDP GDP Rate Rate 
Deflator LIBOR LIBOR 
1961 2.7 0.9 4.4 3.4 
1962 5.1 2.2 4.4 2.1 
1963 4.1 1.3 4.0 2.6 
1964 5.6 1.7 4.3 2.6 
1965 5.6 2.7 4.8 2.0 
1966 6.0 3.3 6.1 2.7 
1967 2.6 3.1 5.5 2.3 
1968 4.1 4.9 6.4 1.4 
1969 2.7 5.0 9.8 4.5 
1970 -0.0 5.3 8.5 3.0 
1971 3.1 5.3 6.6 1.2 
1972 4.8 5.0 5.4 0.4 
1973 5.2 6.3 9.4 2.9 
1974 —0 .6 8.8 10.9 2.0 
1975 -0.8 9.6 7.0 -2.4 
1976 4.9 6.3 5.6 — 0.6 
1977 4.5 6.9 6.0 -0.8 
1978 4.8 7.9 8.8 0.8 
1979 2.5 8.7 12.1 3.1 
1980 -0.5 9.4 14.2 4.4 
1981 1.8 10.0 16.9 6.3 
1982 -2.2 6.2 13.3 6.7 
1983 3.9 4.1 9.7 5.4 
1984 6.2 4.5 10.9 6.2 
1985 3.2 3.6 8.4 4.6 
1986 2.9 2.7 6.9 4.1 
1987 3.1 3.2 7.2 3.9 
1988 3.9 3.9 8.0 4.0 
1989 2.5 4.5 9.3 4.6 
1990 0.8 4.3 8.3 3.8 
1991 — 1.2 4.0 6.0 1.9 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF; 
and Business Statistics, Department of Commerce. 
a 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product, LIBOR = London 
Interbank Interest Rate. 
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Beginning in 1978, the new administration of Lopez 
Portillo abandoned the restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies adopted a year earlier. During the next four 
years, the 1978-1981 oil-boom years, the administration 
engaged in heavy spending, heavy external borrowing, and 
much more government involvement in the economy in which the 
acquisition of private sector firms played a key role. The 
nationalization efforts of Lôpez Portillo ended in 1982 with 
520 new public enterprises created throughout his 
administration, including the commercial banking system that 
was nationalized in his last year in office. 
To support this administration's nationalization 
efforts, the authorities adopted a modest trade 
liberalization program that consisted of lowering import 
licensing from 90.0 percent in 1977 to 60.0 percent in 1980. 
In addition, the authorities raised import tariffs in 1978, 
arguing that higher tariffs would allow firms to adjust to 
the new system and thus they would eventually be removed. 
The policy of lowering import permits was abandoned in 
1981 when the real exchange rate appreciated substantially 
(see Figure 2.4). By year-end 1982, the authorities raised 
import licensing to 100.0 percent of total merchandise 
imports. Also, the tariff increases of 1978 that were 
supposed to be temporary, were maintained and increased even 
further in 1981 and in 1982. 
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Looking at the protective effects of these policies, we 
find that the protection from foreign competition increased 
during this period. By 1980, the ERP on intermediate goods 
increased to 43.0 percent, a rate which was higher than that 
of 16.8 percent of 1970. Similarly, in 1980 the ERP on 
capital goods and durable consumer goods of 128.0 percent 
was also higher than that of 77.2 percent of 1970 (see Table 
2.12). 
It would appear that the modest attempt of trade 
liberalization undertaken by Mexico in 1978-1979 resulted in 
much higher protection than before, particularly by 1982. 
This time the agricultural sector also experienced 
protective policies as its ERP rose from -1.4 percent in 
1970 to 18.0 percent in 1980, perhaps as a result of the 
introduction of the SAM (Sistema Agricola Mexicano), the 
Mexican Foodstuffs Program in the late seventies. Under SAM 
some support prices of domestic crops were increased making 
it more attractive for farmers to produce for the domestic 
market rather than to export abroad. Also, continuing with 
policies against freer trade, Lôpez Portillo decided against 
GATT membership in March of 1980, which appeared to be 
followed by more protective measures that were implemented 
in 1981 and 1982. 
Overall, Mexico's adoption of the Import-Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) strategy for economic development 
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along with the increasingly larger government intervention 
in the economy during the period 1957-1982, encouraged the 
creation of cost-inefficient industries that were unable to 
compete in foreign markets and had become increasingly 
dependent on imported inputs throughout this period. A 
measurement of imported inputs content was constructed by 
Arellano-Cadena (1990) using data from Mexico's various 
Input-Output tables. He defined an import-substitution 
coefficient as * 100 / VA^ * where Mj^ is the 
imported inputs by industry i, and VAj[ is its value added. 
According to Arellano's coefficient, a successful ISI 
strategy would imply a decrease in the value of that 
coefficient over time, as the reguirements of imported 
inputs (Mi) in the production process also diminishes. In 
contrast to the ISI prediction, Mexico's economy became more 
and more dependant on imports. For instance. Table 2.15 
illustrates the case in which with few exceptions, most 
sectors of the Mexican economy gradually increased the 
amount of imported inputs from 1970 to 1980. In particular, 
agriculture, mining, some manufactures (such as food, 
products of wood, paper, and chemicals), and metallurgy, all 
observed increasing values in their import substitution 
coefficients. Thus, Mexico's import-substitution model, 
(ISI strategy) that was supposed to eventually lead to 
lesser imports, had become an import-intensive model itself. 
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Table 2.15. Mexico's Coefficients of Import Substitution 
Years 
Economic Activity 
1970 1975 1978 1980 
Agriculture 0. 44 1. 07 1. 42 1. 13 
Mining (excluding oil) 2. 88 0. 74 0. 99 3. 09 
Oil Extraction 5. 68 6. 79 7. 45 3. 96 
Food Products 5. 21 8. 95 10. 01 17. 41 
Textiles and Leather 5. 37 2. 55 4. 08 4. 19 
Wood Products 1. 56 2. 81 3. 39 4. 12 
Paper Products 13. 68 14. 67 13. 80 17. 54 
Chemical Products 16. 16 17. 81 19. 13 23. 97 
Non-Metalic Minerals 6. 15 4. 28 7. 04 4. 28 
Metallurgy 14. 98 23. 13 15. 79 22. 47 
Equipment and Machinery 20. 42 21. 59 23. 96 24. 56 
Other Manufactures 21. 92 16. 29 13. 87 15. 78 
Source: Rogelio Arellano-Cadena (1990), Table VI.5 p. 181. 
Note; The import substitution coefficient is defined as 
M(i)*100/{VA(i)+M(i), where M(i) is the imported inputs by 
industry i, and VA(i) is its value added. It was calculated 
with data from Input-Output tables published by INEGI. 
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According to Ten Kate (1992), Mexican policy makers 
acknowledged that the lack of economic growth was partly due 
to inefficient productive structures resulting from the 
adoption of the ISI strategy, to the increasingly larger 
participation of the government in the economy, and to some 
extent, the adopted policy against foreign investment. To 
bring the economy back to the path of growth and lower 
inflation, in 1983 the administration of incoming president 
De La Madrid adopted a series of policies aimed at reducing 
such inefficiency in production and government participation 
in the economy while encouraging foreign investment. The 
policies adopted by the De La Madrid administration 
consisted of 1) promoting trade liberalization, 2) 
undertaking a process of privatization of state-owned 
companies and 3) adopting a less restrictive foreign 
investment policy. 
In 1983, the authorities began the process of trade 
liberalization by lowering import tariffs while maintaining 
import licensing on all imports. During the next few years 
both tariffs and import licensing were continuously lowered. 
According to Zabludovsky (1989, p. 448) by the end of June 
1985, Mexican imports had an average tariff of 21.1 percent 
compared to a 27.0 percent in December 1982. Moreover, 
import licensing, as a percentage of merchandise imports, 
also decreased from 100.0 percent in 1983 to about 83.0 
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percent in 1984 (see Table 2.11). Nevertheless, Ten Kate 
(1992) noted that the Mexican authorities abolished only 
licenses for goods not produced in Mexico. He also noted 
that most of the imported goods competing with domestically 
produced goods remained under import licensing. 
On July 25, 1985, the Mexican authorities decided to 
accelerate the structural reform that aimed at reducing 
dependence on oil exports and foreign borrowing while 
increasing efficiency of the Mexican industry through 
greater exposure to international competition. The 
structural reform, that began in 1983, was now further 
accelerated with the July Decree in combination with an 
acceleration in the rate of depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate. The July Decree removed import licensing for 
almost 3,600 tariff lines, leaving only 908 under control. 
In addition, the July 1985 Decree called for increasing 
import tariffs and increasing the official prices in the 
second half of 1985. 
According to Table 2.11, import licensing as a 
percentage of merchandise imports decreased from 83.0 
percent in 1984 to 35.1 percent in 1985. Moreover, import 
licensing as a percentage of total domestic production fell 
from 92.2 percent to 47.1 percent from June to December 
1985. During the same period the average import tariff 
increased from 23.5 percent to 28.5 percent, while official 
Table 2.16. Mexico's Import Licensing, Average Tariff and Official Import Prices 
Proportion of Total 




Weighted With Total 
Production of Goods 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
April June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. June Dec. 
64.0 92.2 47.1 46.9 39.8 35.8 25.4 23.2 21.3 21.8 19.8 19.6 17.9 
22.8 23.5 28.5 24.0 24.5 22.7 11.8 11.0 10.2 12.6 12.5 12.5 12.4 
Proportion of Total 13.4 18.7 25.4 19.6 18.7 13.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Production of Goods 
Under Official 
Import Prices 
Source; Adriaan Ten Kate (1992b), Table 1 p. 521; Table 2 p. 522; and Table 3 p. 522. 
Note; Official Import Reference Prices were eliminated on January 11, 1988. 
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prices coverage, as a percentage of domestic output, 
increased from 18.7 percent to 25.4 percent (see Table 
2.16). 
One could argue that, as a result of the July 1985 
Decree, import licensing reduction was compensated, to some 
extent, by higher import tariffs and higher official prices 
in addition to a 20 percent Peso depreciation that followed 
the reform. In other words, these events suggest that the 
elimination of import licenses was redundant as no import 
boom took place in the following years after the July decree 
was put into effect. In fact, merchandise imports decreased 
by 5.9 percent in 1986 (see Table 2.17). 
The trade reform of July 1985, adopted during a period 
of heavy capital flight, marked a change in the management 
of Mexico's macroeconomic policies. Contrary to the 
policies adopted in previous years consisting of the 
introduction of additional import restrictions to correct 
for balance of payments imbalances, in 1985 the authorities 
adopted the exchange rate as a chief policy tool to correct 
such imbalances. Moreover, after the initial nominal 
devaluation of 20 percent in July 1985, the nominal exchange 
rate continued to depreciate at a rate which was above 
Mexico's inflation. That exchange rate policy allowed for a 
continuous real depreciation of the Peso during 1986, 1987 
and part of 1988 (see Figure 2.4). The trade liberalization 
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Table 2.17. Mexico's Imports of Merchandise,1957-1991 








1958 -2.3 3.2 -5.4 -2.2 
1959 -10.8 -13.8 -4.2 -14.5 
1960 17.9 9.3 10,9 27.4 
1961 -4.0 4.7 -6.6 -5.4 
1962 0.4 3.2 -0,8 0.1 
1963 8.5 23.6 10.1 0.9 
1964 20.4 6.0 17.1 30.6 
1965 4.5 -0.3 13.1 0.5 
1966 2.7 -4.1 4.0 4.6 
1967 8.4 -4.3 2.3 18.1 
1968 10.4 9.6 6.1 13.5 
1969 3.7 -0.2 11.3 0.2 
1970 17.1 54.4 12.9 8.7 
1971 -3.1 -4.3 1.9 -6.3 
1972 22.5 46.7 15.3 17.4 
1973 40.9 42.7 54.0 29.9 
1974 58.0 51.5 77.4 44.1 
1975 9.0 -50.5 50.6 -0.3 
1976 -6.0 -19,2 0.8 -13.2 
1977 -9.5 -10.6 -2.3 -23,2 
1978 38.8 29.4 42.1 33.7 
1979 51.3 53.9 40.1 80.4 
1980 57.7 144.4 52.3 44.8 
1981 26.7 14.7 20.3 46.4 
1982 -39.7 —46.0 -37.9 -40.6 
1983 -40.8 -59.5 -31.8 -51.2 
1984 31.6 38.2 36.5 17.1 
1985 17.4 27.5 14.5 23,0 
1986 -5.9 -21.8 -3.7 -6,7 
1987 7.0 -9.3 14.8 -11.0 
1988 52.4 150.3 44.6 53.1 
1989 25.5 82.1 19.9 18.4 
1990 22.9 45.7 12.9 42.4 
1991 22.1 10.6 24.2 24.8 
Source: Banco de México, Indicadores Econômicos. 
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policies adopted by the Mexican authorities continued 
through the end of the De La Madrid administration (1988) 
and have been furthered throughout the current 
administration of Salinas De Gortari. 
In March 1986, after lowering the 100 percent tariff 
level to a maximum level of 50 percent, an across-the-board 
tariff reduction calendar was announced. According to such 
calendar tariffs would be reduced from 0-50 percent to 0-30 
percent in four consecutive steps with the final step taking 
place in October 1988. Moreover, as Table 2.16 shows, a 
weighted average tariff decreased to 24.5 percent in 
December 1986 from 28.5 percent in December 1985. Also, 
import licensing and official import prices continued to be 
lowered during the same period. Another important step 
taken by the authorities to make Mexico's economy more open 
consisted of joining the GATT in August 1986. This measure, 
according to the authorities, increased the credibility of 
the government policies among both domestic investors and 
foreign financial institutions. 
During 1986 the Peso continued to depreciate which 
together with a high fiscal deficit and an inflation rate 
above 100 percent, convinced the Mexican authorities to make 
a lower inflation rate the top policy objective from then 
on. At that point the authorities considered correcting for 
balance of payments imbalances a second priority. 
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To help reduce Mexico's inflation, the authorities 
decided to decrease the rate of nominal depreciation. 
However, by 1987, the real exchange rate began to appreciate 
as the authorities slowed down nominal depreciation at a 
rate that was smaller than Mexico's rate of inflation. 
Nonetheless, inflation continued its upward trend throughout 
the year. Moreover, as 1987 came to an end, a crisis 
developed in the Mexican stock market (October 1987) that 
was accompanied by significant capital flight. Facing these 
new developments, the authorities decided to reverse the 
exchange rate policy and accelerated the nominal rate of 
depreciation of the exchange rate in November of that year. 
By the end of 1987, the authorities decided that trade 
liberalization alone was not enough to bring down inflation 
and adopted the Economic Solidarity Pact (PSE) in December 
of that year. Under the PSE, trade liberalization played an 
important role in lowering inflation. As a result, trade 
liberalization was accelerated by changing the tariff 
structure to a less complicated system with only five levels 
from 0 to 20 percent ad valorem. Next, in July 1988, the 
authorities adopted a Harmonized Tariff System that made the 
tariff classification more uniform according to GATT 
specifications. Since then, throughout the Salinas 
administration, no major changes have occurred. By 1990, 
Mexico's three major trade barriers stood at unprecedented 
Table 2.18. State-Owned Enterprises in Mexico 
Concept 1960 1970 1976 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Companies with 
a Majority of 
Participation 
744 700 703 629 528 437 252 229 147 114 100 
Companies with 
a Minority of 
Participation 
78 78 78 69 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Decentralized 
Organizations 
102 97 95 96 94 94 89 88 82 82 82 
Public Trusts 231 199 173 147 108 83 71 62 51 43 35 
Total 360 527 635 1155 1074 1049 941 737 617 412 379 280 239 217 
Source: Banco de México, Annual Reports and The Mexican Economy 1993. 
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low levels (see Table 2.16). 
The second most important policy adopted by the De La 
Madrid administration during 1983 was the undertaking of a 
process of privatization of state-owned companies (the first 
major policy was the trade liberalization reform described 
above). During the privatization process, which has been 
intensified by the Salinas administration, the Mexican 
authorities have lowered their ownership of public 
enterprises from 1,155 in 1982 to 223 in 1992 (see Table 
2.18). Furthermore, the share of the public sector's GDP in 
total GDP has diminished as well, from 25.4 percent in 1983 
to 19.9 percent in 1990 (see Table 2.19). Other changes in 
Mexico's industrial policy of the 1980s and 1990s consisted 
of lowering or dissipating most of the subsidies in energy, 
railroad transportation, and interest rates which were also 
contributing to increasingly larger fiscal deficits. 
The third key policy of the De La Madrid 
administration, as far as industrial policy is concerned, 
refers to the adoption of a much less restrictive foreign 
investment policy for non-residents of Mexico. According to 
Zabludovsky (1989), the previous Mexican Law of Foreign 
Investment of 1973 did not contain specific guidelines for 
regulating foreign investment. That made the authorization 
of foreign investment in Mexico uncertain, largely 
discretionary and time consuming, which discouraged foreign 
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Table 2.19. Mexico's Gross Domestic Product of the Public 
Sector in Billions of Mexican Pesos 
Public Sector GDP Shares of Public Sector GDP 
Year 
Billions of Share of General Public 
Pesos Total GDP Government Enterprises 
Percent Percent Percent 
1975 463.0 14.6 — — 
1980 827.3 18.5 42.7 57.3 
1981 1,168.9 19.1 40.8 59.2 
1982 2,232.9 22.8 38.5 61.5 
1983 4,548.1 25.4 38.0 62.0 
1984 7,238.2 24.6 38.5 61.5 
1985 10,680.7 22.5 38.8 61.2 
1986 16,398.3 20.6 40.5 59.5 
1987 42,143.6 21.9 39.8 60.2 
1988 74,051.8 19.0 40.5 59.5 
1989 94,827.0 18.8 41.3 58.7 
1990 135,109.0 19.9 41.1 58.9 
Source: Banco de México, Annual Reports and The Mexican 
Economy 1992. 
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investors. New regulations for foreign investment were 
introduced with a Decree on May 16, 1989. Under the new 
regulations, out of 122 economic activities, only 8 are 
reserved to the State and 18 to Mexican citizens. One 
hundred percent foreign-owned investment was permitted in 
automobiles, capital goods, textiles, agroindustry and 
agriculture. Other changes of the new foreign investment 
law of 1989 include simplified administrative procedures and 
shorter resolution periods that in most cases will save as 
much as a year in the authorization process. Also, 
authorization to foreign investors to operate in restricted 
sectors will be allowed on a temporary basis up to 20 years. 
The Mexican authorities expect that this new foreign 
investment regulation will bring new inflows of foreign 
investment that will contribute to job creation and to 
economic growth, as the transfer of technology associated 
with those investment flows increases productivity and 
international competitiveness while at the same time they 
facilitate access to foreign markets (Zabludovsky 1989) . 
By implementing a trade liberalization policy, among 
other policies, the Mexican government has attempted to 
shift from an inward-looking industrialization system to an 
export promotion model. 
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Summary and Implications for the 
Econometric Estimation 
Following the Second World War, Mexico adopted a 
development strategy that consisted of increasing the 
government's participation in the economy while implementing 
trade barriers aimed at protecting Mexico's domestic 
producers from foreign competition. That model of economic 
development is referred to as the Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI). 
During the period of the ISI, 1957-1971, Mexico grew at 
the very impressive rate of over 7 percent while enjoying 
inflation rates of less than 4 percent. In addition, the 
average real minimum wage grew at positive rates. Moreover, 
during the ISI strategy monetary and fiscal policies were 
not expansionary, which among other things, allowed the 
Mexican authorities to finance its public sector deficits 
without much debt monetizing or foreign borrowing. In spite 
of these achievements, by the end of the ISI strategy the 
participation of the government in the economy had reached 
significant levels, which together with highly protective 
trade barriers, made the Mexican industry not only unable to 
produce and sell in markets abroad but also very dependent 
on imported inputs and capital goods. 
Following the ISI strategy, Mexico undertook a "public-
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expenditure-led growth model that lasted from 1971 to 1982, 
in which growth averaged a little under 7 percent a year. 
During the Echeverrla administration, the first six years of 
that period of highly expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies, Mexico endured higher rates of inflation which, 
together with a fixed nominal exchange rate, resulted in a 
continuous real appreciation of the Mexican currency. At 
the same time, large current account deficits and a capital 
flight developed which were accompanied by borrowing abroad 
and by depleting the international reserves held at Mexico's 
central bank. In the end, external borrowing was less easy 
to obtain and international reserves reached such low levels 
that the Central Bank was not able to support Mexico's fixed 
exchange rate. At that point the Mexican authorities 
depreciated the Mexican peso significantly. 
Most of the last six years of the "public-expenditure-
led" growth model, that corresponded to the Lôpez-Portillo 
administration (1977-1982), were also characterized by very 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. During these 
"oil-boom" years (1978-1981), public spending, that was 
supported by oil export revenues and heavy external 
borrowing, was much higher than in the previous 
administration. As fiscal deficits reached historical 
proportions, so did capital flight. In addition, as 
inflation surged to almost 100 percent, and international 
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reserves at the central bank fell significantly, external 
financing, once again, became difficult to obtain. To deal 
with this situation, the Mexican authorities undertook some 
drastic measures. First, during mid-August 1982, the 
Mexican government confiscated all dollar-denominated 
deposits in Mexico's commercial banks and made them payable 
only in Mexican Pesos at an exchange rate much lower than 
the free market rate. Next, in late August of the same 
year, Mexico requested a moratorium on payments of principal 
on its public external debt. Finally, President L6pez-
Portillo, in his last presidential address, announced that 
all private commercial banks would be nationalized and that 
foreign exchange controls would be implemented, effective 
September 1, 1982. 
By 1982, a year that marked the end of the "public-
expenditure- led" growth model and the end of the "oil-boom" 
years, the new administration of Miguel De La Madrid faced 
an economy with heavy government spending, a large number of 
loss-making companies owned by the public sector (producing 
about 25 percent of Mexico's GDP), an exporting sector 
heavily dependent on oil, and an external debt that amounted 
to about 60 percent of total GDP. In addition, economic 
growth turned negative in that year. This situation 
worsened as, once again, foreign banks became unwilling to 
provide Mexico with new lending. At that point, Mexico 
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(that traditionally had been a net importer of capital) 
became a net exporter of financial resources as servicing 
its external debt required historical transfers of resources 
abroad. 
During the period of "Fiscal Correction and 
Stabilization", that began with former president De La 
Madrid in 1983 and continues to the present with the Salinas 
de Gortari administration, the Mexican government has 
undertaken various programs of stabilization and structural 
adjustment. The adoption of these programs has restored 
economic growth and price stability, while at the same time 
has made Mexico's economy more open and competitive. In 
addition, net payments abroad have significantly diminished, 
particularly since 1989, when Mexico completed a period of 
intense negotiations with the foreign financial community. 
This chapter overview of Mexico allows us to identify 
key dates that will be taken as a reference when testing for 
structural change in the co-integration tests. Let us point 
out some of these dates in chronological order. 
First, on September 1, 1976, the nominal exchange rate 
was devaluated for the first time since April 1954. 
Thereafter it was no longer fixed except from February 28, 
1988 through the end of 1988. 
Second, during August 1982, the Mexican authorities 
confiscated all dollar-denominated deposits in the Mexican 
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banking system and made them payable only in domestic 
currency. Also, on August 20, Mexico requested a three-
month moratorium on payments of its external debt. In 
addition, on September 1, all private and commercial banks 
were nationalized and foreign exchange controls were 
implemented. 
Third, in November 1987, the Mexican authorities 
implemented a stabilization program known as the Economic 
Solidarity Pact (PSE) which has been renewed more than four 
times with its last renewal in October 1993 to expire in 
December 1994. In addition, prior to the adoption of the 
PSE, the Mexican stock market experienced a significant fall 
that was accompanied by capital flight (October 1993). 
Finally, in November 1988, the Mexican authorities 
adopted open market operations as their chief policy 
instrument for monetary policy management and source of 
financing to the public sector. This measure allowed 
interest rates to be determined by market conditions. Next, 
let us describe some recent events that will update this 
overview. 
In 1988, President Salinas de Gortari launched the Pact 
for Stability and Economic Growth (PECE) which had four 
components. The first was "orthodox", involving the 
implementation of restrictive fiscal and monetary policies 
through the management of aggregate demand (restricting 
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government spending and increasing tax revenues) while at 
the same time restricting credit supply. The second was 
"heterodox" including incomes policies and "nominal anchors" 
that attempted to break the component of inflation known as 
"inertia." The third involved external debt renegotiation. 
The final component consisted of the implementation of a 
structural reform program with the purpose of lowering trade 
barriers, privatizing public enterprises and deregulating 
the Mexican economy (Aspe (1991), and The Mexican Economy 
(1993)). All four of these targets of the PECE have been 
pursued throughout the Salinas administration. 
Structural reforms of the Mexican economy have included 
the privatization of numerous public firms including TELMEX 
(the Mexican telephone company) and commercial banks (it was 
completed in 1992). The resources from the sale of public 
enterprises (about 16 billion dollars by 1992) have been set 
aside in a special "Contingency Fund" at the Central Bank. 
For the most part, that fund has been used to reduce 
domestic debt instead of financing current government 
spending. 
Financial reforms, in addition to the privatization of 
commercial banks, included the adoption (in late 1988) of a 
full reliance on open market operations to finance 
government spending. This implied the abandonment of the 
traditional required reserve ratio system as a tool of 
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monetary policy. Also, a system of selective credit 
allocation was eliminated in 1989. In addition, the 
ceilings on interest rates paid on deposits were eliminated 
in April 1989, letting market conditions determine their 
movements. Moreover, on June 22, 1992, Mexico's Congress 
approved a decree establishing a new monetary unit which 
will preserve the name "peso" and is equivalent to one 
thousand old pesos. Effective January 1, 1993, the new 
notes and coins have been put into circulation. 
Furthermore, the amendment to Article 27 of the 
Constitution in 1992 has brought about a change in the land 
tenure system. The new tenure system allows land owners 
(ejidatarios) to lease or transfer property rights. It also 
allows private businesses to participate in agricultural 
activities. 
After undertaking a number of measures to lower 
barriers to trade, Mexico has focused its trade policy 
towards achieving closer formalized economic ties with other 
countries. In February 1991, Mexico, Canada and the U.S. 
agreed to negotiate a free trade agreement. Formal 
negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) began in June 1991 and concluded on August 12, 1992. 
Some of NAFTA's goals are: to eliminate barriers to trade, 
to increase investment opportunities, to promote conditions 
of fair competition and to establish procedures for 
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effective dispute resolutions. NAFTA has been ratified by 
the governments of the three countries and took effect 
January 1, 1994. 
Finally, on May 1 7 ,  1993, President Salinas de Gortari 
sent to Mexico's Congress a proposed Constitutional 
Amendment that would allow the central bank to enjoy 
independence in the management of monetary policy. Under 
this proposal no government agency would be able to dictate 
the Bank of Mexico to issue credit or to undertake policies 
that differ from what the bank judges appropriate. Also, 
according to the Amendment, the main responsibility of the 
central bank will be to preserve the purchasing power of the 
national currency. That Amendment has been approved and 
will take effect in April 1994. 
In summary, the economic stabilization strategy, 
together with the structural reforms adopted by the Mexican 
authorities in recent years, is expected to help bring 
Mexico back on the path of price stability and sustained 
economic growth with a more open and competitive economy in 
the years to come. 
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CHAPTER 3. A CO-INTEGRATION APPROACH TO MEXICO'S 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND EXCHANGE RATES, 1971-1988 
Introduction 
The direction of causality running from domestic credit 
to international reserves is an important result of the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments (MBOP). The 
MBOP is important because its theoretical results are used 
by policy makers (Gil Diaz (1991)). In addition, the 
International Monetary Fund uses the MBOP when making policy 
recommendations to its member countries (Rhomberg and Heller 
(1977), Crockett (1981), and Dernburg (1989)). Not 
surprisingly, the MBOP has been widely tested for both the 
industrialized and less developed countries.* 
The prediction of the MBOP that an exogenous increase 
in domestic credit will cause losses in international 
reserves, exchange rate depreciation, or both, is very 
important. For instance, if the direction of causality is 
not from domestic credit to international reserves and if 
domestic credit is not exogenous, then the MBOP's 
^he classical references of the monetary approach are 
the articles by Harry G. Johnson (1972) and by Robert A. 
. Mundell (1968). Other references are Jacob A. Frenkel and 
Harry G. Johnson, editors (1976); Jacob A. Frenkel and Harry 
G. Johnson, editors (1978) ; and Bluford H. Putnam and D. Sykes 
Wilford, editors (1986). 
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theoretical results, its policy implications, and its 
empirical tests are questionable. Such a situation may 
arise when central banks adjust their domestic assets to 
neutralize the impacts of balance-of-payments surpluses or 
deficits upon the monetary base in an effort to keep the 
domestic money supply unchanged. In this instance, domestic 
credit is no longer exogenous and the direction of causality 
runs in the opposite direction, from foreign reserves to 
domestic credit. Consequently, it is essential to test the 
causal relationship between domestic credit and 
international reserves. 
Several statistical tests have been conducted to 
determine the direction of causality between these 
variables, as shown in the studies by Blejer (1979), Feige 
and Johannes (1981), Johannes (1981), Gupta (1984), and 
Taylor (1987). 
The definition of causality used in those studies and 
in this paper is the one proposed by Granger (1969)J 
Blejer (1979), applied bivariate Sims (1972) tests to five 
European countries and found that the direction of causality 
was from domestic credit to international reserves. Feige 
'As Arnold Zellner (1979) pointed out, this definition of 
causality proposed by C.W.J. Granger (1969) is controversial, 
although it is widely adopted in econometric work. Its 
usefulness is based upon the fact that causality is 
characterized by reducing the OLS forecasting variance of a 
regression, given an information set. 
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and Johannes (1981), employing Granger (1969), Haug (1976), 
and Sims (1972) bivariate tests on six European countries, 
showed a bidirectional causality between these two 
variables. Johannes (1981), using Granger (1969) tests, 
also found a bidirectional causality. Gupta (1984) applied 
the same methodology used by Feige and Johannes (1981) to 
five developing countries, including India, Malaysia, 
Mexico, and Taiwan. Gupta's bivariate tests also found a 
bidirectional causality between domestic credit and 
international reserves. Finally, Taylor (1987), using data 
on the U.K., also found Granger causality running from 
international reserves to domestic credit. 
Nonetheless, there are two potential problems with the 
methodology used by those authors. First, the statistical 
procedure for those studies involves testing for 
nonstationarity. When present, nonstationarity is removed 
by either filtering or by differencing the time series under 
study. The problem is that if the time series involved show 
a long-run relationship, or if their nonstationarity arises 
from the same common source, (in other words, they share a 
common stochastic trend), then they should be modeled as 
co-integrated variables. This is because differencing 
purges the data from its long-run relationship. In other 
words, as Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987) have 
shown, modeling co-integrated data in differences will 
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result in misspecification error, while modeling the same 
data in levels will overlook important constraints. Engle 
and Granger suggest modeling co-integrated variables as an 
error-correction model, which includes a long-run 
error-correction term while allowing for short-run dynamics 
captured by the differenced variables. 
The second problem with those causality tests is that 
they were conducted in a bivariate framework. Thus, the 
authors assume that no other variables affect the two 
variables involved. In fact, this type of causality test, 
which excludes relevant variables such as prices, expected 
rates of inflation, interest rates, or output, might, as 
Skoog (1976) points out, induce specification error and 
therefore should be conducted in a multivariate framework. 
Beginning in the 1970s, in contrast to earlier years, 
Mexico's monetary and fiscal policies turned very 
expansionary. After enjoying a period of sustained economic 
growth and price stability, Mexico experienced an inflation 
rate of 159.2 percent in 1987, an increase in the money 
supply (currency plus demand deposits) of 130 percent in 
1987, a budget deficit as a proportion of GDP of about 17 
percent in 1982, a loss in international reserves of about 7 
billion dollars in 1982, and a nominal devaluation of the 
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Mexican peso by several hundred percent (see Chapter 2) 
These wide fluctuations in Mexico's macro-variables suggest 
that the data could be nonstationary, and it would therefore 
be suitable to formally test it for co-integration. 
In this chapter, co-integration techniques are used to 
test whether a negative bidirectional Granger causality 
between growth in international reserves and the exchange 
rate and growth in domestic credit is consistent with 
Mexico's time-series data. The tests are performed as 
multivariate Granger causality tests, which include measures 
of inflation, the money multiplier, output, and foreign 
inflation.* The results obtained show that, for the period 
1971 to 1988, Mexico's data appear to be nonstationary. In 
addition, a long-run relationship as suggested by the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments and exchange 
rate is clear. Furthermore, Mexico's data support the 
causality direction proposed by both the monetary approach 
and the sterilization policies undertaken by Mexico's 
monetary authorities. In other words, Mexico's growth rates 
^Studies of Mexico's economy during this period of time 
include Francisco Gil Diaz (1984), Alain Ize and Gabriel Vera 
(1984), Guillermo Ortiz (1985), Francisco Gil Diaz and Raûl 
Ramos Tercero (1988), Van Wijnbergen (1988), Victor M. 
Guerrero and Luis G. Arias (1990), Jose Angel Gurria (1990), 
and Guillermo Ortiz (1990). 
'a similar application of this methodology includes Yash 
P. Mehra's (1991) work on wage growth and inflation process in 
the U.S. 
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in domestic credit, international reserves, and the exchange 
rate are co-integrated and consistent with Granger causality 
from domestic credit to international reserves and the 
exchange rate, as well as from international reserves and 
the exchange rate to domestic credit. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The following 
section presents a relationship between domestic credit and 
international reserves based on a monetary model of the 
balance of payments and the exchange rate. The next section 
describes Granger causality tests and co-integration theory. 
The last two sections present the empirical results of the 
statistical tests and some conclusions. 
A Monetary Model of Balance of Payments 
and the Exchange Rate 
A long-run monetary model that explains changes in 
international reserves and exchange rates was developed by 
Girton and Roper (1977). This model, known as the 
Girton-Roper monetary model of exchange market pressure 
(EMP), has been expanded by Connolly and Da Silveira (1979), 
Modeste (1981), Connolly and Lacky (1984), and Kim (1985). 
A version of the EMP model can be derived by assuming a 
stable money demand, a money supply identity, a 
purchasing-power-parity relationship, and a monetary 
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equilibrium condition. For a small open economy that faces 
given prices for goods and capital determined in world 
markets, and in which the money supply and money demand 
adjust instantaneously, the following money market can be 
modeled:^ 
jjd = p-f(y, IT) (3.1) 
M® = A(R + C) (3.2) 
P = EP* (3.3) 
= M® (3.4) 
where is the nominal demand for money, P is the domestic 
price level; Y is the real income; n is the expected rate of 
inflation or opportunity cost of holding money; M® is the 
money supply; A is the money multiplier; R is net foreign-
exchange reserves in terms of domestic currency held by the 
central bank; C is domestic credit; E is the exchange rate, 
defined as the price of one unit of foreign currency in 
^Instantaneous adjustment in the money market means that 
the residents of a country can get rid of money either through 
the international market for commodities or through the 
international market for securities. 
^Most studies of money demand include some measure of 
interest rates. However, during inflationary periods the 
interest rate no longer represents the opportunity of holding 
money. Thus, a measurement of the expected rate of inflation 
is used instead. See Guillermo Ortiz (1980) and Rafi Melnick 
(1990). 
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terms of domestic currency; and P* is the foreign price 
level. The demand for money, equation (3.1), is assumed to 
be homogeneous of degree one in prices and a function of 
real output and the expected rate of inflation, with 
positive and negative partial derivatives, respectively. 
The money supply, equation (3.2), states that changes in the 
money stock derive from a change in foreign reserves via the 
balance of payments, a change in domestic credit created by 
the central bank, or a change in the money multiplier. The 
sum of R plus C is the monetary base or high-powered money. 
The purchasing-power-parity relationship is shown by 
equation (3.3). It illustrates how the demand for money is 
affected, through changes in the domestic price level, as 
the exchange rate or the foreign price level change. The 
money market equilibrium condition, equation (3.4), 
establishes that money demand and money supply adjust 
rapidly. In the presence of an excess supply of money, 
equilibrium is restored either by a decrease in 
international reserves (decreasing the stock of money) or by 
exchange rate depreciation (an increase in nominal money 
demand), or some combination of the two. Under a system of 
fixed exchange rates, the stock of money adjusts through 
changes in international reserves, while under flexible 
exchange rates the money demand adjusts through changes in 
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the exchange rate. In a mixed system, both international 
reserves and exchange rates change such that money market 
equilibrium is restored. 
Now, substituting equation (3.3) into (3.1), and 
equations (3.1) and (3.2) into (3.4), taking natural 
logarithms of both sides, and differentiating with respect 
to time, after some manipulation, the long-run Girton-Roper 
model of exchange market pressure (BMP) is obtained: 
(r - e)t = -ct - at + Yt " ^t + Pt (3.5) 
where r^ is the change in foreign reserves, or balance of 
payments, as a proportion of the monetary base; e^ is the 
percentage change in the exchange rate; c^ is the change in 
domestic credit as a proportion of the monetary base; a^ is 
the rate of change of the money multiplier; y^ is the 
percentage change of real income; is the expected rate of 
inflation; p^ is the percentage change in the foreign price 
level; and the subscript t denotes time. 
From equation (3.5), the following conclusions, ceteris 
paribus, can be derived; (i) if the exchange rate is fixed, 
et = 0, an increase in c^ will cause losses in international 
reserves; (ii) if the exchange rate is fully flexible, r^ = 
0, an increase in c^ will cause exchange rate depreciation; 
and (iii) under a managed float regime, an increase in c^ 
will cause either foreign exchange losses, or exchange rate 
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depreciation, or both. Therefore, expansion of domestic 
credit in excess of domestic demand for money will result in 
either a balance-of-payments deficit, or exchange rate 
depreciation, or both, as the public gets rid of the excess 
supply of money. These conclusions suggest that, according 
to the Girton-Roper monetary model of exchange market 
pressure, equation (3.5), the direction of causality is from 
ct to (r-e)t, which assumes, among other things, that 
domestic credit is exogenous. 
Empirically, the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments and exchange rates has been widely tested on data 
from Mexico. Again, assuming that domestic credit is 
exogenous, those studies support a negative causality from 
ct to (r-e)t. (see Wilford (1977), Blejer (1977), Wilford 
and Zecher (1979), Rasulo and Wilford (1980), Wilford 
(1984), Connolly and Lackey (1984), Kamas (1986), and 
Connolly and Fernandez-Perez (1987)). Studies questioning 
that domestic credit is exogenous in those studies of 
Mexico, center on the sterilization issue.Cumby and 
i^The theoretical literature has dealt with this issue in 
the works by Robert A. Mundell (1963), and Russel s. Boyer 
(1979). The empirical literature has followed three 
approaches: (a) estimation of reduced form equations as in 
Victor Argy and Pentti J.K. Kouri (1974) , Pentti J.K. Kouri 
and Michael G. Porter (1974), Donna Bean (1976) , Hans A. 
Genberg (1976), Norman C. Miller and Sherry S. Askin (1976), 
and Lance Girton and Don Roper (1977); (b) estimation of 
structural equations as in Robert E. Cumby and Maurice 
Obstfeld (1983); and (c) estimation of Granger causality tests 
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Obstfeld (1983), for instance, estimated a structural model 
for Mexico and found that the central bank of Mexico indeed 
sterilized movements in international reserves, particularly 
during the late 1970s. Gupta (1984), using Granger tests, 
also found statistical evidence of a bidirectional causality 
between domestic credit and international reserves. Those 
studies were conducted using data from no later than 1980 
and did not account for the possibility of co-integration. 
This issue of co-integration is a topic of the next section. 
Granger Causality Tests and Co-integration 
In this section. Granger causality, stationarity, and 
co-integration are discussed. 
Simply stated, a variable X^t Granger causes X2t if 
past values of improve the forecast of X2f Let X^, X2, 
and X3 be stationary stochastic processes with their set of 
past values X^, X2/ and X3, respectively. Let (X^ | n) be 
the conditional mean square error or conditional variance of 
the error series of the optimum unbiased, least squares 
predictor of X2, given the relevant information set n. 
as in Mario I. Blejer (1979), Edgar L. Feige and James M. 
Johannes (1981), James M. Johannes (1981), Senjeer Gupta 
(1984), and Mark P. Taylor (1987). The present paper falls 
within the Granger causality approach and extends it by using 
co-integration theory. 
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Here, the relevant information set n may contain X2, and 
X3. Thus, in a two-variable case, X2t is Granger caused by 
Xit if 
(X2t |Xi, X2) < a2(X2 I X2) (3.6) 
In a three-variable case. Granger causality is defined 
similarly. Here, X2t is Granger caused by X^t conditional 
on X^t if 
(X2t |Xi, X2' X 3 )  < *2(X2 |X2' X2) (3.7) 
In a multivariate case, the definition of Granger 
causality is analogously defined. 
To test for Granger causality, one can examine whether 
lagged values of one series add statistically significant 
predictive power to another series' own lagged values for 
one-step ahead forecasts. If so, the first series is said 
to "Granger cause" the second. In this chapter, we are 
interested in testing for causality between c^ and (r-e)^, 
while at the same time accounting for other variables (e.g. 
* 
at, Yf ^ t and , see the EMP equation (3.5) above). In a 
simple case that consists of c^, (r-e)^, and a^, the Granger 
procedure consists of estimating two regressions; 
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n n 
ct = 5i + ct-i +. E ^ 2i (r-e)t-i + 
i=l i=l 
n 




(r-e)t = ^2 +.E®li ct-i t £ ®2i (r-e)t_i + 
1=1 1=1 
n 
.E®3iat-i + «2t 
1=1 
(3.9) 
Where c^, (r-e)t, and a^ are defined as before; S2, the 
/S^s, and the e^s are regression coefficients; and 
are white-noise error terms; and n is the lag length. If an 
F-test shows the estimated in (3.8) to be statistically 
significant, then the series (r-e)t Granger causes c^ 
conditional on af Likewise, if the estimated G^s in (3.9) 
are statistically significant, then the series c^ Granger -
causes (r-e)^ conditional on a^. Granger (1969) has shown 
that the operational definitions of causality (3.8) and 
(3.9) are equivalent to the formal definition (3.7). To 
* 
account for additional variables (y^, wt p^ ) in the 
test for causality we apply an analogous methodology. 
Recently, Sims, Stock, and Watson (1986), Phillips 
(1986), and Ohania (1988) have shown that if the series 
included in the causality test are nonstationary — i.e., 
they contain unit roots — then the F-statistics will have 
nonstandard distributions, and thus any conclusions based on 
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these F-tests will be misleading. In addition, the ordinary 
least squares estimators of a regression with variables 
containing unit roots are not consistent (West (1988)). In 
this chapter, stationarity is a key issue because Mexico's 
data seem to display nonstationarity, as will be shown later 
on. The implication of nonstationarity is crucial, since a 
variable that exhibits nonstationarity shows no tendency to 
return to its long-run or average value after a disturbance 
has taken place. In other words, conventional econometric 
techniques require stationarity." 
Furthermore, stationarity in a variable is an important 
property for several reasons. First, stationarity 
guarantees that the effects of a random disturbance on a 
variable will die out over time. Second, if nonstationary 
variables are used in statistical tests, any conclusions 
based upon t- or F-ratio tests will be misleading and can 
lead to spurious relationships. Third, the regression 
"Following Judge, et al. (1988, p. 679), a stochastic 
process is stationary if it has a constant mean and a 
finite variance. More formally, a stochastic process is 
stationary, if 
i. E(Xt) = H for all t 
ii. var(U^) < «> for all t 
iii. cov(Ut, Xt+k) = E[(Xt - M)(Xt+k - M)] = 7k 
for all t and k, where E(.) is the expected value 
operator and n and 7k constants. 
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estimators of a regression with unit root variables will not 
be consistent Fourth, and perhaps the most relevant for 
this chapter, in the estimation of long-run or equilibrium 
relationships, it is important to determine whether a 
variable is stationary or not. To elaborate on this, let us 
use the Girton-Roper exchange market pressure model. 
According to equation (3.5), the behavior of the rates 
of growth in domestic credit c^ and international reserves 
and the exchange rate (r-e)t must be related in the long 
run. Moreover, if long-run components in c^ and (r-e)^ are 
modeled as stochastic trends and if they move together — 
i.e., they share a common trend — then these two times-
series should be co-integrated, as discussed in Granger 
(1986) and Engle and Granger (1986). Stated differently, if 
two variables are co-integrated, a long-run relationship 
exists between them because the source of nonstationarity is 
common to these variables. This argument can be summarized 
as follows; suppose that c^ and (r-e)^ each contain a unit 
root, but Act A(r-e)t do not. To determine causality 
directions between c^ and (r-e)t, we could use first 
differences, since by assumption they do not contain unit 
roots and the statistical properties of the F-tests make 
their use appropriate (in general, these variables may or 
^Tor consistency's implication for OLS, see Judge, et al. 
[1988]. 
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may not contain unit roots). However, using variables in 
first difference would be inappropriate if c^ and (r-e)^ are 
co-integrated as their long-run relationship would be 
ignored. This is because first differencing purges the data 
of long-run movements and therefore valuable information is 
lost. According to Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger 
(1987), the appropriate way to deal with this problem is to 
estimate an error-correction model which is discussed in the 
last part of this section. 
Engle and Granger (1987, pp. 252-53) illustrate 
CO-integration theory by way of the following definitions: 
" A series with no deterministic components which has a 
stationary, invertible ARMA representation after 
differencing d times, is said to be integrated of order d, 
denoted by x^-I (d).'' 
" The components of the vector are said to be co-
integrated of order d, b, denoted Xt~CI(d,b), if (i) all 
components of x^ are 1(d); (ii) there exists a vector a(?^0) 
so that = a'x^-I (d-b) , b>0. The vector a is called the 
CO-integrating vector." 
To illustrate, let us assume a vector x^ which contains 
two variables, such that xt~CI(l,l). If these two variables 
are co-integrated, it means that both variables of x^ 
achieve stationarity after taking their first difference, 
and at least one linear combination of its elements is 
stationary without taking any differences at all. Co-
100 
integration of order (1,1) implies that the two series will 
not drift away from each other; instead, the difference 
between them will be stationary. At present, several co-
integration tests have been developed — by Engle and 
Granger (1987), Johansen (1988), Stock and Watson (1988), 
and Fountis and Dickey (1989). The methodology adopted here 
is that of Engle and Granger (1987). 
Engle and Granger's test for co-integration consists of 
two steps. The first is to test whether each variable has 
one or more unit roots or, in other words, to determine the 
degree of integratability (e.g. the value of d). This is 
done by performing the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit 
roots on a given time series X^, which requires estimating 
the following regression: 
n 
AX'f- = /XQ + /i^T + pXt—1 E Ti^^t—i ^xt (3.10) 
i=l 
where A is the first difference operator, i.e., 
AX^ = Xt - Xt_i; X^ is the time series under study; H q, /x^, 
p, and the 7j^s are regression coefficients; T is a time 
trend; and e^t is a white-noise error term (Dickey and 
Fuller (1979)).15 
^Another test for unit roots is the Phillips-Perron test 
which is discussed in Chapter 4. Both tests, the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test are 
asymptotically equivalent. 
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Next we test the null hypothesis Hg: p = 0 against the 
alternative hypothesis p > 0. The null hypothesis 
states that the series contains a unit root, or X^- is 
non-stationary. The test statistic to test the null 
hypothesis is the standard t-statistic, which is the ratio 
of the estimated coefficient to its standard error. 
However, under the null hypothesis, this test statistic does 
not have the usual t-distribution, and thus, the critical 
values given in Fuller (1976, p. 373) are used. Taking 
absolute values, we reject the null hypothesis if the t-
statistic is greater than the critical values given by 
Fuller (1976), at some desired significance level. If it is 
determined that all variables are integrated of the same 
order d — i.e., they have the same number of unit roots — 
then step 2 is followed. 
Step 2 is to determine whether the stochastic trends in 
these variables are related to one another. This is 
equivalent to determining whether there is a long-run 
relationship between variables that contain unit roots. In 
general, we do this by estimating an equilibrium or co-
integrating equation (in the present case equation (3.5)), 
and then test whether the residuals of that regression, say, 
V^, are stationary or not. 
Now, if Vt appears to be stationary — i.e., it does 
ic 
not contain a unit root, while c^, (r-e)^, a^, y^/ Wf p^ 
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each have a unit root — then these variables are said to be 
CO-integrated. In that case, ordinary least squares 
estimators of (3.5) are consistent as shown by West (1988). 
The null hypothesis, Hg: no co-integration, or, 
equivalently, is non-stationary, is tested by checking 
for the statistical significance of the estimated tp in the 
following regressions; 
AVj. = + e^t (3.11) 
4 
AVt = -«Vt-I + EgiAVt-i + €vt (3.12) 
i=l 
where A is the first difference operator, is the residual 
from the co-integrating regression equation (3.5), and 
is a white-noise disturbance. The standard t-statistic is 
used to test for the significance of <p. The null hypothesis 
is rejected in favor of co-integration if the estimate of <p 
is statistically different from zero. For the bivariate 
case, the critical values for the Dickey-Fuller test (DF) 
regression (3.11) and the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) 
of regression (3.12) do not have the usual t-distribution, 
but are given in Engle and Granger (1987). For the 
multivariate case, the critical values for both of these 
tests are given in Engle and Yoo (1987). 
The existence of a co-integration equation tells us 
only about long-run relationships, but the short-run 
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dynamics are also important. Let us consider next the issue 
of co-integration and error-correction models. A problem 
with nonstationarity is that it restricts variables to 
entering a model in differenced form. Furthermore, if a 
long-run relationship exists among these variables and they 
are differenced, then that relationship will be ignored. A 
solution to this problem is to model the co-integrated 
variables as an error-correction model.An error-
correction model allows for short-run movements while 
imposing gradual adjustment of the dependent variable toward 
a long-run or equilibrium value. That is, it relates the 
change of the dependent variable to lagged changes of the 
dependent variable itself, lagged changes of the independent 
variables, and a lagged equilibrium error. Here the lagged 
changes of the dependent and independent variables capture 
the short-run movements, while the lagged error captures the 
adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, as 
Engle and Granger (1987) have shown, if two variables are 
^Error-correction models were introduced by J.E.H. 
Davidson, D.F. Hendry, F. Srba, and S. Yeo (1978) in an 
article on aggregate consumption behavior. In general, any 
equation that expresses the change in a variable as a function 
of the difference between that variable and its target or 
long-run value can be interpreted as an error-correction 
model. This is because the error between the endogenous 
variable and its target causes a correction in the endogenous 
variable. Other studies applying error-correction models 
include D.F. Hendry (1980), T.J. Jenkinson (1986), Brian M. 
Lucey (1988), and B. Motley (1988). 
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CO-integrated — for instance c^ and (r-e)t — then these 
series satisfy an error-correction model of the form: 
n n 
Act = *0 +.I*liAct-i +.I:*2iA(r-e)t_i 
1=1 i=l 
n n 
+ I $3iAat-i + E *4iAyt-i 
i=l i=l 
n n 




A(r-e)t = .E 'ï'iiAct-i+. E,'^'2iA(r-e)t-i 
1=1 1=1 
n n 
+ .E ^3iAat-i+.I^4iAyt-i 
1=1 1=1 
1=1 1=1 
+ ^2^t- l  "2t  (3-14)  
where c^, (r-e)^, a^, Yt» and are defined as before; 
Vt_i is the residual from the co-integrating regression 
(3.5); Wit and W2t are white-noise error terms; and one of 
or X2 0. The coefficients of the error-correction 
terms, and Xg, are expected to be negative and capture 
the adjustment of AC^ and A(r-e)t toward long-run 
equilibrium, while the lagged variables in the right-hand 
side of these equations capture the short-run dynamics of 
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this model. Notice that or X2 0 implies Granger 
causality in at least one direction. Granger (1988) has 
shown that since V^-i depends on lagged c and (r-e), the 
model above implies that either Ac or A(r-e) or both must be 
caused by lagged c and (r-e). Intuitively, if there is a 
long-run relationship between c and (r-e), then there must 
be causation between them to provide the necessary dynamics. 
This error-correction model is used to test for Granger 
causality by testing the statistical significance of the $^s 
and ^^s using the standard F-tests. 
Empirical Results 
As suggested in the previous section, we follow three 
steps. First, the unit root tests are performed by 
estimating the augmented Dickey-Fuller equation (3.10) for 
A 
(r-e)t, a^/ Yt/ ^t' p^ . The results of unit root 
tests on growth rates are presented in Table 3.1, and the 
results on their first differences are in Table 3.2. 
Second, the co-integrating regression equation (3.5) is 
estimated and tested for co-integration by estimating the 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) equation (3.11) and the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) equation (3.12). Those results support co-
integration and are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, 
respectively. And third, the error-correction model. 
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equations (3.13) and (3.14), is estimated, and the results 
of the Granger causality tests are reported in Tables 3.5 
and 3.6. 
The data are quarter averages of all series from the 
first quarter of 1971 to the second quarter of 1988, taken 
from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. This 
period was chosen because Mexico's monetary authorities 
followed policies that were very similar throughout these 18 
years. Although any empirical research is subject to the 
Lucas critique, it is expected that the similarity in policy 
management during 1971-1988 will minimize the implications 
of the Lucas proposition.^^ The variable c^ is the change 
in domestic credit divided by the monetary base. It was 
obtained by subtracting the change in international reserves 
(line 79dad multiplied by line RF) from the percentage 
change in the monetary base. The variable r^ is the ratio 
of the change in international reserves in Mexican pesos 
(line 79dad times line rf) divided by the monetary base^®; 
"'The Lucas critique states that if the monetary or the 
fiscal rule changes, then the time parameters of a model will 
change as well, and therefore the conclusions based on that 
model are no longer valid (Robert E. Lucas Jr. (1976)). 
^®Line 79dad was chosen and not line 11 because, as an 
anonymous referee pointed out, line 79dad, reserve assets, 
covers changes in holding assets resulting from market 
transactions that exclude valuation changes due to 
monetarization or demonetarization of gold, allocation or 
cancellation of special drawing rights, and reclassification. 
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is the rate of change in the exchange rate, the peso 
price of a U.S. dollar (line rf); a^ is the rate of change 
in the money multiplier, obtained as a percentage change of 
the ratio of the money supply to the monetary base. The 
money supply is the sum of currency plus demand deposits. 
Both the money supply and the monetary base are quarterly 
averages of monthly observations taken from International 
Financial Statistics, IMF. Further, y^, the growth rate in 
real income, is proxied by the rate of change in the 
industrial production index because quarterly income data is 
not available; rr^, the expected rate of inflation, is again 
proxied by the actual rate of inflation obtained as a 
percentage change in the consumer price index (line 64); and 
ic 
Pt is the foreign rate of inflation, calculated as the 
percentage change in the U.S. consumer price index (line 
64). PC RATS by Doan (1988) was used in the estimation. 
The results of the unit root tests reported in Tables 
3.1 and 3.2. provide statistical evidence that c^, (r-e)^, 
ic 
at, yt» ^t' arid p^ all have a unit root but their first 
differences do not. Further unit root tests which account 
for structural breaks also support this conclusion (Perron's 
unit root tests under structural breaks are reported in 
Appendix A). This suggests that Granger causality tests 
should be performed using first differences of these 
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Table 3.1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Lagrange Multipliers IiM(i)® 
Xta b No Trend Trend 
Ho 
Trend® 




















0.2 0.7 5.4 9.3 0.0 0.1 5.9 8.8 
'^ t -0.05 (-0.43) 
-0.49 
(-2.18) 






0.9 1.4 2.0 3.0 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.5 
^Except for c^ and r^ all variables are percentage 
changes of quarterly data from 1971 to 1988. Cj- = change in 
domestic credit/monetary base, r^ = change in international 
reserves/monetary base, e^ = peso price of a U.S. dollar, a^ 
= money multiplier, y^  = industrial production index, tij- = 
Mexico's inflation, and p^ = U.S. rate of inflation. 
is the OLS estimate of p and its t-statistic is in 
parentheses. 
Cpor T = 0, the critical values at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
are -2.58, -2.89, and -3.51, Fuller (1976), p. 373. 
^For T = 1, 2,...,72, the critical values at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% are -3.15, -3.45, and -4.04, Fuller (1976), p. 373. 
®For i = 1, 2, 3, 4, IjM(i) are the Lagrange Multiplier 
test statistics proposed by Godfrey (1978) to test for ith 
order serial correlation, and are distributed as chi-sguare, 
X^, with 1, 2, 3 and 4 degrees of freedom. The 5% critical 
values for x^(l) = 3.84, X^(2) = 5.99, x^(3) = 7.81 and 
x2(4) = 9.49. 
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Table 3.2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
Lagrange Multipliers LM(i)® 
X^a No Trend Trend 
No 
Trend® 































3.2 3.5 5.1 6.6 3.8 4.1 5.9 7.5 
^Except for c^ and r^, all variables are percentage 
changes of quarterly data from 1971 to 1988. c^ = change in 
domestic credit/monetary base, r^ = change in international 
reserves/monetary base, e^ = peso price of a U.S. dollar, a^ 
= money multiplier, y^ = industrial production index, = 
Mexico's rate of inflation, and pj. = U.S. rate of 
inflation. 
is the OLS estimate of p and its t-statistic is in 
parentheses. 
Cpor T = 0, the critical values at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
are -2.58, -2.89, and -3.51 respectively. Fuller (1976), p. 
373. 
^For T = 1, 2,...,72, the critical values at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% are -3.15, -3.45, and -4.04 respectively. Fuller 
(1976), p. 373. 
®For i = 1, 2, 3, 4, LH(i) are the Lagrange Multiplier 
test statistics proposed by Godfrey (1978) to test for ith 
order serial correlation, and are distributed as chi-square, 
X^, with 1, 2, 3 and 4 degrees of freedom. The 5% critical 
values for x^(l) = 3.84, x^(2) = 5.99, x^(3) = 7.81 and 
x2(4) = 9.49. 
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variables but they first need to be tested for co-
integration. Table 3.3 presents the results of estimating 
the co-integrating regression equation (3.5). In its 
estimation, several coefficients were held equal to zero, 
which resulted in five equations, 3.5.1 to 3.5.5. These 
restrictions were imposed in order to determine whether 
adding other explanatory variables in the traditional 
bivariate model (c and (r-e) only) will change the results 
of the tests for co-integration. 
The co-integration tests, reported in Table 3.4, show 
that, in all five cases, co-integration among these 
variables cannot be rejected, although from Table 3.3, it 
* 
appears that some variables such as y^ and p^ , are not 
significant. Table 3.4 also reports the Lagrange 
multipliers proposed by Godfrey (1978) to test for serial 
correlation of first, second, third, and fourth order of the 
DF and ADF tests for co-intégrâtion.'' Those statistical 
results suggest that no serial correlation is present in the 
co-integration tests. However, as Phillips and Perron 
''The Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation of 
order i is constructed by regressing the equation's residuals 
on both the original regressors and the residuals themselves 
lagged i times. Next, multiply the number of observations 
times the coefficient of determination R^. This will produce 
a statistic asymptotically distributed as chi-square, x » with 
i degrees of freedom. Reject the null hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation if the Lagrange multiplier statistic is 
greater than at some significance level. 
Ill 
Table 3.3. Co-integrating Regressions with Dependent 
Variable (r-e)^ 
Equation Number 







































r2 .36 .44 .65 .67 . 66 
DW 1.08 1.40 1.58 1.60 1.63 
^The co-integration or equilibrium equation (3.5) takes 
the regression form: (r-e)t = -c^ - + Yt " *t + P*t + ^ t* 
Except for r^ and c^, all variables are percentage changes 
of quarterly data from the first quarter of 1971 to the 
second quarter of 1988. c^ = change in domestic 
credit/monetary base, r^ = change in international 
reserves/monetary base, a^ = money multiplier, = Mexico's 
rate of inflation, y^ = industrial production index, p^ = 
U.S. rate of inflation, and is a white-noise error term. 
r2 is the coefficient of determination, and DW is the 
Durbin-Watson statistic. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 1%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
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Table 3.4. Engle-Granger and Engle-Granger-Yoo Co-
integration Tests 
Equation Number^ 
Statistic 3.5.1 3.5.2 3.5.3 3.5.4 3.5.5 
DF^ -4.94* -5.99* -6.56* -6.66* -6.76* 
ADF° -3.10*** -3.29 -3.80*** -3.89 —4.04 
ppd 
-5.18* -6.04* -6.30* -6.32* -6.43* 
DFLM(l)® 1.67 5.82 0.21 0.01 0.06 
DFLM(2) 2.05 5.76 0.32 0.02 0.31 
DFLM(3) 2.76 7.08 0.36 0.18 0.47 
DFLM(4) 3.30 12.32 3.47 3.28 3.99 
ADFLM(l)f 0.46 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.24 
ADFLM(2) 0.44 0.77 2.04 1.88 2.11 
ADFLM(3) 0.71 3.98 2.33 1.12 2.25 
ADFLM(4) 1.09 5.53 4.87 4.14 4.74 
The Vt used in the DF, ADF, and PP tests are the 
residuals from the co-integration regressions of Table 3.3. 
^Refers to the corresponding equation number of Table 
3.3. 
^he DF 5% critical values for 2 to 5 variables are 
-3.37, -3.93, -4.22, and -4.58 (Engle and Yoo p. 157). 
°The ADF 10% critical values for 2 to 5 variables are 
-2.91, -3.32, -3.71, and -4.06 (Engle and Yoo, p. 157). 
^Regression equation: V|. = /i - âV^-i + Cyt' and test 
Hq: & = 1. The PP 1% critical values for 2 to 5 variables 
are -3.73, -4.22, -4.61, and -4.98 (Engle and Yoo, p. 158). 
®»^Refer to Lagrange multipliers to test for serial 
correlation of first to fourth order of the DF and ADF, 
respectively. The 5% critical values for x^{l) - 3.84, 
x2(2) = 5.99, X^(3) = 7.81, X^(4) = 9.49. 
*Significant at 1%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
***Significant at 10%. 
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(1988) and Perron (1988) have shown, the DF and ADF tests do 
not account for possible heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the residuals of the co-integration 
regression. Those authors suggest the use of their 
Phillips-Perron Test (PP), which was also performed and 
reported in Table 3.4 (The Phillips-Perron test is discussed 
in Chapter 4). Again, stationarity of cannot be 
rejected. Thus, co-integration is supported by all three 
tests, although the significance level of the ADF tests is 
lower. 
The results of the unit root and co-integration tests 
provide statistical evidence supporting the existence of a 
long-run relationship between the growth rates of domestic 
credit, international reserves, and exchange rates, which is 
a notion consistent with the long-run monetary model of 
exchange market pressure. The next step in our Granger 
causality tests is to estimate an error-correction model. 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the results of testing for 
Granger causality between Ac^. and A(r-e)^ using the error-
correction model of equations (3.13) and (3.14). Dummy 
variables were included to account for the adoption of a 
flexible exchange rate on September 1, 1976 and for the 
nationalization of the Mexican banking system on August 31, 
1982. The dummy variables were equal to 1 in the third 
quarter of 1976 and 1982, zero otherwise. 
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Table 3.5. F-Statlstlcs for Granger-Causality Tests^ 
Dependent Variable With Estimated Vt-_i of: 
Regressor^ Equation 3 .5.1 Equation 3. 5.2 
A(r-e)^. Ac*. A(r-e)t Act 
A(r-e)t 7.91 3.67 9.88 3.57 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
5.23 6.43 10.22 6.07 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Aaj. 6.26 5.96 
(0.00) (0.00) 
.2692** -.3240* 
(-1.83) ( -2.27) 
^2 -.2812** -.2336*** (-1.91) (-1.68) 
FPE° -9.493 -15.823 
^F-statlstlcs to test the null hypothesis Hg: all lags 
of a regressor equal zero. 
^Definitions of the variables are given in Tables 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.3. Numbers under and X2 are the estimates of 
the coefficients of the error-correction term, V^-i, the 
residuals of the corresponding co-integration equation of 
Table 3.3. 
^Akaike's final prediction error calculated as 
suggested by Judge, et al., (1985) p. 687, indicated the lag 
length of the regressors to be equal to four. 
Numbers in parentheses are the significance levels of 
the F-statistics, but are t-statistics for and X2. 
*Signifleant at 1%. 
**Signifleant at 5%. 
***Signifleant at 10%. 
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Table 3.6. F-Statistics for Granger-Causality Tests^ 
Regressor 
Dependent Variable With Estimated V^_i of; 
Equation 3.5.3 Equation 3.5.4 Equation 3.5.5 















































(0 .00)  
3.58 


















Xo -.6924** -.7415** -.8278** 
(-1.99) (-1.93) 
FPE° -21.480 -28.932 -31.906 
Bp-statistics to test the null hypothesis Hg: all lags 
of a regressor equal zero. 
^Definitions of the variables are given in Tables 3.1, 
3.2, and 3.3. Numbers under and are the estimates of 
the coefficients of the error-correction term, V^-i/ the 
residuals of the corresponding co-integration equation of 
Table 3.3. 
^Akaike's final prediction error calculated as 
suggested by Judge, et al., (1985) p. 687, indicated the lag 
length of the regressors to be equal to three. 
Numbers in parentheses are the significance levels of 
the F-statistics, but are t-statistics for and X2. 
*Significant at 1%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
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Granger tests are sensitive to the regressors' selected 
lag length. Hence, the lag length was selected by Akaike's 
final prediction error criterion as presented in Judge, et 
al. (1985, p. 687).2° Akaike's results suggested lag 
lengths of four for the traditional bivariate and three 
variable models, and three lags for the others. 
Now, let us consider the traditional bivariate model 
with A(r-e)t and Ac|. only. For the first equation (3.5.1), 
Table 3.5 shows that indeed statistical evidence exists 
supporting a bidirectional Granger causality between the 
percentage changes in domestic credit and in international 
reserves and the exchange rate. The F-value = 5.23 supports 
causality from Ac^ to A(r-e)^, while the F-value = 3.67 
indicates causality from A(r-e)t to Ac^. That is, the 
lagged values of both A(r-e)t and Acj. are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, this finding does 
not support the monetary approach to the balance of payments 
°^The final-prediction-error due to H. Akaike [1969] is 
described in Judge, et al., and is calculated by finding the 
value: 
AlC(n) = Ln det (En) + Z-wf-n 
T 
where an estimate of the residuals covariance matrix of 
the system, M is the number of the variables in the system, n 
is the number of lags in the system, and T is the sample size. 
These AlC(n) values are calculated for different lags. The 
lag length with the minimum value for AlC(n) is chosen. 
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and exchange rate of a unidirectional causality from c^ to 
(r-e)t, nor does it support the assumption that c^ is 
exogenous. Moreover, this statistical evidence supports the 
view that Mexico's central bank sterilizes changes in the 
balance of payments. This finding is consistent with other 
studies, such as those by Cumby and Obstfeld (1983) and 
Gupta (1984). The coefficient on the error-correction 
term -.2812, statistically significant at 5 percent, reveals 
that approximately 28 percent of the previous quarter's 
international reserves and/or exchange rate deviation from 
its long-run value is corrected within each quarter. 
Likewise, the coefficient on the error-correction term in 
the Ac^ equation, -.2692, suggests that about 27 percent of 
the previous quarter's domestic credit deviation from its 
long-run or equilibrium value will be corrected each 
quarter. 
Next, let us consider the multivariate cases, equations 
(3.5,2) to (3.5.5). In general, the bidirectional causality 
found in the bivariate model is also supported by the 
statistical significance of the F-statistics of the 
multivariate models. In the A(r-e)t equations, the F-
statistics for the lagged values of Ac^ are significant at 
the 1 or 5 percent level. In the Ac^ equations, all lagged 
values of A(r-e)t are significant at the 1 percent level. 
The estimates of the coefficients on the error-correction 
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term (X^ and X2) show no change in their significance level 
of 5 percent when other variables enter the estimation. 
However, the size of these estimates increases from less 
than 30 percent in the traditional bivariate model to more 
than 80 percent in the model with five variables. Further 
analysis of the time series involved in the previous 
discussion can be carried out by using vector 
autoregressions (VAR) as proposed by Sims (1980a, 1980b). 
See Chapter 4 for a discussion on VARs. 
Given the complicated structure of the coefficients in 
the equations of VARs, Sims suggested using innovation 
accounting to interpret them. Innovation accounting refers 
to measuring the dynamic responses, over time, of one 
variable to a single unexpected shock in itself 
or in another variable. Two measurements of the dynamic 
interactions of VAR are the impulse response functions and 
the forecast error variance decomposition (see Chapter 4). 
The impulse response functions allow us to trace and 
measure the response of a variable, say A(r-e)t' to 
innovations in other variables of the system. Figures 3.1 
through 3.5 show the reactions of A(r-e)t to the innovations 
ic 
in Act, Aat, Ay^ and Ap^ for the 5 models that 
resulted from the co-integrating equations 3.5.1 through 
3.5.5. Those impulse responses show that, ceteris paribus, 
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• Ac • A(r-e) 
Figure 3.1. Responses of International Reserves and 
Exchange Rate, "A(r-e)" to Unit-shocks 
Source; Equation 3.5.1. 
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• Ac • A(r-e) + Aa 
Figure 3.2. Responses of International Reserves and 
Exchange Rate, "A(r-e)" to Unit-shocks 
Source; Equation 3.5.2. 
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Figure 3.3. Responses of International Reserves and 
Exchange Rate, "A(r-e)" to Unit-shocks 
Source: Equation 3.5.3. 
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Figure 3.4. Responses of International Reserves and 
Exchange Rate, ••A(r-e)" to Unit-shocks 
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Figure 3.5. Responses of International Reserves and 
Exchange Rate, "A(r-e)" to Unit-shocks 
Source: Equation 3.5.5. 
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an unexpected increase in Ac^ produces international 
reserves losses, nominal exchange depreciation or a 
combination of both (e.g. A(r-e)t falls). Thus, the 
reaction of A(r-e)t to a positive unexpected innovation in 
Ac^ is negative. 
Similarly, Figures 3.6 through 3.10 show that the 
reaction of Ac^ to a positive unexpected shock in A(r-e)t 
turns out to be negative as well. Intuitively, an 
unexpected increase in the change of international reserves 
(assuming e = 0 in A(r-e)t) will bring about sterilization 
policies on the part of the authorities that will attempt to 
offset an increase in Mexico's money supply. This result, 
together with the F-statistics of Tables 3.5 and 3.6, 
suggests that the Mexican authorities have followed 
sterilization policies during the period 1971-1988. 
The second measurement of the dynamics of VAR consists 
of the forecast error variance decomposition. This 
measurement shows how important an innovation is in 
explaining the behavior of the variables of the system 
relative to other innovations (see Chapter 4). Tables 3.7 
through 3.11 show the variance decomposition of forecast 
error of A(r-e)t and Ac^ for 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 quarters 
ahead. These variance decompositions, as in the case of the 
impulse response functions, refer to the models which 
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Figure 3.6. Responses of Domestic Credit "Ac" to 
Unit-shocks 
Source: Equation 3.5.1. 
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Figure 3.7. Responses of Domestic Credit "Ac" to 
Unit-shocks 
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Figure 3.8. Responses of Domestic Credit "Ac" to 
Unit-shocks 
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Figure 3.9. Responses of 
Unit-shocks 
Source: Equation 3.5.4. 
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Domestic Credit "Ac" to 
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Figure 3.10. Responses of Domestic Credit "Ac" to 
Unit-shocks 
Source: Equation 3.5.5. 
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resulted from the five co-integrating equations reported in 
Table 3.3. 
Tables 3.7 through 3.11 provide statistical evidence 
suggesting that both A(r-e)t and Ac^ are endogenous to the 
system. For instance, considering the systems with at least 
four variables (the models that resulted from the co-
integration equations 3.5.3, 3.5.4 and 3.5.5), A(r-e)t 
explains its own forecast error variance at most 85 percent 
after two quarters of forecast and 76 percent after 10 
quarters of forecast. At the same time, Ac^ explains even 
less of its own forecast error variance. After two quarters 
of forecast, Ac^ explains at most 43 percent of its own 
forecast variance, while after 10 quarters of forecast, it 
explains at most 38 percent of its own forecast error 
variance. Recall that a variable is considered exogenous to 
the system if it explains 100 percent of its own forecast 
error variance (see Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, unit innovations in Ac^ are important in 
explaining A(r-e)t as they amount to somewhere between 12 
and 20 percent after 2 and 10 quarters of forecast. 
Moreover, innovations in A(r-e)t are also important in 
explaining the forecast error variance of Ac^, as they 
amount to at least 50 percent after 2 and 10 quarters of 
forecast. 
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Table 3.7. Variance Decomposition of Forecast Error& 
Triangular Unit Innovations 
Forecast In 
Error in 
k A(r-e)t Act 
A(r-e)t 2 86.63 13.37 
4 86.65 13.35 
6 77.63 22.37 
8 75.23 24.77 
10 73.87 26.13 
Act 2 25.31 74.69 
4 33.79 66.21 
6 34.15 65.85 
8 41.85 58.15 
10 41.13 58.87 
^ Proportions of forecast error k quarters ahead 
produced by each innovation. Definitions of variables are 
given in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.8. Variance Decomposition of Forecast Error^ 
Triangular Unit Innovations 
Forecast In 
Error in 
k A(r-e)t Act Aat 
A(r-e)t 2 74.09 9.70 16.21 
4 70.73 13.25 16.02 
6 66.33 19.03 14.64 
8 62.25 21.27 16.48 
10 60.85 22.15 16.99 
Act 2 11.79 87.16 1.05 
4 17.95 77.99 4.06 
6 16.23 73.13 10.64 
8 21.89 64.82 13.28 
10 21.80 65.69 12.50 
Aa^ 2 9.07 28.20 62.72 
4 13.64 33.48 52.87 
6 11.65 29.92 58.43 
8 12.60 29.52 57.88 
10 13.40 25.27 61.33 
® Proportions of forecast error k quarters ahead 
produced by each innovation. Definitions of variables 
are given in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.9. Variance Decomposition of Forecast Error® 
Triangular Unit Innovations In 
Forecast 
Act Aat Error in k A(r-e)t Apt 
A(r-e)t 2 85.26 13.62 .63 .49 
4 77.16 19.89 1.78 1.17 
6 76.23 20.46 2.04 1.26 
8 76.02 20.52 2.05 1.41 
10 75.52 20.37 2.70 1.41 
Act 2 52.93 43.37 1.77 1.93 
4 56.78 38.98 2.03 2.22 
6 56.77 38.83 2.15 2.25 
8 55.70 38.82 2.90 2.58 
10 55.40 38.58 3.44 2.57 
Aat 2 19.13 14.27 64.23 2.37 
4 29.33 12.09 53.79 4.78 
6 34.01 9.67 52.39 3.93 
8 36.84 9.93 48.64 4.58 
10 37.02 9.31 49.21 4.47 
Apt 2 39.06 7.20 8.78 44.95 
4 43.08 10.58 8.89 37.45 
6 41.98 10.55 9.79 37.68 
8 41.63 10.41 10.40 37.57 
10 41.34 10.30 11.16 37.20 
® Proportions of forecast error k quarters ahead 
produced by each innovation. Definitions of variables 
are given in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.10. Variance Decomposition of Forecast Error& 
Triangular Unit Innovations In 
Forecast 
Error in k A(r-e)t Act Aat Apt Ayt 
A(r-e)t 2 85.15 12.68 1.39 .36 .42 
4 77.17 17.72 3.37 1.22 .53 
6 76.79 17.83 3.55 1.15 .69 
8 76.09 18.53 3.43 1.27 .69 
10 75.61 18.82 3.61 1.27 .68 
Ac^ 2 55.61 38.14 3.88 2.03 .34 
4 60.38 34.08 3.13 2.12 .28 
6 60.77 34.04 2.94 2.01 .24 
8 60.04 34.28 3.20 2.20 .28 
10 59.68 34.44 3.42 2.17 .28 
Aat 2 24.54 15.19 57.59 2.37 .31 
4 35.58 12.03 45.71 4.47 2.20 
6 36.34 9.20 48.55 3.99 1.91 
8 37.83 8.79 46.36 4.83 2.19 
10 36.85 7.85 48.21 4.64 2.44 
Apt 2 46.63 6.30 3.89 42.47 .71 
4 47.08 9.92 6.85 33.93 2.22 
6 45.60 10.64 7.01 33.21 3.55 
8 45.08 10.85 7.16 32.88 4.02 
10 44.12 10.59 8.97 32.09 4.22 
Ayt 2 4.45 51.11 8.38 2.95 79.11 
4 25.47 12.13 8.15 4.91 49.34 
6 30.81 18.73 10.10 5.12 35.24 
8 30.99 18.06 12.36 5.17 33.42 
10 31.61 19.07 12.86 5.41 31.05 
® Proportions of forecast error k quarters ahead 
produced by each innovation. Definitions of variables 
are given in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.11. Variance Decomposition of Forecast Error^ 
Triangular Unit Innovations In 
Forecast 
Error in k A(r-e)t Act Aat Apt Apî 
A(r-e)t 2 84.84 14.33 .42 .39 .02 
4 77.74 18.44 1.94 1.27 .61 
6 77.16 18.10 1.90 1.39 1.45 
8 77.03 17.88 1.96 1.51 1.62 
10 76.80 17.68 2.35 1.49 1.68 
Act 2 58.37 37.17 1.72 2.29 .44 
4 61.76 32.82 1.45 2.15 1.81 
6 61.65 32.14 1.59 2.27 2.35 
8 60.82 32.31 1.96 2.50 2.41 
10 60.71 32.95 2.25 2.47 2.62 
Aat 2 24.10 16.96 54.13 1.46 3.35 
4 37.57 12.72 38.34 2.94 8.43 
6 41.10 11.18 39.71 2.56 5.46 
8 43.52 11.42 35.73 3.08 6.26 
10 43.31 10.93 37.25 3.03 5.48 
Apt 2 37.77 8.82 6.65 45.81 .94 
4 42.72 12.06 7.03 37.05 1.14 
6 41.59 11.98 7.81 36.61 2.00 
8 41.38 11.74 8.28 36.03 2.57 
10 41.23 11.64 9.02 35.49 2.61 
Apî 2 2.75 .20 1.30 .73 95.02 
4 2.92 1.19 1.16 1.06 93.68 
6 3.31 1.25 1.34 1.10 93.00 
8 3.48 1.27 1.54 1.20 92.52 
10 3.76 1.31 1.81 1.25 91.87 
® Proportions of forecast error k quarters ahead 
produced by each innovation. Definitions of variables 
are given in Table 3.3. 
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Overall, the statistical tests conducted on changes in 
international reserves and exchange rate and changes in 
domestic credit throughout this section, lend support to the 
notion that both A(r-e)t and Ac^ Granger-cause one another 
and are important in explaining each other's behavior. This 
notion is supported by the F-statistics for Granger 
causality reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, the impulse 
response functions of Figures 3.6 through 3.15, and the 
forecast error variance decompositions reported in Tables 
3.7 through 3.11. 
Conclusions 
Using co-integration and vector autoregressions 
techniques, the nature of the relationship between domestic 
credit, international reserves, and the exchange rate 
embodied in the monetary model of exchange market pressure 
was studied for Mexico during the first quarter of 1971 to 
the second quarter of 1988. Tests for co-integration among 
these variables support the existence of a long-run 
relationship in the growth rates of domestic credit, the 
exchange rate, and international reserves — that is, those 
variables seem to be co-integrated. In addition, 
multivariate Granger causality tests, together with 
innovation accounting, support a bidirectional Granger 
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causality from changes in international reserves and 
exchange rate to changes in domestic credit, and vice versa. 
This finding leads to two observations. 
First, the notion of the monetary approach of the 
balance of payments and exchange rate of a unidirectional 
causality from c^ to (r-e)^ is not supported, nor is the 
assumption of an exogenous Cf Second, the statistical 
support of bidirectional causality indicates that Mexico's 
monetary authorities adjust domestic assets to neutralize 
exogenous balance-of-payments deficits on the monetary base. 
Moreover, the error-correction term suggests that some 
percentage of the discrepancy between the actual rates and 
the long-run values of international reserves and the 
exchange rate, as well as of domestic credit, will be 
corrected within the next period. 
While the results of this chapter are fairly robust in 
that including more than two variables in the system does 
not significantly affect the Granger causality tests, the 
next step in studying these variables might be to construct 
and estimate a structural model. 
The findings of this chapter, together with the fact 
that Mexico is an open economy with a fixed, or controlled, 
(crawling-peg) exchange rate system, underline Mexico's 
dependence on the rest of the world as far as monetary and 
fiscal policy is concerned. 
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CHAPTER 4. CO-INTEGRATION AND TESTS 
OF PURCHASING POWER PARITY: 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF MEXICO'S DATA 
Introduction 
The condition of purchasing power parity (PPP) has been 
used as a critical building block in many modern models of 
balance of payments and exchange rate determination.^' 
These models have been criticized because, among other 
things, some empirical evidence supports the existence of 
l a r g e  a n d  p e r s i s t e n t  d e v i a t i o n s  f r o m  P P P . M o r e o v e r ,  
deviations from PPP are of short and long-run nature. On 
the one hand, short-run deviations may be transitory and due 
to commodity arbitrage failure and measurement error (Bruce 
and Purvis (1985)); inefficient markets and government 
^See for instance Rudiger Dornbusch (1984) and Chapter 
3 of this dissertation. 
^^The empirical evidence on PPP is mixed and the 
results obtained depend upon the countries under study, 
sample periods, and the price indexes used in the 
econometric work. Surveys on PPP literature can be found in 
the articles by Lawrence H. Officer (1976), Rudiger 
Dornbusch (1987) and Peter Isard (1987). Authors whose 
papers provide support for a long-run PPP include Mark Rush 
and Steven Husted (1985), Hali J. Edison (1987), and Walter 
Enders (1988) and (1989). Authors whose papers do not 
support PPP include Paul R. Krugman (1987), Craig S. Hakkio 
(1984) and Jacob A. Frenkel (1981) . 
139 
intervention (Shapiro (1986)); delivery lags (Magee (1978)); 
and short-run non-neutrality of money (Dornbusch (1976) and 
Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982)). On the other hand, long-run 
deviations from PPP may be permanent and due to changes in 
equilibrium relationships between exchange rates and 
relative national prices levels. Such deviations, called 
real disturbances or real shocks, may be due to countries' 
differences in real wages, productivity, and technology 
(Sanyal and Jones (1982)). 
Furthermore, nominal shocks can result in temporary, 
but not permanent deviations from PPP. For instance, in the 
short run, the "overshooting" model shows that an increase 
in the money supply will cause both real and nominal 
exchange rate depreciation. In the long run, however, the 
nominal exchange rate and the price level will change by the 
same proportion as the change in the money supply bringing 
the real exchange rate to its long-run level. Thus, money 
will be neutral in the long run but not in the short run 
(Dornbusch (1976), and Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982)). 
In the case of Mexico, empirical studies of the balance 
of payments and exchange rate determination are numerous 
(see Chapter 3). Without exception, all of those studies 
impose purchasing power parity as an important assumption 
when building and testing those long-run models. However, 
studies dealing with tests of PPP using Mexican data are for 
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the most part rare in the literature. 
In this chapter, the co-integration techniques 
developed by Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987), 
are applied to Mexico's data to test whether PPP holds 
during the period 1960-1988.^ The null hypothesis of non 
co-integration (e.g. PPP does not hold) was rejected in 
favor of accepting PPP for both the consumer price index and 
the wholesale price index during 1960-1988. An estimated 
error-correction model, as proposed by Granger (1986) and 
Engle and Granger (1987), suggests that Mexican prices 
and/or the peso price of a U.S. dollar adjusted to maintain 
PPP during the same period. 
Further analysis of the real exchange rate was 
conducted using vector autoregressions (VAR) techniques. 
Innovation accounting and Granger causality tests derived 
from the estimated VAR also support the finding that Mexican 
prices and/or nominal exchange rate adjust to maintain PPP. 
This statistical evidence in turn, supports the assumption 
often made in the literature of international economics, 
that Mexico is a price taker in world markets. 
^Several authors that have employed co-integration 
techniques to test for PPP include: Richard T. Baillie and 
David D. Selover (1987); Dean Corbae and Sam Ouliaris 
(1988); Mark P. Taylor and Patrick C. McMahon (1988) ; Walter 
Enders (1988); Walter Enders (1989); Nelson C. Mark (1990); 
Walter Enders (1991); Peter Kugler and Carlos Lenz (1993); 
and Yoonbai Kim (1991). 
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This chapter is organized as follows. The following 
section presents a discussion on purchasing power parity, 
co-integration, and vector autoregression techniques. The 
next section presents the empirical results. Finally, the 
last section presents some conclusions. 
Purchasing Power Parity, Co-integration 
and Vector Autoregressions 
The purchasing power parity condition (PPP) was 
expressed in Chapter 3 as equation (3.3). Here that 
equation is reproduced as; 
Pt = Et ' Pt (4.1) 
where P^ is the domestic price level (Mexico's price level); 
Et is the nominal exchange rate defined as the price of a 
unit of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency 
is 
(mexican pesos per U.S. dollar); P^ is the foreign price 
level (U.S. price level); and the subscript t refers to 
time. According to equation (4.1), PPP would hold if 
* 
Mexican prices adjust to changes in and/or in AP^ . 
To test whether PPP holds, several issues must be 
addressed. First, since all variables involved are 
endogenous, there is not a clear-cut solution to selecting 
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the dependent variable to be used in a regression. Second, 
as shown by West (1988), ordinary least squares estimators 
of a regression with nonstationary variables are not 
consistent. Here, this is an important issue since P^/ E^, 
ic 
and Pt as will be shown later on, seem to be nonstationary. 
These two problems are addressed by applying co-integration 
techniques as proposed by Granger (1986), and Engle and 
Granger (1987). 
To illustrate co-integration in the context of PPP, let 
us obtain an alternative formulation of PPP by rewriting 
equation (4.1) as equation (4.2): 
Pt - aEt'Pt = (4.2) 
where all variables are defined as before, a is a constant 
and e^t is a stochastic disturbance. Here, PPP will hold if 
a = 1 and e^t is stationary. Now, we can think of these two 
* 
variables as P^ = and E^'Pt = ^ 2t' Following Granger 
(1986) and Engle and Granger (1987), a pair of variables are 
co-integrated if the following is satisfied. First, and 
X2t are integrated of the same order d, i.e., X^t and X2t 
achieve stationarity after differencing them d times denoted 
as X^t ~ 1(d) and X2t ~ 1(d). Second, there exists a 
constant a (a ?£ 0 ) such that the linear combination ~ 
143 
I(d-b), b > 0. Consider the following linear combination 
equation (4.3): 
^It G%2t ~ ^ t (4.3) 
Here, having d = b = 1, (i.e., and X2t are both 1(1) and 
~ 1(0)) means that even though and X2t are each 
nonstationary, (both have an infinite variance), their 
linear combination Z^, is stationary. Furthermore, if 
economic theory suggests a long-run relationship such as 
PPP, then the statistical relationship, equation (4.3), can 
be used to test for long-run PPP. Therefore, co-integration 
* 
between P^ and E^'Pt will suggest, from a statistical point 
of view, that PPP holds as a stable long-run relationship. 
The co-integration tests suggested by Granger (1986) 
a n d  E n g l e  a n d  G r a n g e r  ( 1 9 8 7 )  c o n s i s t  o f  t w o  s t e p s . T h e  
first step is to determine the order of integratability of 
each variable or the value of d. This is equivalent to 
testing for unit roots in each variable. 
Two tests for unit roots which are asymptomatically 
equivalent are the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and 
Fuller (1979)) and the Phillips-Perron test (Phillips 
^^Other tests for co-integration include Soren Johansen 
(1988), James H. Stock and Watson W. Mark (1988), and 
Nicolaos G. Fountis and David A. Dickey (1989). 
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(1987), Phillips and Perron (1988), and Perron (1988)). An 
important assumption of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(ADF) is that the error term of the ADF regression should be 
white noise. Alternatively, the Phillips and Perron test 
(PP) does not make this assumption. Instead, they provide 
several tests for unit roots which are robust to serial 
correlation and time-dependent heteroskedasticity. Since 
the ADF test was discussed in Chapter 3, only the PP will be 
discussed here. 
The Phillips-Perron (PP) test for unit roots on the 
series requires the estimation of one of the two 
following ordinary least squares regressions: 
Xt = M* + a*Xt_i + Ut (4.4) 
Xt = M* + fi(T - |) + *Xt_i + Ut (4.5) 
where /i*, a*, /ï, /3, and a are regression coefficients; T is 
a linear trend; N is the sample size; and are the 
error terms that could be serially correlated processes with 
time-dependent variances; and the subscript t refers to 
time. The main difference between equations (4.4) and (4.5) 
is that the latter accounts for a time trend while the 
former does not. 
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In equation (4.4), the null hypothesis of a unit root, 
HQ: a* = 1, is tested against the stationarity alternative. 
Hi: a* = 0, by using the adjusted t-statistic, 
given in Perron (1988) p. 308 line (d). Taking absolute 
values, reject Hq if Z(ta*) larger than the critical 
values reported by Fuller (1976) p. 373. 
Similarly, in equation (6) the r.u3J. hypothesis of a 
unit root with a deterministic trend, Hg: a =1, and the 
alternative hypothesis of stationarity, a =0, are 
tested by using the adjusted t-statistic, )' given by 
Perron (1988), p. 308 line (h). Again taking absolute 
values, reject Hq if Z^^ct ) larger than the critical 
values reported by Fuller (1976) p. 373. Next, assuming 
that all variables are integrated of the same order, step 2 
is followed. 
Step 2 of the Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger 
(1987) co-integration test, is to determine whether these 
variables observe a statistical long-run relationship. This 
is done by estimating the equilibrium or co-integration 
equation and then testing the residuals of that regression 
for stationarity. If the residuals from the co-integrating 
regression are stationary, then these variables are said to 
be CO-integrated. The co-integration regression takes the 
form of: 
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Et'Pt = ao + qPt + ^ 2t (4.6) 
Pt = ai + q Et'Pt + ^3t (4.7) 
Notice that equations (4.6) and (4.7) define relative 
prices in terms of Mexican pesos. These specifications of 
PPP allow us to observe the behavior of the nominal exchange 
rate and the foreign price level jointly, in the term 
it 
Et'Pt . Alternatively, relative prices can be expressed in 
terms of foreign currency, i.e. in U.S. dollars. 
Expressing relative prices in U.S. dollars will allow 
us to observe the behavior of Mexico's price level and its 
nominal exchange rate together in the same term. In that 
case, the co-integration regressions take the form of: 
Et 'Pt = bg + q*-Pt + €4t (4.8) 
* 1 * 
Pt = bi + =*Et 'Pt + Cgt (4.9) 
* 
where Et = 1/Et is the U.S. dollar price of a peso; Pt is 
Mexico's price level; bg, b^ and q* are constants; P^ is 
the U.S. price level; and e^t and e^t are stochastic 
disturbances. In this alternative specification, PPP will 
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hold if q* = 1 and 64^ and €5^ are stationary. 
Equation (4.8) is particularly appealing as it shows 
how Mexico's exchange rate (l/E^-) and/or Mexico's price 
level (Pt) would adjust to changes in the foreign price 
level (Pt )• That adjustment would take place regardless of 
the exchange rate regime. For instance, if Mexico's 
exchange rate is fixed, (i.e., Ej. = E^-i = ^t-2 ~ ®t-3 ~ 
...) PPP indicates that Mexico and the U.S. would have the 
same inflation rate. On the other hand, if Mexico's 
exchange rate regime consists of a flexible or crawling-peg, 
PPP would predict that Mexico's exchange rate, its price 
level, or both would adjust to changes in foreign prices. 
Again, PPP will hold if E^ "Pt and P^ are co-integrated, 
e.g. the estimated residuals, e2t' ^3t* ^4t and €5^ are 
stationary. To test them for unit roots the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test, equation (3.12) of Chapter 3 is used. 
Notice, however, that the critical values used are no longer 
from Fuller (1976), but from Engle and Yoo (1987).%' 
For the time being, let us assume that the long-run 
^^After using Monte Carlo techniques Engle and Granger 
(1987) and Engle and Yoo (1987) have shown that when the 
are observations from data, the critical values from Fuller 
(1976) will be appropriate. However, when the are 
observations from estimated regressions, then Fuller's 
critical values will be numerically too small which will 
find co-integration too often. In this case the null 
hypothesis of no co-integration will be rejected too often. 
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relationship PPP equation (4.8) exists, or alternatively, 
let us assume that 'Pt and P^ are co-integrated. That 
being the case. Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987) 
have shown that an error-correction specification can be 
constructed that would take the following form; 
* . n _ 
AEt 'Pt = $0 + E*liAEt_i 'Pt-i 
i=l 
+ . i;*2iAPt-i 
1=1 
+ ^l^t-l + Wit (4.10) 




+ ^ 2^t-l + "2t (4.11) 
A 
where AEt 'Pt and APt are defined as before; V^-i is the 
residual from the co-integrating regression; w^t and W2t are 
white-noise error terms; and one of or X2 9^ 0. The 
coefficients of the error-correction terms, and X2, are 
expected to be negative and capture the adjustment of 
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ic ic 
AE(. "P^  and AP^  toward long-run equilibrium. Here the 
lagged variables in the right-hand side of these equations 
capture the short-run dynamics of the model. This error-
correction model is used to test for Granger causality by 
testing the statistical significance of the $j^s and SF^s 
using the standard F-tests. 
* * 
Further analysis of *Pt and P^ can be performed by 
using the vector autoregressions (VAR) techniques proposed 
by Sims (1980a, 1980b). Let us discuss this VAR technique 
by following Hakkio and Morris (1984), Falk, Devadoss and 
Meyers (1986), and Judge, et al., (1988, Chapter 18). 
Vector autoregressions are atheoretical models built 
upon the statistical properties of time series data to 
explain time series behavior. An advantage of adopting the 
VAR methodology is that to test specific hypotheses, one 
does not need to impose prior exogeneity or endogeneity on 
the model considered. A disadvantage of using this 
technique is that it is difficult to interpret VAR 
coefficients as structural parameters. For instance, as 
Salemi (1986) has shown, if the structural equations and the 
expectations formations are known, then the VAR coefficients 
will be non-linear functions of the structural and 
expectations parameters. Furthermore, if the monetary or 
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fiscal rule changes, then the true values of the VAR 
parameters will change as well, i.e., the VAR results will 
be subject to the Lucas (1976) critique. Here, this is not 
a serious problem since estimation of structural parameters 
is not the objective of this chapter. 
Furthermore, let us assume that the error-correction 
specification, equations (4.10) and (4.11) can be expressed 
as a VAR that has 2 stationary stochastic variables and that 
it can be written as; 
1 1 
Aii(L) Al2(L) AEt-1 'Pt-1 "it 
_ ^4 _ A22<L) _ APt-l _ _"2t_ 
where A is the first difference operator i.e., 
AXt = Xt - Xt-i; Et 'Pt = Mexico's price level in U.S. 
dollars; = U.S. price level; the subscript t refers to 
time; A^j are polynomials in the lag operator L; and Uj^t are 
white noise stochastic errors (k = 1, 2). The variables 
^^Structural interpretations of VARs can be found in 
the works by Ben S. Bernanke (1986), Oliver J. Blanchard 
(1986), and Christopher A. Sims, James H. Stock, and Mark W. 
Watson (1986). In addition to the difficulty of 
interpreting the VAR coefficients, further disadvantages of 
VAR models have been pointed out by others. For instance, 
Cooley and Leroy (1985) stated that it is not appropriate to 
use VARs for purposes other than unconditional forecasting. 
Also, Gordon and King (1982) showed that a given ordering 
imposes a semi-structure in the model and thus each ordering 
influences the results of a VAR in a different way. 
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enter the VAR model in first differences under the 
assumption that their levels are not stationary but their 
first differences are. 
Furthermore, let us assume that the system (4.12) can 
be written as the n-th order stationary vector 
autoregressions, VAR(n): 
[I - A(L)]Xt = Ut (4.13) 
where I is the 2x2 identity matrix; A(L) = A(1)L + A(2)l2 + 
... + A(n)L" is a 2X2 matrix of constants polynomial in the 
lag operator L. is a 2x1 vector of stationary variables 
f * * 
such that Xt = [ AEt 'Pt is a 2x1 vector of 
error terms contemporaneously correlated across equations 
with a finite 2x2 variance-covariance matrix Y, î and the 
subscript t denotes time. The elements of are also named 
innovations in that they represent the part of X^ which 
cannot be predicted linearly from n-lagged values of X^. 
Also, notice that the variance-covariance matrix of the 
error terms, %, is a measure of the across equations 
correlations of the unanticipated changes in each variable. 
Given the complicated structure of the coefficients in 
the equations of the VAR, Sims (1980a, 1980b) suggested 
using innovation accounting to interpret it.^^ Innovation 
^^See Judge, et al., (1988 p., 751) and Salemi (1986). 
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accounting refers to measuring the dynamic responses, over 
time, of one variable to a single unexpected shock in itself 
or in another variable. Two measurements of the dynamic 
interactions of VAR are the impulse response functions and 
the forecast error variance decomposition. Both of these 
statistics are derived from the moving average 
representation of equation (4.13).^® 
The impulse response functions will allow us to trace 
and measure the response of an element of to an 
innovation of Uf For instance, using impulse response 
function we can trace out the response of the Mexican price 
•k 
level in U.S. dollars, AE^ "Pt, to an unanticipated shock in 
the foreign price level, ^ 2t' This, however, posits a 
problem. If the elements of are contemporaneously 
correlated, then it is unclear what distinguishes an 
unanticipated foreign price shock from another unanticipated 
ic 
shock, say a shock in 'Pt itself. Thus it would not make 
sense to treat and U2t as if they were independent 
unanticipated shocks in Mexico's price level in U.S. dollars 
and in U.S. price levels respectively. 
To obtain a pure unanticipated or orthogonal shock to 
^®To ensure that the moving average representation of 
the system (15) can be obtained, we assume stationarity by 
supposing that the roots of the characteristic equation, 
det [I - A(L)] = 0, lie outside the unit circle so that 
[I - A(L)] is invertible. 
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the system, Sims (1980a, 1980b) suggested decomposing the 
variance-covariance matrix ,£ > into the product PP' where P 
is a 2x2 nonsingular lower triangular matrix comprising, say 
the choleski decomposition of Next, premultiply the 
system by P~^. Thus the system (4.13) can be written as; 
P-1[I - A(L)]Xt = P-lUt (4.14) 
Furthermore, since [I - A(L)] is invertible the system 
(4.14) can be written as: 
Xt = B(L)Wt (4.15) 
where B(L) = {[I - A(L)]"lp} such that B(L) = B(0) + B(1)L + 
B(2)l2 + ...; and Wt = P'^Uf System (4.15) is the 
orthogonalized moving average representation of system 
(4.13), in which by construction the vector contains 
mutually orthogonal innovations that are functions of Uf 
Next, let us define W^. = [w^tr Furthermore, if we 
define bij(s) as the i, j-th element of B(s) where i, j = 1, 
2 and s = 0, 1, 2 ... then the second element of , the 
^This is possible since ^ is symmetric and positive 
definite. Notice that P, the factorization of , is not 
unique. Several factorization techniques include: the 
cholesky decomposition; the Eigen decomposition; and the 
structural decompositions by Ben S. Bernanke (1986). Also, 
notice that P, in the cholesky decomposition, will also 
depend on the ordering of the variables, and therefore a 




change in the U.S. price level, , can be written as: 
* ®° 
APt = E [b2i(s)wit-s + b^2(s)W2t-s] (4.16) 
s=0 
* 
Equation (4.16) shows that the response of AP^ to current 
and past shocks or innovations in Mexican prices in U.S. 
dollars can be characterized by the infinite sequence 
b2i(s), s = 0, 1, 2,.... Furthermore, according to Sims 
(1980a, 1980b) the b2i(s) sequence can be isolated by 
following the next four steps. 
First, set the variables in equal to zero prior to 
* 
the current period of time (period 0). This means AE^ 'Pt = 
0 for s > 0 or t < 0. Second, let the current innovation in 
the change of Mexico's prices in U.S. dollars increase by 
one in period 0, and assume that no further shocks occur. 
Thus w^t = 1, W2t = 0, and w^^+s ~ W2t+s ~ ® for s > 0. 
Third, premultiply by P to obtain U^. Finally, use 
(4.13) to obtain AP^ , AP^+i , ^ Pt+2 ' — ' ^^t+k • Here 
k, a non-negative integer, is the number of quarters ahead 
for which we want to trace the system's behavior. Thus, by 
* 
following this procedure we will obtain AP^+g = b2i(s), 
while at the same time we would have generated simulated 
values for the other variable in our model such that 
^Et+s "Pt+s = bll(s). 
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Therefore, b2i(s) and bn(s) correspond to the 
ic * 
responses of AP^ and AE^ *Pt to an unanticipated orthogonal 
unit innovation in the change in Mexico's price level in 
U.S. dollars, (i.e., = 1). Moreover, b2i(k) is defined 
as the k step-ahead impulse response of AP^ to an 
orthogonal unit innovation in Mexico's price level in U.S. 
dollars. The remaining impulse responses functions to 
shocks or innovations in the other variables (the other 
elements of B(L)) can be obtained by following the four 
steps already described. 
In general, b^j(k) will be the k-step-ahead impulse 
response function of a variable i to an orthogonal unit 
shock in the variable j. Furthermore, as Falk, Devadoss and 
Meyers (1986) point out, the shape of the discrete function 
t>2i(s) provides information about the direction and timing 
* 
of the behavior of the change in U.S. price level (AP^ ) in 
response to a unit shock in the change in Mexico's price 
level (Wit = 1)• The relative importance of this shock or 
innovation in explaining the actual behavior of AP^ can be 
determined by Sims' second statistic, namely, the forecast 
error variance decomposition of the k-step forecast 
described by equation (4.17); 
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k 2 2 k 2 
d2i(k) = 100{ ]Cb2i(s)/[ I £ b2j(s)} (4.17) 
s=0 j=l s=0 
2 k 2 
Where g E bojfs) is the total k-step-ahead forecast j=l s=0 
variance of AP^ • Thus the forecast error variance 
decomposition, equation (4.17), is meant to show how much of 
the total k step-ahead variance in AP^ is caused by an 
orthogonal innovation in the change in Mexico's price level 
expressed in U.S. dollars (w^t). The closer the forecast 
error variance decomposition is to 100 percent, the more 
important are Mexico's price level innovations, relative to 
other innovations, in explaining U.S. price level movements 
(APt ). In addition the forecast error variance 
decomposition can be used to measure the degree to which a 
variable is considered exogenous with respect to a set of 
variables. A series is considered exogenous if 100 percent 
of the forecast error variance decomposition is due to an 
innovation in the series itself. For instance, if an 
innovation in AP^ (say W2t)/ explains close to 100 percent 
ic 
of the forecast error variance decomposition of AP^ itself, 
then AP^ will be considered exogenous to this system. 
In this PPP model, if the U.S. is a large country 
relative to Mexico (in the sense that the U.S. is a price 
setter in world markets), unexpected innovations in its own 
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price level changes (W2t) would explain most of the forecast 
is * 
error variance of AP^ • This implies that AP^ is exogenous 
to our system. Moreover, assuming that Mexico is a small 
country (in the sense that it is a price taker in world 
markets), an unexpected innovation in Mexico's price level 
expressed in U.S. dollars (w^t) will not explain a 
relatively large proportion of the forecast error variance 
* 
of the U.S. price level (AP^ ) . The next section presents 
the empirical results. 
Empirical Results 
In this section the results of testing for stationarity 
in the real exchange rate or equivalently, testing for co-
integration between AE^ "Pt and AP^ are reported. In this 
specification of PPP, equation (4.8), the relative prices of 
both the U.S. and Mexico are expressed in U.S. dollars. 
This facilitates the interpretation of PPP as it allows us 
to observe how changes in U.S. prices affect movements in 
Mexico's price level and/or its nominal exchange rate 
regardless of the exchange rate regime. This is 
particularly important because if the nominal exchange rate 
is fixed, then equation (4.8) will predict that Mexico and 
the U.S. will have the same inflation. On the other hand, 
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if the exchange rate is not fixed, but say is a crawling-
peg, then equation (4.8) will predict that movements in U.S. 
price level will bring about changes in Mexico's price 
level, in its nominal exchange rate or both. Moreover, 
assuming that Mexico is a small country (in the sense that 
it is a price taker in world markets) equation (4.8) 
predicts that movements in Mexico's price level in U.S. 
dollars will have no effect on U.S. price level changes. 
The empirical investigation is conducted by dividing 
the period from the first quarter of 1960 to the second 
quarter of 1988 into two periods. The first period includes 
data from the first quarter of 1960 to the second quarter of 
1976, a period in which Mexico adopted a fixed exchange rate 
regime throughout. The second period is from the third 
quarter of 1976 to the second quarter of 1988. During most 
of this period Mexico abandoned the fixed exchange rate 
regime and adopted a crawling-peg system. This period was 
selected because: a) data prior to 1960 are unavailable and 
b) Mexico experienced structural changes after the second 
quarter of 1988 that made the management of its fiscal and 
monetary policies much different than in prior years. 
The data were taken from the International Financial 
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. The series 
were quarter averages of monthly observations of Mexico's 
consumer price index, Pt=line 64; U.S. consumer price 
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"k 
Index, = line 64; and the nominal exchange rate defined 
as the peso price of a U.S. dollar, = line rf. To 
construct E^ 'Pf where E^ = l/E^, the nominal exchange 
rate and Mexico's consumer price index were normalized to 1 
yip 
in the first quarter of 1960. Likewise, P^ was normalized 
to 1 in the same period. In addition, wholesale price 
indices were used in the estimation as an alternative 
measure of price levels, in place of consumer price indices. 
The unit root tests were performed by estimating the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron equations 
for P^ , E^ 'Pt, APt t and AE^ 'Pf The results of these 
tests, reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, indicate that P^ and 
ic * 
E^ "Pt are nonstationary while their first differences, AP^ 
* 
and AE^ 'Pt are stationary, e.g. both series are integrated 
of the same order 1. Further unit root tests which consider 
structural breaks also support the same conclusion (Perron's 
unit root tests that account for structural breaks in the 
time series are reported in Appendix A). Before commenting 
on the co-integration tests, let us consider the following. 
From April of 1954 to August of 1976, Mexico's monetary 
authorities maintained a fixed exchange rate of 12.50 pesos 
per dollar. Since September of 1976, the nominal exchange 
rate has be under crawling-peg regime (see Chapter 2). 
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Table 4.1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
X? 
Consumer Price Indexb Wholesale Price IndexC 
pd pd 
No Trend® Trend^ No Trend® Trend^ 
Et -Pt -.0097 -.1095 .3441 -.1037 
(-.62) (-2.45) (3.52) (-2.61) 
AEJ -Pt -1.0787 -1.1076 -.8932 -.8919 
(-4.87) (-4.83) (-4.98) (-4.95) 
Pt .0019 —.0066 —.0005 -.0146 
(.83) (-1.91) (-.21) (-2.08) 
APÎ -.1086 -.2222 -.2549 -.3047 
(-2.10) (-2.99) (-2.90) (-3.16) 
®Data are quarterly averages of monthly observations 
from the first quarter of 1960 to the second quarter of 
1988. = U.S. dollar price of a Mexican peso; = 
Mexico's price level; P^ = U.S. price level. All variables 
were normalized to 1 in the first quarter of 1960. The 
sample consists of 114 observations to estimate: 
n 
AXt = Mo + MiT + pXt_i + Z 7iAXt_i + Cyt 
i=l 
^The consumer price index data were used as the price 
levels Pj. and P^ . 
^The wholesale price index data were used as the price 
levels Pt and P^ . 
is the OLS estimate of p and its t-statistic is in 
parentheses. 
^Assuming T = 0, the critical values at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
are -2.58, -2.89, and -3.51 respectively. Fuller (1976), 
p. 373. 
^Assuming T = 1, 2,...,114, the critical values at 10%, 
5%, and 1% are -3.15, -3.45, and -4.04 respectively. Fuller 
(1976), p. 373. 
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Table 4.2. Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
X? a* 5 2(ta*) b Z(tS)C 
Consumer Price Index^ 
Et • Pt .9883 .9259 -1.04 -2.75 
AEÎ •Pt .4070 .4075 -6.56 -6.57 
Pt 1.0122 .9849 2.48 -1.82 
APÏ .8405 .7388 -3.05 -4.15 
Wholesale Price Index® 
Et • Pt .9902 .9310 -.93 -2.64 
AEt •Pt .3904 .3898 -6.92 -6.79 
Pt 1.0065 .9774 .59 -2.05 
APt .7062 .6813 —4.63 -4.94 
®Data are quarterly averages of monthly observations from 
the first quarter of 1960 to the second quarter of 1988. 
= U.S. dollar price of a Mexican peso; P^ = Mexico's price 
level; P^ = U.S. price level. All variables were normalized 
to 1 in the first quarter of 1960. The sample consists of 114 
observations to estimate: 
* * * Xt = At* + a*Xt-i + Ut 
Xt = M* + /8(T - |) + ôxt-i + Ut 
^Critical values at 10%, 5%, and 1% are -2.58, -2.89, and 
-3.51 respectively. Fuller (1976), p. 373. 
^Critical values at 10%, 5%, and 1% are -3.15, -3.45, and 
-4.04 respectively. Fuller (1976), p. 373. 
^The consumer price index data were used as the price 
levels Pt and P^ . 
®The wholesale price index data were used as the price 
levels Pt and P^ . 
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To account for these two exchange rate regimes, the co-
integration regressions were estimated using three samples; 
one from the first quarter of 1960 to the second quarter of 
1988, another from the first quarter of 1960 to the second 
quarter of 1976, and the third sample from the third quarter 
of 1976 to the second quarter of 1988. 
Table 4.3 reports the co-integration regressions to test 
for PPP and both the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-
Perron unit root tests conducted on the estimated residuals of 
the PPP co-integration regressions. Equations 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 
and 4.3.5 were estimated with the consumer price index as the 
* 
price levels (P^ and P^ ), while the remaining equations 
included the wholesale price index. Except for Equation 
4.3.3, the ADF test provides statistical evidence of co-
* * 
integration between 'Pt and P^ in all cases. The 
Phillips-Perron tests support co-integration only for 
* * 
Equations 4.3.2 and 4.3.4. Next, assuming that E^ "Pt and P^ 
are co-integrated, an error-correction model was estimated 
using wholesale prices as the price levels and equations 
(4.10) and (4.11) as benchmark specifications. 
Using the estimated residuals of equations 4.3.2, 4.3.4 
and 4.3.6, various error-correction models were estimated 
following the vector autoregressions (VAR) technique described 
in the previous chapter. Relative prices entered the VAR in 
'fc ^ 
first differences, i.e. AE^ "P^ and AP^ . To explain changes 
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r2 ADF° G(ta)^ 
First Quarter 1960 to Second Quarter 1988 
4.3.1 
* 
Et "Pt .4878 .7707 .7697 -3.64 -2.75 
(5.05) (19.35) 
4.3.2 Et 'Pt .2204 .9343 .8718 -4.19 -3.21 
(3.08) (27.6) 
First Quarter 1960 to Second Quarter 1976 
4.3.3 
* 
®t 'Pt -.6203 1.5936 .9584 -1.03 -1.24 
(-11.50) (38.43) 
4.3.4 Et 'Pt -.2750 1.3468 .9861 -3.64 -2.97 
(-11.16) (67.45) 
Third Quarter 1976 to Second Quarter 1988 
4.3.5 
* 
Et 'Pt 1.6624 .3946 .1816 -2.94 -2.19 
(4.26) (3.19) 
4.3.6 Et 'Pt .7867 .7376 .3460 -2.90 -2.24 
(1.80) (4.93) 
®The OLS residuals of the co-integrating regression, V^, 
are used in the co-integration testsData are quarterly 
averages of monthly observations. = U.S% dollar price of 
a Mexican peso; = Mexico's price level; P^ = U.S. price 
level. All variables were normalized to 1 in the first 
quarter of 1960. is the coefficient of determination. 
^Equations 4.3.1, 4.3.3, and 4.3.5 were estimated^with 
the consumer price index as the price levels (P^ and P^ ), 
while the remaining equations included the wholesale price 
index in the estimation. 
^Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics to test the null 
hypothesis Hg: is nonstationary in: 
4 
AVt = -0Vt-i + E ^ iAVt-i + €vt' 
i=l 
The 10% critical values for 50, 100 and 150 observations 
are -2.90, -2.91 and -2.98, Engel and Yoo (1987) p. 158. 
^Phillips-Perron statistics to test the null hypothesis 
Hg: Vt is nonstationary in = êV^-i + 0^. The 10% critical 
values for 50, 100 and 150 observations are -2.90, -2.91 
and -2.98, Engle and Yoo (1987) p. 157. 
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* 
in Mexico's price level in U.S. dollars (AE^- the lagged 
* 
change in U.S. price level (AP^ ) was tested by performing 
Granger causality tests. In addition, impulse response 
functions and variance decompositions were used to trace the 
behavior of movements in Mexico's price level. 
Assuming that each single equation of the system (4.12) 
has serially uncorrelated disturbances and has also the same 
number of explanatory variables, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
applied to each equation will result in an asympotmatically 
efficient estimator of A(L), that is equivalent to the 
Generalized Least Squares Estimator (Judge, et al. (1988) p. 
756). Using PC RATS by Doan (1988), system (4.12) was 
estimated by applying OLS to each regression which included 
* * 
one lag of AE^ 'Pt and AP^ ; a constant; the lagged residuals 
of the corresponding co-integration regression (i.e. 
regressions 4.3.2, 4.3.4 and 4.3.6); and two dummy variables 
with values of one in August 1976 and 1982, zero otherwise. 
To determine the order of A(L) Akaike's method, as in 
Judge et al., (1988 p. 761), was used.^° 
Many of the interactions among AE^ 'Pt and AP^ are 
contemporaneous. In a VAR these interactions are captured by 
the correlations among residuals or innovations. 
^°The final-prediction-error due to H. Akaike (1969) is 
described in footnote 20. 
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Table 4.4. Correlation Matrix of the Contemporaneous 
Disturbances® 
AEÎ . Pt AP? 
First Quarter 1960 to Second Quarter 1988 
AEt •Pt 1.00 .1907 
APt 1.00 
First Quarter 1960 to Second Quarter 1976 
AEt •Pt 1.00 .3316 
AP? 
Third Quarter 1976 to Second 
1.00 
Quarter 1988 
AEt •Pt 1.00 .4037 
APÎ 1.00 
^Computed from the least squares residuals from the 
estimated error-correction models using the lagged residuals 
of the co-integration regressions, equations 4.3.2, 4.3.4, and 
4.3.6. Data are quarterly averages of monthly observations. 
Et = U.S. dollar price of a Mexican peso; = Mexico's price 
level; P^ = U.S. price level. All variables were normalized 
to 1 in the first quarter of 1960. 
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Table 4.4, the correlation matrix of contemporaneous 
residuals, shows that innovations in Mexico's price level are 
positively correlated to innovations in the U.S. price level. 
That correlation appears to be larger for the period from the 
third quarter of 1976 to the second quarter of 1988 (equal to 
.4037). The positive correlation between innovations in 
^ 'fc 
AEt 'Pt and AP^ suggest that an unexpected increase in U.S. 
prices would bring about an increase in Mexico's price level. 
Another use of the correlation matrix of contemporaneous 
disturbances, Table 4.4, is to determine whether a given 
ordering of variables has important implications for the 
interpretation of a VAR model. This is because Cholesky's 
method of orthogonalizing innovations is based on these 
contemporaneous correlations. Consequently, by reordering the 
rows and columns of S, we will obtain a different 
factorization matrix. Note, however, that if the 
contemporaneous residuals or innovations are not correlated, 
then any particular ordering will not make any difference, 
since no variance will be explained by other variables of the 
system. So, is there a criterion to follow when choosing a 
particular ordering in the system? Indeed there is. Given 
that P (the Cholesky matrix decomposition of £ ) is lower 
triangular, one should order the variables so that the most 
exogenous variable appears before the less exogenous variable. 
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with the most endogenous variable placed last. This is 
because w^t* the orthogonal shock of the first variable in the 
ordering (the most exogenous), will immediately affect all the 
other variables in the system while , the last variable in 
the ordering, will immediately be affected by innovations from 
any other variable in the system. 
Moreover, we could assume that Mexico's price level is 
the most endogenous and place it last. However, no such 
assumption is made, in which case two orderings were adopted. 
* * 
First AE^ 'Pt and AP^ , and then we reverse it. 
Notice, however, that the F-statistics to test for 
Granger causality are not sensitive to a particular ordering 
of variables. This is because, once the system is estimated 
the F-statistics are calculated before orthogonalizing ^. 
Table 4.5 provides statistical evidence that changes in 
•k 
Mexico's price level in U.S. dollars (AE^ "Pt) are Granger 
ic 
caused by changes in U.S. price levels (AP^ )• This is 
supported by the F-statistics which are all significant at the 
1 percent level. This implies that the null hypothesis that 
the lagged AP^ is equal to zero is rejected at the 1 percent 
it 
level, e.g. lagged AP^ appears to be statistically different 
from zero. As shown by Table 4.5, the F-statistics are 6.95, 
3.86, and 4.86 for the periods 1960-1988, 1960-1976, and 1976-
1988 respectively. 
Next, let us consider the results of the estimation with 
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4f 
an ordering that assumes AEj- 'P^ to be endogenous (i.e., 
ordering AP^ first then AE^ *Pt)• The last two columns of 
Table 4.6 show the variance decomposition of forecast error 2 
to 10 quarters ahead produced by unit innovations in U.S. 
price changes (AP^ ) and in Mexico's price movements 
(AEt 'Pt). Table 4.6 provides statistical evidence that 
* 
innovations in U.S. prices (AP^ ) help explain the forecast 
* 
error variance of Mexico's price level movements (AE^ "Pt)• 
For instance, unit innovations in Ap]^ explain between 10.52 
percent to 17.10 percent of the forecast error of AE^^ 'P^ 
during the period 1960-1988. During 1960-1976 that proportion 
decreased to somewhere between 8 percent and 12 percent, while 
during 1976-1988 that percentage rose, e.g. during the period 
* 
1976-1988, unit innovations in AP^ account for somewhere 
between 27.39 percent to 46.09 percent of the forecast error 
* 
variance of AE^ «Pf 
Moreover, information provided in Table 4.6 suggests that 
* 
U.S. price movements are exogenous to the system. That AP^-
is exogenous to this system is supported by its variance 
decomposition of forecast error which is explained in very 
* 
large proportions by unit innovations in itself (AP^ ). 
Notice that for the period 1976-1988, it reached 100 percent. 
This result lends support to the notion that the U.S. is a 
large country relative to Mexico. 
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Table 4.5. F-Statistics for Granger-Causality Tests^ 
Dependent Variable With Estimated of: 
Regressors" 
Eauation 4.3.2 Eauation 4.3.4 Eauation 4.3.6 
* * * * * * 
AEfc "Pt APt AEt 'Pt APt AEfc 'Pt APt 
AEfc -Pfc 15.58 .27 11.62 1.02 8.01 0.00 
(0.00) (0.60) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.98) 
APt 6.95 40.41 3.86 1.11 4.86 36.29 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00) 
^1 -.0033 .1059 -.0114 (-.39) (.97) (-1.09) 
^2 -.2712 -.3200 -.1055 (-5.87) (-2.69) (-1.82) 
FPE° -11 .88 -15.' 97 -11 .44 
Bp-statistics to test the null hypothesis Hg: all lags of 
a regressor equal zero. 
^Definitions of the variables are given in Tables 4.1 to 
4.4. Numbers under and X2 are the estimates of the 
coefficients of the error-correction term, the residuals 
of the corresponding co-integration equation reported in Table 
4.3. 
^Akaike's final prediction error calculated as suggested 
by Judge, et al., (1985) p. 687, indicated the lag length of 
the regressors to be equal to one for equations using the 
lagged residuals of equations 4.3.2 and 4.3.6. For the 
remaining two regressions the lag length was five. 
Numbers in parentheses are the significance levels of the 
F-statistics, but are t-statistics for and X2. 
170 
Table 4.6. Variance Decomposition of Forecast Error^ 
Triangular Unit Innovations In^ 
Forecast it * * * 
Error in k AEt -Pt ^t APt AEt "Pt 
First Quarter 1960 to Second Quarter 1988 
AEI "Pj. 2 95.57 4.43 10.52 89.48 
4 90.86 9.14 16.03 83.97 
6 89.99 10.01 16.95 83.05 
8 89.86 10.14 17.09 82.91 
10 89.84 10.16 17.10 82.90 
AP% 2 4.49 95.51 99.85 .15 
4 5.04 94.96 99.71 .29 
6 5.13 94.87 99.68 .32 
8 5.14 94.86 99.67 .33 
10 5.14 94.86 99.67 .33 
First Quarter 1960 to Second Quarter 1976 
AEt *Pt 2 82.50 17.50 12.18 87.82 
4 85.08 14.92 8.37 91.63 
6 85.46 14.54 6.98 93.02 
8 85.30 14.70 8.01 91.99 
10 84.04 15.96 8.78 91.22 
APt 2 11.26 88.74 99.98 .02 
4 29.33 70.67 84.90 15.10 
6 38.16 61.84 77.60 22.40 
8 45.93 54.07 68.84 31.16 
10 47.70 52.30 67.49 32.51 
Third Quarter 1976 to Second Quarter 1988 
AE% -Pt 2 94.40 5.60 27,39 72.61 
4 83.93 16.07 39.35 60.65 
6 79.24 20.76 43.72 56.28 
8 77.37 22.63 45.41 54.59 
10 76.60 23.40 46.09 53.91 
AP% 2 16.21 83.79 100.00 0.00 
4 16.13 83.87 100.00 0.00 
6 16.11 83.89 100.00 0.00 
8 16.10 83.90 100.00 0.00 
10 16.09 83.91 100.00 0.00 
® Proportions of forecast error k quarters ahead produced 
by each innovation. Ordering AE^ "P^, AP^ , AP^ , and 
AE^ 'Pf Definitions of variables are given in Tables 4.1 
through 4.4. Price levels are the wholesale price index. 
^Correspond to the innovations ^2t.> "2t wit 
respectively. 
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Figure 4.1. Responses of Mexico's Price in U.S. Dollars, 
AE^ "P^ to Unit-shocks, 1960-1988 
Source: Equation 4.3.2. The ordering is; AP^ , AE^ "Pf 
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Figure 4.2. Responses of Mexico's Price in U.S. Dollars, 
AE^ "P^ to Unit-shocks, 1960-1976 
Source: Equation 4.3.4. The ordering is: AP^ , AE^ -P^. 
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Figure 4.3. Responses of Mexico's Price in U.S. Dollars, 
AE^ 'Pt to Unit-shocks, 1976-1988 
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Source: Equation 4.3.6. The ordering is: AP^ , AE^ -P^. 
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Next, let us discuss the k-step-ahead impulse response 
yip 
function of AE^ to orthogonal unit shocks in AP^ . 
Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show the responses of Mexico's price 
A 
level movements (AE^ 'Pt) to unit innovations in U.S. price 
changes (ApJ ) for 1960-1988, 1960-1976 and 1976-1988, 
respectively. Figures 4.1 and 4.3 show a positive response of 
A 
AE^ *Pt to unit innovations in AP^ which rises during the 
first two quarters and then decreases over time. This result, 
together with the F-test for Granger causality and the 
variance decomposition analysis, supports the notion that 
Mexican price levels movements respond to U.S. price changes, 
but not the opposite. In other words, the empirical evidence 
of this chapter supports the assumptions commonly made in the 
literature that Mexico is a small country and that purchasing 
power parity holds between Mexico and the U.S. during the 
period 1960-1988. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter co-integration and vector autoregressions 
(VAR) techniques were used to test whether PPP held between 
Mexico and the U.S. By way of testing for co-integration 
between Mexican and U.S. prices expressed in the same 
currency, the null hypothesis of non-co-integration (e.g. PPP 
did not hold) was rejected. The data period was from the 
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first quarter of 1960 to the second quarter of 1988. The 
testing was performed using both consumer and wholesale price 
indices. 
After finding co-integration between the price levels of 
Mexico and the U.S., an error-correction model was estimated. 
Furthermore, Granger causality tests derived from the 
estimated VAR, together with impulse response function and 
variance decomposition of forecast error, suggest that the 
Mexican price level and/or the nominal exchange rate adjusted 
as to maintain PPP during 1960-1988. 
That statistical finding also lends support to the 
assumption, often made in the literature of international 
economics, that Mexico is a small country, in the sense that 
it is a price taker in world markets. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE DEMAND FOR MONEY IN MEXICO: 
EVIDENCE OF AN ERROR-CORRECTION MODEL 
AND CO-INTEGRATION 
Introduction 
The conditions of equilibrium in the money market are 
of considerable importance in practically all theories that 
explain aggregate economic activity. A clear understanding 
and measurement of this market is fundamental in formulating 
an appropriate monetary policy. 
In particular, on the demand side, there have been 
various estimations of the money demand function using 
Mexican data. The estimated regressions of these studies 
have included a measurement of real income and expected 
inflation which resulted in positive and negative 
coefficients, respectively. 
Recent developments in econometrics, however, allow us 
to question those results. Specifically, those money demand 
studies of Mexico do not recognize that if the time series 
involved in the empirical estimation are not stationary or 
alternatively, their variables contain unit roots, then the 
results obtained may be subject to doubt. 
On the one hand, if nonstationary variables used in the 
estimation are entered in levels, then the results will be 
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subject to "spurious regression phenomenon". On the other 
hand, if the same nonstationary variables enter the 
estimation in first or second difference form, then a 
possible long-run relationship might be ignored. A problem 
with the latter approach is that if the time series involved 
observe a long-run relationship, then they should be modeled 
as co-integrated variables and not as first difference 
variables. This is because differencing removes much of the 
long-run characteristics of the data. In other words, as 
Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987) have shown, 
modeling co-integrated data in differences will result in 
misspecification error, while modeling the same data in 
levels will omit important constraints. They suggest 
modeling co-integrated variables as an error-correction 
model. 
In this chapter, the co-integration methodology 
suggested by Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger (1987) is 
applied to quarterly Mexican data with the purpose of 
empirically estimating a money demand function for the 
period from the first quarter of 1968 to the first quarter 
of 1991. This chapter is organized as follows. The 
following section presents a discussion of an error-
correction money demand model, co-integration, and its 
empirical implementation. Next, the empirical results are 
reported, and the final section presents some conclusions. 
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An Error-Correction Money Demand Model 
and Co-integration 
In an inflationary economy the long-run demand for 
money can be formulated as suggested by Cagan (1956). In 
Cagan's view the demand for money is a function of a 
transaction's demand component and an opportunity cost 
variable associated with real money holdings. 
Empirically, Cagan's equation of a long-run real money 
demand can be formulated as equation (1); 
Mt = #0 + PiYt + #3*t + (5.1) 
where m^ is the natural logarithm of the real money demand; 
/Sq is a constant; is the long-run income elasticity; y^ 
is the natural logarithm of real income; 183 is the long-run 
semi-elasticity of expected inflation; is the expected 
rate of inflation; is the long-run random disturbance 
term; and the subscript t denotes time. The money demand 
elasticities are assumed to be > 0 and 03 < 0. 
^^Most empirical studies of money demand equations 
include an interest rate instead of an expected rate of 
inflation. However, in an inflationary economy with a 
controlled interest rate policy, such an interest rate 
captures neither market conditions nor an opportunity cost 
of holding money. 
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Furthermore, since money market equilibrium may not hold all 
the time, Goldfeld's postulate of a partial adjustment 
mechanism is assumed: 
(mt - mt-l) - 7(®t ~ Mt-l) (5.2) 
where m^ is the natural logarithm of the real money supply 
and 0 < 7 < 1. To interpret 7, let us rewrite equation 
(5.2) in a different form: 
mt = 7«»t + (1 - 7)mt-l (5.3) 
Thus, the value of 7, between zero and one, represents 
the speed of adjustment in the money market. The closer the 
value of 7 to one, the faster the speed of adjustment 
between the stock of money and the demand for money. Thus 
if 7 = 1, then m^ = mt 
Now, substituting equation (5.1) into equation (5.3) we 
obtain: 
mt = 7^0 + T^iYt + T^S^t + (l-7)mt_i + 7Ut (5.4) 
Implicitly assuming that all variables in (5.4) are 
stationary, this equation (5.4) has been estimated with data 
from Mexico. All of those studies provide statistical 
evidence of positive and negative coefficient estimates for 
real income and the expected rate of inflation, respectively 
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(Genel (1971), Rizzo (1972), Diaz de la Garza (1973), Gomez-
Oliver (1976), Ortiz (1980a), Ortiz (1980b), and De La Cruz 
Martinez (1982). However, if Yt» and are not 
stationary or alternatively, these time series contain unit 
roots, then the statistical results of these time series 
will be questionable. 
Stationarity in a variable is an important property for 
several reasons. First, stationarity guarantees that the 
effects of a random shock on a variable will die out over 
time. Second, if nonstationary variables are used in 
statistical tests any conclusions based upon t- or 
F-statistics will be misleading. This is known as "spurious 
regression phenomenon" (Granger and Newbold (1974), Sims, 
Stock, and Watson (1986), Phillips (1986), and Ohania 
(1988)). Third, the regression estimators of a regression 
with unit root variables will not be consistent (Phillips 
(1986) and West (1988)). And fourth, in estimating long-run 
or equilibrium relationships, such as a money demand 
equation, it is important to determine whether the variables 
are stationary (Granger (1986) and Engle and Granger 
(1987)). 
The traditional model equation (5.4) has been estimated 
using variables entering a regression in natural logarithms 
of their respective levels. Therefore, those regression 
results would be subject to "spurious regression phenomenon" 
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if unit roots were detected in the regressors (Nelson and 
Plosser (1982) and Engle and Granger (1987)). Furthermore, 
to avoid such nonstationarity in the regressors, other 
authors have used variables in first differences (Fackler 
and McMillin (1983), and Hetzel and Mehra (1989)). 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, this differenced-
variable approach has also been questioned by the co-
integration and error-correction approach (Granger (1986) 
and Engle and Granger (1987)). They have argued that if the 
nonstationary time series involved observe a long-run 
relationship, or their nonstationarity arises from the same 
common source, then they should be modeled as co-integrated 
variables. Moreover, the authors suggest modeling co-
integrated variables as an error-correction model. Such a 
model will attempt to capture both a long-run relationship 
and short-run dynamics in the same regression. The 
adjustment toward long-run equilibrium will be imposed by an 
error-correction term, while the short-run dynamics will be 
captured by the differenced variables, both of which entered 
the same regression equation. This methodology has been 
applied to the estimation of money demand equations by 
Hendry and Richard (1982), Hendry, Pagan and Sargan (1983), 
Trehan (1988), Small and Porter (1989), Baum and Furno 
(1990), Hendry and Ericsson (1990), Melnick (1990), Hafer 
and Jansen (1991), Mehra (1991), Miller (1991) and Mehra 
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(1993). Most of those studies report estimations using data 
from industrialized countries. For the case of Mexico, this 
type of estimation is rare in the literature. Let us 
describe this modern approach to estimating money demand 
equations. 
The co-integration, error-correction money demand model 
has two parts. The first part is the long-run equilibrium 
model and the second part is the error-correction equation. 
In the long-run equilibrium model, it is assumed that money 
supply equals money demand and can be represented by 
equation (5.5); 
mt = Oq + oiyt + a2^t + Vt (5.5) 
where m^- is the natural logarithm of the real money supply; 
ttg is a constant; is the long-run income elasticity; y^ 
is the natural logarithm of real income; 0:2 is the long-run 
semi-elasticity of expected inflation; is the expected 
rate of inflation; V^. is the long-run random disturbance 
term; and the subscript t denotes time. The elasticities 
are assumed to be > 0 and 02 < 0. Regarding this long-
run equilibrium or co-integration equation (5.5), the modern 
approach considers that individually m^, y^, and may be 
nonstationary while a linear combination of them will be 
stationary. If this is the case, then these series are said 
to be co-integrated. More formally, following Granger 
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(1986) and Engle and Granger (1987), Xit, ^2t.» ^3t are 
considered to be co-integrated if the following is 
satisfied. First, X2tf Xg^ are all integrated of 
the same order d, i.e., X^t, X2t' and X^j. achieve 
stationarity after differencing them d times denoted as X^^ 
~ 1(d), X2t ~ 1(d), and X^^ ~ 1(d). Second, there exists a 
vector of constants (o^, «2' ®3) such that the linear 
combination is stationary. Thus, will take a form: 
®l^lt G2%2t ®3*3t - ^t (5.6) 
In (5.6) if Z^ is stationary, then X^t, X2t, and X^^ share a 
common stochastic trend. Thus, the long-run movements in 
these time series are related to one another. Furthermore, 
considering Z^ as V^, the existence of the long-run money 
demand specification (5.5) requires to be stationary and 
m^, y^, and to be integrated of the same order. For the 
time being, let us assume that the long-run money demand 
(5.5) exists, or, alternatively, let us assume that m^, y^/ 
and TT^ are co-integrated. 
The second part consists of an error-correction model 
such as equation (5.7): 
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+ E *3S S=0 
+ \Vt_i + (5.7) 
where all variables are defined as above; A is the first 
difference operator, i.e., the i's are 
regression coefficients; nl, n2, and n3 are the number of 
lags of the corresponding variable; V^-i is the lagged value 
of the long-run random disturbance term; is the short-
run disturbance term; and the subscript t denotes time. The 
parameter X in the equation (5.7) is expected to be negative 
and captures the adjustment of real money balances, Am^, 
toward long-run equilibrium, while the lagged variables in 
the right-hand side of that equation capture the short-run 
dynamics of this model. 
Notice that as Mehra (1991) pointed out, on the one 
hand, the existence of the error-correction model equation 
(5.7), implicitly requires the error term to be 
stationary. being stationary means that the money 
supply, m^, will not permanently drift away from its long-
run specification equation (5.5). On the other hand, if 
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is not stationary, then will permanently drift away from 
its long-run specification, and thus estimating equation 
(5.5) will yield results subject to the "spurious regression 
phenomenon" and the estimates of the coefficients will not 
be consistent. 
To illustrate, first let us take equation (5.5) and lag 
it one period. Second, using the results obtained in the 
previous step, take the first difference of equation (5.5) 
and express the result as equation (5.8): 
Am^ = OiAyt + - V^-i (5.8) 
Third, assume that follows a first-order autoregressive 
process such as equation (5.9): 
Vt = pVt-i + ^it (5.9) 
where e^t is a white noise error term. Finally, 
substituting equation (5.9) into equation (5.8), after 
rearranging terms we obtain: 
Amt = «t^yt + a2Ant + (P ~ + ^it (5.10) 
Letting X = (p- 1), equations (5.7) and (10) can be thought 
of as similar error-correction models. Now, if 0 < p < 1 
i.e., Vj. is stationary, then X in (5.7) is different from 
zero. However, if p = 1, i.e., is not stationary, then X 
= 0. This will mean that an error-correction model would 
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not exist and thus, the first difference approach will be 
appropriate as a money demand model. Consequently, the 
modern approach or co-integration approach, equation (5.7), 
requires to be stationary. 
Assuming that in (5.5) is stationary, i.e., the 
co-integration equation (5.5) exists, the error-correction 
model (5.7) can be estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares 
method in two alternative ways. The first alternative 
involves two steps. The first step requires estimating the 
long-run equation (5.5) and calculating the estimated 
residuals of Vf The second step entails estimating the 
error-correction model (5.7) using the estimated residuals 
of V^, lagged one period, in place of V^-i (Baum and Furno 
(1990), Melnick (1990), Hafer and Jansen (1991), Hendry and 
Ericsson (1991), and Miller (1991)). The long-run money 
demand elasticities are estimated in step one, and the 
short-run money demand parameters are estimated in step two. 
Alternatively, a second method to estimate the error-
correction model consists of replacing V^-i by the one-
period lag of the long-run money demand equation (5.5), 
(Small and Porter (1989) and Mehra (1991)). This means that 
first we lag (5.5) one period and solve it for V^-i. Next, 
we substitute that result into the error-correction model 
(5.7) so that the following equation (5.11) is obtained: 
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+ E 03s A^t-s 
S=0 
+ e^mt-l + Gs^t-l 
+ Gg^t-i + ^et (5.11) 
where G q = (*o " koo)' ®ls = *ls' ®2s = *2s' ®3s = *3s? 
04 = X; ©5 = -Xtti; ©6 = -\a2; and = e*f Here, the 
long-run and short-run money demand elasticities can be 
recovered from the estimated parameters of (5.11). For 
instance, the long-run income elasticity is 85 divided by 
©4; the long-run semi-elasticity of the expected rate of 
inflation «2 is Gg divided by G4; and the error coefficient 
X is G4, (Small and Porter (1989) and Mehra (1991)). 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the empirical 
implementation of the modern or co-integration, error-
correction approach, involves four steps (Granger (1986) and 
Engle and Granger (1987)). 
Step one consists of testing for unit roots or 
determining the order of integration of m^, y^ and Two 
tests are adopted which are asymptotically equivalent. They 
are known as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and 
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Fuller (1979)) and the Phi Hips-Perron test (Phillips 
(1987), Phillips and Perron (1988), and Perron (1988)). 
These tests are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
Step two is to determine whether the stochastic trends 
in these variables are related to one another. This is 
equivalent to determining whether there is a statistical 
long-run relationship between variables that contain unit 
roots. We do this by estimating the equilibrium or co-
integrating equation (5.5), by the Ordinary Least Squares 
method. 
In the third step the estimated residuals of the 
co-integration regression, say, V^, are tested to determine 
whether they are stationary. Now, if appears to be 
stationary — i.e., it does not contain a unit root, while 
mt, ytf and each have a unit root — then these variables 
are said to be co-integrated. In that case, ordinary least 
squares estimators of (5.5) are consistent as shown by West 
(1988). To test Vt for stationarity we employ three tests: 
the Dickey-Fuller test (DF), the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test (ADF), and the Phillips-Perron test. 
In the fourth step an error-correction model is 
estimated. This amounts to estimating either the error-
correction money demand equation (5.7) or equation (5.11) by 
the Ordinary Least Squares method. Estimating an error-
correction model is important because the existence of co-
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integrating relationships tells us only about long-run 
relationships, but not about the short-run dynamics which 
are also important. 
Empirical Results 
In this section the empirical results are discussed. 
Drawing from our discussion of the previous section, we 
follow four steps. First, unit root tests are performed by 
estimating the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-
Perron regressions for m^, yt and Wf The results of unit 
root testing these variables' levels are reported in Table 
5.1, and the results for their first differences are 
reported in Table 5.2. Second, the co-integrating money 
demand regression, equation (5.5), is estimated. Third, the 
equilibrium regression is tested for co-integration. The 
results of both step 2 and step 3 are reported in Table 5.3. 
In the fourth and final step, two alternative error-
correction models are estimated and reported in Tables 5.4 
and 5.5. Estimating the error-correction models, equations 
(5.7) and (5.11), will allow us to obtain and compare the 
long-run money demand elasticities under two different 
approaches. Both estimation approaches provided similar 
results. 
Table 5.1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
Xt No Trend® Trendb No Trend® Trend^ 
P P ADF P P ADF a* Z(ta*) a Z(ta) 
ml 8 -.0562 -2.29 8 -.0558 -2.25 .9538 -1.77 .9532 -1.83 
m2 8 -.0425 -1.83 8 -.0590 -2.21 .9531 -1.99 .9555 -1.92 
m3 6 -.0236 -0.98 6 -.0825 -1.76 .9691 -1.28 .9158 -2.18 
y 4 -.0229 -1.80 4 -.0695 -1.89 .9836 -1.46 .9457 -1.52 
IT 6 -.0514 -1.96 6 -.1129 -2.24 .9555 -1.96 .9538 -2.04 
ml = natural logarithm (Ml/CPI); m2 = natural logarithm (M2/CPI); m3 = natural 
logarithn (M3/CPI); Ml, M2, M3 are definitions of money; CPI is consumer price 
index; y = natural logarithm of industrial production index; tt is the rate of 
inflation. 
P 
® Values under p are OLS estimates of that parameter in AX^ = pO + pX^-i +, E 
1—1 
7iAXt_i + Uj.. The 10%, 5% and 1% critical values to test the null hypothesis Hg: 
p=0 are -2.58, -2.89, and -3.51 respectively. Fuller (1976) p. 273. 
p 
^ Values under p are OLS estimates of that parameter in AX^ = fiO + pX^-i + S 
i=l 
7iAXt_i + MiT + u^. The 10%, 5% and 1% critical values to test the null hypothesis 
Hq: p=0 are -3.15 -3.45, and -4.04 respectively, Fuller (1976) p. 273. 
^ Values under a* are its OLS estimates in X^ = M* + a*Xt_i + U^. The 
critical values to test the null hypothesis Hq: a =1 are given in note a above. 
^ Values under a are OLS estimates of that parameter in = n + i8(T-N/2) + 
oYt-l ^t* The critical values to test Hg: a = 1 are given in note b above. 
Table 5.2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
Xt No Trend® Trendb No Trend® Trend^ 
P P ADF P P ADF a* Z(ta*) a Z(tS) 







r H 1 
.1003 -10.10 
Am2 7 -.4198 -2.10 7 -.4267 -1.82 .3601 -6.44 .3508 -6.43 






6 -.1.0631 -4.20 .0112 -9.26 .0120 -9.27 
Ay 5 -.9749 -3.72 5 -1.0842 
00 CO m
 
1 .0449 -9.91 .0562 -9.91 
An 5 -.5063 -3.82 6 -.16195 -4.15 .6804 -3.54 .6771 -3.56 
ml = natural logarithm (Ml/CPI); m2 = natural logarithm (M2/CPI); m3 = natural 
logarithn (M3/CPI); Ml, M2, M3 are definitions of money; CPI is consumer price 
index; y = natural logarithm of industrial production index; n is the rate of 
inflation. 
P 
® Values under p are OLS estimates of that parameter in AX^ = pO + pX^-i + S 
i"l 
7j[AXt_i + U^. The 10%, 5% and 1% critical values to test the null hypothesis Hg: 
p=0 are -2.58, -2.89, and -3.51 respectively. Fuller (1976) p. 273. 
, P 
" Values under p are OLS estimates of that parameter in AX^ = nO + pX^-i + E 
1—1 
7iAXt_i + MiT + U^. The 10%, 5% and 1% critical values to test the null hypothesis 
Hg: p=0 are -3.15 -3.45, and -4.04 respectively, Fuller (1976) p. 273. 
^ Values under a* are OLS estimates of that parameter in X^ = M* + a*Xt_i + U^. 
The critical values to test the null hypothesis Hg: a* = 1 are given in note a 
above. 
Values under a are OLS estimates of that parameter in X^ = M + l8(T-N/2) + 
oYt-i + The critical values to test Hg: 5=1 are given in note b above. 
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The data are quarter averages of all series for the 
period from the first quarter of 1969 to the first quarter 
of 1991. Except for the industrial production index, IPI, 
all data are taken from Indicadores Economicos, Banco de 
Mexico. IPI is from International Financial Statistics, 
line 66, IMF. The definitions of money supply are as 
follows. Ml is currency in circulation plus demand deposits 
in domestic and foreign currency, M2 is Ml plus banking 
instruments with maturity of up to one year plus bankers' 
acceptances; and M3 is M2 plus CETES, PAGAFES, BONDES and 
commercial paper. These securities are non-banking liquid 
investments with a minimum maturity of one year. The money 
supply enters the regressions in natural logarithm of the 
monetary aggregate deflated by the consumer price index. 
They are denoted by the lower case ml, m2, and m3. The 
variable y^ is the natural logarithm of the industrial 
production index. The expected rate of inflation, tt^, is 
proxied by the actual rate of inflation measured by the 
percentage change in the consumer price index. RATS version 
3.11 by Doan (1988) was used in all estimations. 
The results of the unit root tests, reported in Tables 
5.1 and 5.2, provide statistical evidence that ml^, m2t, 
m3j., yt and are all integrated of order one. Thus, their 
levels are not stationary but their first differences are. 
This conclusion is supported by both the Augmented Dickey-
Table 5.3. Co-Integration Regressions and Co-Integration Tests& 
Coefficients of 
Variable 
Constant Y n 





















.8881 .3427 -2.85 -3.76 -3.67 
^ The OLS residuals from the co-integrating regression, denoted by are 
used in the co-integration tests. CPI = Mexico's consumer price index; Ml, M2, and 
M3 are definitions of money supply, ml = natural logarithm (Ml/CPI), m2 = natural 
logarithm of (M2/CPI), m3 = natural logarithm of (M3/CPI). y = natural logarithm 
of the industrial production index; n = rate of inflation which is the percentage 
change in the CPI. and DW are the coefficient of determination and the Durbin-
Watson statistic respectively. 
^ Dickey-Fuller statistics to test the null hypothesis Hg: is 
nonstationary in AV^ = + ^vt* The 10%, 5%, and 1% critical values are 
-3.59, -3.93, and -4.45, Engle and Yoo (1987) p. 157. 
^ Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics to test the null hypothesis Hg: is 
nonstationary in AV^ = -0Vt_i +.Ê ^ i^^t-i + ^vt* The 10%, 5% and 1% critical 
1—1 
values are -3.32, -3.62, and -4.22 respectively, Engle and Yoo (1987) p. 158. 
^ Phillips-Perron statistics to test the null hypothesis Hq: is 
nonstationary in + 0^. The 10%, 5%, and 1% critical values are -3.59, 
-3.93, and -4.45 respectively, Engle and Yoo (1987) p. 157. 
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Fuller tests and the Phillips-Perron tests which were 
performed with and without trends. This is also supported by 
Perron's unit root tests that account for structural breaks 
in the time series which are reported in Appendix A. In the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, the lag length p, was chosen 
by the Akaike (1969) criterion. In the Phillips-Perron 
tests, adjusted t-statistics were calculated for lags 1 to 
12. After 8 lags these t-statistics were very similar and 
so this is the only one reported. The statistical results 
of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 suggest to continue further and test 
for co-integration. 
Table 5.3 presents the co-integration regressions and 
their tests for co-integration. Three definitions of money 
supply were utilized, but only m3 seems to observe a long-
run relationship with income and the rate of inflation, i.e. 
only m3t, yt» and seem to be co-integrated. Such a 
conclusion is supported by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test and by the Phillips-Perron (PP) test but not by the 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) test.3% 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the results of estimating the 
money demand error-correction for both alternative one, 
^^A RATS program provided by Dr. Walter Enders and Dr. 
Barry Falk from Iowa State University, and further modified by 
the author, was used in the Phillips-Perron unit root tests 
for co-integration. In the other Phillips-Perron tests, the 
programs provided with the RATS software were used. 
195 
equation (5.7), and alternative two, equation (5.11). For 
each alternative several models were estimated. All the 
regressions included seasonal dummy variables (Dl, D2 and 
D3), and dummy variables to account for the nationalization 
of the banking system (DM824) and for the adoption of a 
crawling-peg regime in 1976 (DM764). In both cases the 
maximum number of lags was determined by the final 
prediction error (FPE) suggested by Akaike (1969) which 
corresponds to models 5.1 and 5.4. The other models 5.2, 
5.3, 5.5, and 5.6 were determined by eliminating the lagged 
variables of regressors which were not statistically 
significant. 
Moreover, Chow stability tests were estimated for two 
periods. The first test of the money demand equation for m3 
provides no statistical evidence of a structural change from 
the period of a fixed exchange rate to the crawling-peg 
regime (August 1976). However, the second Chow tests do 
provide statistical evidence of a structural change after 
1988 (third quarter), when the authorities implemented 
various economic reforms (see Chapter 2). 
The estimates of the error-correction term, X, the 
coefficient of in the first alternative and 64, the 
coefficient of mS^-i in the second, are of the correct 
negative sign and significant in all models. Its size 
varies from -.16 to -.13. This means that about 16 percent 
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Table 5.4. Error-Correction Models; Dependent Variable 
Variable 













Constant .0576 9.41 .0572 9.69 .0680 9.54 
D1 -.0963 -9.52 -.0983 -10.39 -.1095 -11.06 
D2 -.0760 -7.09 -.0752 - 7.42 -.0565 - 5.71 
D3 -.0570 -5.41 -.0541 - 6.02 -.0662 - 7.22 
DM764 -.0712 -2.49 -.0713 - 2.52 -.0754 - 2.45 
DM824 .1500 5.52 .1501 5.61 .1512 5.17 
A^t -.4207 -4.84 -.4104 - 4.84 -.3479 - 3.81 
Ant-1 -.0790 -0.82 
Ayt .1937 1.66 .2223 2.03 .2639 2.23 
Ayt-1 .0310 .26 
Am3t_i .3205 3.65 .3504 4.42 .4322 5.15 
Am3t_2 .3494 3.80 .3144 4.08 
Vt-1 -.1575 -4.28 -.1656 - 4.74 -.1421 - 3.80 
R2 .7844 .7822 .7332 
X^d) 3 .22 3.01 2.49 
V n  -.2718 
V y  .9126 
FPE® -7.062 
Chow^ 1.01 1.31 1.21 
Chow^ 1.90 1.91 1.96 
Dlf D2, D3, DM764, and DM824 are dummy variables; A is the first 
difference operator; definitions of n, y, and m3 are given in Table 5.3; 
R is the coefficient of determination; X (1) is the lagrange multiplier 
proposed by Godfrey (1978) to test for first order serial correlation; 
and and rjy are the long-run money demand elasticities of inflation 
and income respectively. 
^Akaike's final prediction error calculated as suggested by Judge, 
et al. (1985) p. 667, indicated the lag length to equal 1. 
^chow test for structural change from the fixed exchange rate to 
the crawling-peg (fixed rate is up to second quarter 1976). 
°Chow test for structural change after third quarter 1988. 
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Table 5.5. Error-Correction Model: Dependent Variable 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variable Esti­ t- Esti­ t- Esti­ t-
mate value mate value mate value 
Constant -.3035 -3.41 -.2982 -3.61 -.2661 - 3.03 
Dl -.0905 -9.16 -.0913 -9.79 -.0986 -10.12 
D2 -.0689 -6.55 -.0701 -7.16 -.5360 - 5.79 
D3 -.0549 -5.44 -.0565 -6.58 -.0670 - 7.83 
DM764 -.0850 -2.93 -.0797 -2.95 -.0846 - 2.92 
DM824 .1454 5.54 .1465 5.69 .1459 5.30 
ATT^ -.4247 -5.11 -.4279 -5.27 -.3821 - 4.45 
Ant-1 -.0379 - .04 
Ayt .1448 1.26 .1505 1.40 .1709 1.50 
Ayt-1 .0385 .34 
Am3t_i .2394 2.69 .2365 2.79 .2745 3.05 
Am3t_2 .2744 2.97 .2684 3.58 
*t-l -.2056 -3.42 -.2022 -3.69 -.2368 - 4.10 
Yt-l .1545 4.56 .1524 4.82 .1368 4.09 
m3t_i -.1574 -4.46 -.1553 -4.62 -.1330 - 3.79 
R2 .8084 .8081 .7740 
X^(l) 3.68 3.06 3.23 
V n  -1.3062 -1.3010 -1.7819 
V y  .9813 .9812 1.0285 
PPE® -7.0641 
Chow^ .96 1.16 1.33 
Chow® 1.99 1.71 1.69 
Dl, D2, D3, DM764, and DM824 are dummy variables: A is the first 
difference operator; definitions of ir, y,_and mS are given in Table 3; 
is the coefficient of determination; % (1) is the lagrange multiplier 
proposed by Godfrey (1978) to test for first order serial correlation; 
and and are the long-run money demand elasticities of inflation 
and income. ' 
®Akaike's final prediction error calculated as suggested by Judge, 
et al., (1985) p. 667, indicated the lag length to equal 1. 
bfCsee notes b and c in Table 5.4. 
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(13 percent) of the money supply of the previous quarter's 
deviation from its long-run equilibrium value will be 
corrected each quarter. Furthermore, the coefficients for 
An, as expected, are all negative. The coefficients for Ay 
also have the expected positive sign. Both alternative 
estimations provide long-run elasticities of the money 
demand for M3 with respect to income which are about .9 and 
1.0. The elasticity of the expected rate of inflation of 
the money demand for M3 varies from -.3 to -1.7. These 
elasticities are for the most part similar to the ones 
reported in other studies of Mexico's money demand equations 
(Gômez Oliver (1976), Ortiz (1980a), Ortiz (1980b), and De 
La Cruz Martinez (1982). 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, quarterly money demand functions were 
estimated for the period of the first quarter of 1969 to the 
first quarter of 1991. The methodology applied was that of 
co-integration and error-correction models. Although three 
definitions of money supply were tested ( ml, m2, and m3 ), 
only the aggregate m3 seems to observe a long-run 
relationship with income and inflation— that is, only m3, 
income, and inflation appear to be co-integrated. 
While the long-run income elasticity of money demand 
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for M3 seems to be about 1.0, the long-run money demand 
elasticity with respect to the rate of inflation seems to be 
between -.3 and -1.3. Furthermore, the estimated money 
demand error-correction models suggest that somewhere 
between 13 percent and 16 percent of the previous quarter 
money supply deviation from its long-run equilibrium value 
will be corrected within a quarter. 
In addition, Chow tests for structural changes in the 
money demand for M3 provide statistical evidence of a 
structural change in the period after 1988, but not after 
the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime (August 
1976). 
Finally, in the case of a small open economy in which 
the money stock is endogenous, the error-correction 
regression can be interpreted as the endogenous response of 
the money-stock growth rate to adjustments in the economy 
(Miller (1991)). For instance, in the case of Mexico, if 
the Monetary authorities undertook a fixed or crawling-peg 
exchange rate regime then the money stock would adjust to 
equilibrate the balance of payments. In that case Mexico 
would no longer have control over its monetary policy. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding chapters consist of three 
applications of modern time series analysis to data from 
Mexico. Specifically, co-integration, error-correction, and 
vector autoregression techniques were applied to balance of 
payments, exchange rates, and monetary aggregates data to 
test for the existance of a statistical long-run or 
equilibrium relationships. 
In Chapter 2, an overview of Mexico's macroeconomic 
performance was presented. This chapter allowed us to 
identify key dates that were taken as a reference when 
testing for structural changes in the empirical estimation. 
In Chapter 3, the nature of the relationship between 
domestic credit, international reserves, and the exchange 
rate embodied in the monetary model of exchange market 
pressure, was studied for the period from the first quarter 
of 1971 to the second quarter of 1988. The results obtained 
suggest the existence of a long-run relationship among those 
variables —that is, those variables appear to be co-
integrated. Furthermore, innovation accounting techniques 
and multivariate Granger causality tests, performed within 
an error-correction model, support a bidirectional causality 
from changes in international reserves and exchange rate to 
changes in domestic credit, and vice versa. Therefore, 
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first, the implicit assumption of the monetary model of 
exogenous domestic credit is not supported. Second, the 
results support the notion that Mexico's monetary 
authorities adjust domestic assets to neutralize exogenous 
balance of payments deficits on the monetary base in an 
attempt to control its money supply. 
In Chapter 4, purchasing power parity was examined by 
way of testing for co-integration between relative prices of 
Mexico and the U.S., expressed in the same currency. The 
null hypothesis of non co-integration in the two relative 
prices was rejected. Thus, the notion that purchasing power 
parity held in Mexico from 1960-1988 was supported by the 
statistical analysis. Furthermore, innovation accounting 
and Granger causality tests derived from the estimated VAR 
support the finding that Mexican prices and/or nominal 
exchange rate adjust to maintain PPP. 
In Chapter 5, the co-integration and error-correction 
methodology was applied to estimating a quarterly money 
demand model. Although three definitions of money supply 
were used, only the aggregate M3 seems to observe a long-run 
relationship with income and the rate of inflation. While 
the long-run income money demand elasticity seems to be 
about 1.0, the long-run money demand elasticity with respect 
to inflation appears to be between -.3 and -1.3. Finally, 
the estimated money demand error-correction models suggest 
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that about 16 percent of the previous quarter money supply 
deviation from its long-run equilibrium value will be 
corrected within a quarter. Structural Chow tests 
performed during the 1969-1991 period detected a structural 
change in the money demand for M3 only after 1988. 
The results obtained in this research do not contradict 
previous research on the topics studied. Nevertheless, when 
working with nonstationary time series, one should account 
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APPENDIX A. UNIT ROOT TESTS AND STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
Neither the Dickey-Fuller test nor the Phillips-Perron 
test take into consideration that structural changes may 
have an effect on the testing for stationarity in economic 
variables. As Perron (1989) has shown, the Dickey-Fuller 
and Phillips-Perron tests are biased towards accepting the 
null hypothesis of a unit root. He concluded that, contrary 
to Nelson and Plosser's (1982) finding, most U.S. 
macroeconomic variables turn out to be stationary when 
proper procedures to account for structural breaks are 
adopted in the testing. 
By applying his newly developed unit root test, which 
accounts for structural breaks, to the very same variables 
used by Nelson and Plosser, Perron (1989) concluded that the 
great crash of 1929 and the oil price shock of 1973 were the 
main reasons that nonstationarity was found in Nelson and 
Plosser's analysis. In other words, if structural breaks 
are explicitly incorporated into the unit root tests, most 
U.S. macroeconomic series will be found stationary. 
Perron (1989) and Rappoport and Reichlin (1989) argued 
that the Dickey-Fuller test failed to reject the unit root 
hypothesis because the time series reflected a broken trend. 
Perron (1989) developed a modified Dickey-Fuller test that 
considers as a null hypothesis the presence of a unit root 
222 
in a time series with an alternative hypothesis that the 
data are stationary about a broken trend. In other words. 
Perron (1989) developed a procedure for testing the null 
hypothesis that a given series y^ has a unit root with a 
drift, and an exogenous structural break occurs at time Tg, 
against the alternative hypothesis that the time series is 
stationary about a deterministic time trend with an 
exogenous change in the trend at time Tg. He developed 
three models. Here we only consider his model C, which 
involves estimating the following augmented regression 
equation; 
k 
Yt = P + PiDTBi + P2DU2 + /33T + 184014 + ayt_i + E (Al) 
i=l 
Where the dummy variables are defined as follows. DTB^ = 1 
if T = Tg + 1, 0 otherwise; DU2 = 1 if T > Tg, 0 otherwise; 
T is a time trend; DT4 = T if T > Tg, 0 otherwise. This 
model allows for both changes in the level and in the slope 
of the trend function of the series. 
To formally test for the presence of a unit root. 
Perron suggested using the standard t-statistic for a = 1 
against his critical values reported in table VI.B, p. 1377 
at some confidence level. These statistics depend on the 
location of the break X = Tg/N (N is the sample size). 
Reject the null hypothesis of a unit root if the absolute 
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value of the calculated t-statistic is greater than the 
absolute value of the critical value. 
In Tables A1 through A6, the structural unit root tests 
of the time series of Chapters 3 through 5 of this 
dissertation are reported. Two structural changes were 
considered; first, the change in the exchange rate regime of 
1976 (Tg = third quarter 1976), and second the external debt 
crisis of 1982 (Tg = third quarter of 1982). The results 
suggest that, without exception, all the time series studied 
contain unit roots in their levels. Therefore, both the 
Perron tests and the traditional Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron tests support the same results of nonstationarity. 
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Table Al. Unit Roots Tests with Structural Break 
Third Quarter 1976 
y? At #2 f3 f4 ab 
ct 0. 2637 -0.1490 -0.1617 -0.0069 0.0093 -0 .7130 
(1. 97) (-1.06) (-1.08) (-0.95) (1.24) ( -1 .84) 
(r-e)t 0. 1070 -0.5703 0.2421 -0.0016 —0.0066 -1 .1325 
(0. 76) (-3.59) (1.41) (-0.21) (-0.77) ( -0 .46) 
at -0. 1323 0.5408 -0.5460 0.0055 -0.0015 -0 .6850 
(-1. 78) (6.62) (-0.66) (1.31) (-0.36) ( -2 .36) 
Yt 0. 0447 -0.0818 0.0178 -0.0012 0.0002 -0 .4715 
(1. 51) (-2.39) (0.54) (-0.78) (0.15) ( -1 .35) 
0. 0147 0.1087 -0.1014 0.0009 0.0029 0 .0984 
(0. 36) (2.39) (-1.96) (0.41) (1.18) (0 .42) 
* 
Pt 0. 0121 —0.0060 0.0025 -0.0002 0.0001 0 .6314 
(2. 28) (-1.08) (0.36) (-0.91) (0.32) (5 .20) 
^Except for and r^ all variables are percentage 
changes of quarterly data from 1971 to 1988. c^ = change in 
domestic credit/monetary base, r^ = change in international 
reserves/monetary base, e^ = peso price of a U.S. dollar, a^ 
= money multiplier, y^ = industrial production index, = 
Mexico's rate of inflation, and p^ = U.S. rate of 
inflation. 
bunder the null hypothesis Hg a = 1, the critical 
values at 10%, 5%, and 1% are -3.87, -4.17, and -4.38 
respectively. Perron (1989, p. 1377, Table VI.B). The time 
of break relative to total sample size X = 16/63 = .2540. 
In the regression equation, model A1 was used. The value of 
k, the lag length in model Al, equals six. The structural 
change analyzed was the third quarter of 1976. 
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Table A2. Unit Root Tests with Structural Break 
Third Quarter 1982 
y| M  ^ 2^ Ê2 ÊA  ^
Ct 0. 1270 0. 0091 -0. 2470 0. 0011 0. 0047 -0. 5947 
(1-89) (0. 06) (-0. 79) (0. 62) (0. 88) (-1. 54) 
(r-e)t 0. 0336 0. 3357 0. 0823 -0. 0031 -0. 0030 -0. 1863 
(0. 48) (1. 70) (1. 22) (-1. 37) (-0. 46) (-0. 51) 
at -0. 0573 -0. 0187 -0. 5462 0. 0007 0. 0103 -1. 1837 
(-1. 28) (-0. 16) (-2. 24) (0. 52) (2. 42) (-2. 64) 
Yt 0. 0331 -0. 0365 0. 0476 -0. 0001 0. 0004 -0. 7363 
(2. 23) (-1. 05) (0. 67) (-0. 36) (0. 34) (-1. 60) 
"t 0. 0028 0. 0525 -0. 1153 0. 0017 0. 0028 0. 0048 
(0. 14) (0. 95) (-1. 14) (2. 54) (1. 56) (0. 01) 
* 
Pt 0. 0089 -0. 0094 0. 0045 0. 0000 -0. 0002 0. 4653 
(3. 18) (-1. 58) (0. 40) (0. 87) -(1. 01) (2. 82) 
^Except for c^ and r^ all variables are percentage 
changes of quarterly data from 1971 to 1988. c^ = change in 
domestic credit/monetary base, r^ = change in international 
reserves/monetary base, e^ = peso price of a U.S. dollar, a^ 
= money multiplier, y^ = industrial production index, = 
Mexico's rate of inflation, and p^ = U.S. rate of 
inflation. 
bunder the null hypothesis Hg a = 1, the critical 
values at 10%, 5%, and 1% are -3.86, -4.18, and -4.75 
respectively. Perron (1989, p. 1377, Table VI.B). The time 
of break relative to total sample size X = 44/63 = .6984. 
In the regression equation, model A1 was used. The value of 
k, the lag length in model Al, equals six. The structural 
change analyzed was the third quarter of 1982. 
226 
Table A3. Unit : Root Tests with Structural Break 
Third Quarter 1976 
y? M f4 ab 
Et -Pt 0 .1326 -0.3976 0.3122 0.0032 -0.0020 0 .8158 
(2 .44) (-2.72) (2.08) (2.63) (-1.07) (17 .13) 
Pt 0 .0340 -0.0230 -0.0049 0.0007 0.0005 0 .9506 
(2 .22) (-0.99) (-0.12) (3.12) (0.83) (56 .08) 
®Data are quarterly averages of monthly observations 
from the first quarter of 1960 to the second quarter of 
1988. 
= U.S. dollar price of a Mexican peso; = Mexico's 
price level; = U.S. price level. All variables were 
normalized to 1 in the first quarter of 1960. 
bunder the null hypothesis Hq os = 1, the critical 
values at 10%, 5%, and 1% are -3.95, -4.24, and -4.88 
respectively. Perron (1989, p. 1377, Table VI.B). The time 
of break relative to total sample size X = 67/114 = .5877. 
In the regression equation, model A1 was used. The value of 
k, the lag length in model Al, equals six. The structural 
change analyzed was the third quarter of 1976. 
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Table A4. Unit Root Tests with Structural Break 
Third Quarter 1982 
M JËJL ÉL h. l4 a* 












®Data are quarterly averages of monthly observations 
from the first quarter of 1960 to the second quarter of 
1988. 
* 
Et = U.S. dollar price of a Mexican peso; = Mexico's 
price level; = U.S. price level. All variables were 
normalized to 1 in the first quarter of 1960. 
bunder the null hypothesis Hg a = 1, the critical 
values at 10%, 5%, and 1% are -3.69, -4.04, and -4.70 
respectively, Perron (1989, p. 1377, Table VI.B). The time 
of break relative to total sample size X = 91/114 = .7982. 
In the regression equation, model A1 was used. The value of 
k, the lag length in model Al, equals six. The structural 
change analyzed was the third quarter of 1982. 
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Table A5. Unit 
Third 
Root Tests with Structural 
Quarter 1976 
Break 











































&Data are quarterly averages of monthly observations 
from the first quarter of 1969 to the first quarter of 1991. 
m3 = natural logarithm (M3/CPI) ; M3 is a definition of 
money; CPI is consumer price index; y = natural logarithm of 
industrial production index; n is the rate of inflation. 
bunder the null hypothesis Hg a = 1, the critical 
values at 10%, 5%, and 1% are -3.95, -4.22, and -4.81 
respectively. Perron (1989, p. 1377, Table VI.B). The time 
of break relative to total sample size X = 35/93 = .3763. 
In the regression equation, model A1 was used. The value of 
k, the lag length in model Al, equals six. The structural 
change analyzed was the third quarter of 1976. 
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Table A6. Unit Root Tests with Structural Break 
Third Quarter 1982 
zL h. ÈL. ^3 ÈL a* 
m3t 0.0873 0.0645 -0.2519 0.0013 0.0024 0.9404 
(1.02) (1.21) (-2.33) (1.27) (1.60) (14.03) 
Yt 1.4553 -0.0140 0.2061 
(3.42) (-0.43) (2.12) 
0.0064 -0.0043 0.6044 
(3.30) (-2.62) (5.14) 
TTt -0.0095 -0.0092 0.1660 
-(0.52) (-0.19) (2.10) 
0.0009 -0.0021 0.5519 
(1.83) (-2.07) (3.56) 
^Data are quarterly averages of monthly observations 
from the first quarter of 1969 to the first quarter of 1991. 
m3 = natural logarithm (M3/CPI); M3 is a definition of 
money; CPI is consumer price index; y = natural logarithm of 
industrial production index; n is the rate of inflation. 
bunder the null hypothesis Hg a = 1, the critical 
values at 10%, 5%, and 1% are -3.95, -4.24, and -4.88 
respectively, Perron (1989, p. 1377, Table VI.B). The time 
of break relative to total sample size X = 59/93 = .6344. 
In the regression equation, model A1 was used. The value of 
k, the lag length in model Al, equals six. The structural 
change analyzed was the third quarter of 1982. 
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APPENDIX B. DATA SET 
The following data set corresponds to the data utilized 
in Chapter 3, which were taken from the International 
Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various 
issues. The definitions of the time series included are as 
follows. 
R is international reserves, line 79ad; 
E is the Peso price of a U.S. Dollar, line RF; 
H is the monetary base in billions of Pesos, end of 
period, line 14; 
Ml is money (currency plus demand deposits) in billions 
of Pesos, end of period, line 34; 
MEXCPU is Mexico's consumer price index, line 64; 
IPI is Mexico's industrial production, line 66; and 
USCPU is the U.S. consumer price index, line 64. 
DATE R E H Ml MEXCPU IPI USCPU 
71:1 -95 12.50 27 49 2.1 49.2 37.1 
71:2 -33 12.50 28 49 2.1 48.1 37.5 
71:3 -13 12.50 29 48 2.1 48.0 37.9 
71:4 -43 12.50 33 58 2.2 48.8 38.1 
72:1 -107 12.50 33 54 2.2 51.4 38.4 
72:2 -128 12.50 40 55 2.2 54.5 38.7 
72:3 35 12.50 46 55 2.3 53.9 39.0 
72:4 -24 12.50 58 68 2.3 54.0 39.4 
73:1 -97 12.50 55 65 2.3 56.5 39.9 
73:2 47 12.50 59 67 2.4 58.3 40.8 
73:3 132 12.50 61 69 2.6 59.6 41.7 
73:4 -266 12.50 75 84 2.7 60.9 42.7 
74:1 -224 12.50 79 79 2.9 62.8 43.9 
74:2 —8 12.50 85 82 3.0 63.5 45.1 
74:3 190 12.50 88 82 3.1 62.5 46.5 
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DATE R E 
74 4 -36 12. 50 
75 1 -96 12. 50 
75 2 66 12. 50 
75 3 31 12. 50 
75 4 -205 12. 50 
76 1 11 12. 50 
76 2 75 12. 50 
76 3 559 15. 02 
76 4 -454 21. 69 
77 1 -160 22. 03 
77 2 8 22. 75 
77 3 -228 22. 84 
77 4 -57 22. 67 
78 1 —45 22. 73 
78 2 54 22. 76 
78 3 -83 22. 81 
78 4 -80 22. 77 
79 1 -118 22. 76 
79 2 89 22. 83 
79 3 58 22. 81 
79 4 -185 22. 83 
80 1 -33 22. 83 
80 2 -206 22. 85 
80 3 -158 23. 00 
80 4 -288 23. 13 
81 1 -183 23. 49 
81 2 540 24. 09 
81 3 -219 24. 79 
81 4 -1414 25. 68 
82 1 1311 34. 34 
82 2 1043 46. 77 
82 3 613 71. 18 
82 4 385 73. 32 
83 1 -1247 102. 02 
83 2 -452 114. 20 
83 3 -532 126. 12 
83 4 -871 138. 04 
84 1 -769 149. 96 
84 2 -1385 161. 87 
84 3 -949 173. 73 
84 4 -288 185. 74 
85 1 466 200. 57 
85 2 753 218. 57 
85 3 1221 274. 75 
85 4 -4 333. 60 
86 1 -139 423. 64 
Ml MEXCPU IPI USCPU 
101 3. 3 63. 8 47. 9 
96 3. 4 62. 5 48. 7 
100 3. 5 68. 4 49. 5 
98 3. 6 66. 7 50. 5 
122 3. 7 66. 9 51. 3 
113 3. 9 68. 6 51. 8 
117 4. 0 69. 3 52. 5 
124 4. 1 68. 4 53. 3 
158 4. 6 65. 4 53. 9 
147 5. 0 66. 3 54. 9 
147 5. 2 71. 3 56. 1 
151 5. 4 72. 0 56. 9 
208 5. 6 71. 6 57. 5 
208 5. 9 71. 9 58. 5 
216 6. 1 79. 2 60. 0 
227 6. 4 79. 6 61. 4 
270 6. 6 78. 5 62. 7 
280 7. 0 81. 6 64. 2 
284 7. 2 83. 8 66. 4 
290 7. 5 85. 8 68. 6 
361 7. 8 89. 9 70. 6 
358 8. 6 90. 2 73. 4 
382 9. 0 92. 9 76. 0 
380 9. 6 93. 8 77. 5 
477 10. 1 97. 5 79. 5 
471 10. 9 97. 7 81. 6 
515 11. 6 102. 3 83. 5 
519 12. 2 104. 4 85. 9 
635 13. 0 103. 1 87. 1 
632 14. 5 103. 1 87. 8 
659 16. 7 103. 9 89. 2 
805 20. 2 98. 6 90. 8 
1031 24. 4 94. 0 91. 0 
955 30. 8 92. 5 91. 0 
1016 36. 0 93. 4 92. 1 
1041 40. 6 90. 7 93. 2 
1447 45. 7 90. 0 94. 0 
1423 53. 5 92. 7 95. 1 
1583 60. 4 94. 5 96. 1 
1611 66. 4 95. 7 97. 1 
2315 73. 3 97. 5 97. 8 
2226 85. 2 99. 2 98. 5 
2371 93. 5 100. 6 99. 7 
2648 103. 4 100. 9 100. 4 
3462 117. 8 99. 3 101. 3 

















































DATE R E H Ml MEXCPU IPX USCPU 
86:2 1676 522. 15 6304 3646 165. 6 98.3 101.3 
86:3 51 665. 69 6484 3795 198. 0 90.7 102.1 
86:4 -2212 835. 61 8444 5790 239. 3 92.2 102.6 
87:1 -1981 1025. 66 8970 6059 297. 5 94.8 103.8 
87:2 —4846 1241. 66 9612 7075 371. 4 98.3 105.1 
87:3 -772 1460. 77 10965 8468 463. 8 98.3 106.3 
87:4 1628 1784. 64 14402 12627 594. 3 102.9 107.2 
88:1 -2212 2249. 42 15675 14055 825. 4 99.8 107.9 
88:2 1273 2281. 00 20044 17484 920. 0 99.2 109.2 
The following data were utilized in Chapter A, which 
were taken from the International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund, various issues. The 
definitions of the time series included are as follows. 
USWPI is the U.S. wholesale price index, line 63; 
USCPI is the U.S. consumer price index, line 64; 
MEXRF is the Peso price of a U.S. Dollar, line RF; 
MEXWPI is Mexico's wholesale price index, line 63; and 
MEXCPI is Mexico's consumer price index, line 64. 
DATE USWPI USCPI MEXRF MEXWPI MEXCPI 
60:1 30. 7219 27 .3044 0. 0125 1. 4815 1. 4815 
60:2 30. 7651 27 .4734 0. 0125 1. 5325 1. 5161 
60:3 30. 6787 27 .5445 0. 0125 1. 5473 1. 5789 
60:4 30. 7219 27 .6957 0. 0125 1. 5351 1. 5891 
61:1 30. 8298 27 .7135 0. 0125 1. 5396 1. 5752 
61:2 30. 5276 27 .7224 0. 0125 1. 5470 1. 5634 
61:3 30. 5276 27 .8647 0. 0125 1. 5344 1. 5636 
61:4 30. 5708 27 .9003 0. 0125 1. 5344 1. 5625 
62:1 30. 7435 27 .9537 0. 0125 1. 5425 1. 5775 
62:2 30. 5816 28 .0782 0. 0125 1. 5658 1. 5803 
62:3 30. 7327 28 .2027 0. 0125 1. 5802 1. 5848 



































































































































































































































































































DATE USWPI USCPI MEXRF MEXWPI MEXCPI 
74 4 55. 4419 47. 8541 0. 0125 2. 9827 3. 3004 
75 1 55. 4311 48. 7228 0. 0125 3. 0621 3. 4100 
75 2 56. 0248 49. 4881 0. 0125 3. 1841 3. 5114 
75 3 57. 2230 50. 5431 0. 0125 3. 2887 3. 6241 
75 4 57. 8383 51. 3498 0. 0125 3. 3648 3. 6977 
76 1 58. 1298 51. 8462 0. 0125 3. 5522 3. 8586 
76 2 58. 9826 52. 4874 0. 0125 3. 6663 3. 9583 
76 3 59. 6950 53. 3252 0. 0150 3. 8700 4. 0839 
76 4 60. 2348 53. 9250 0. 0217 4. 6830 4. 5963 
77 1 61. 5625 54. 8765 0. 0220 5. 1745 4. 9926 
77 2 63. 0414 56. 0555 0. 0228 5. 5182 5. 2135 
77 3 63. 1170 56. 8726 0. 0228 5. 7469 5. 4364 
77 4 63. 8618 57. 5035 0. 0227 5. 8282 5. 6469 
78 1 65. 4055 58. 4756 0. 0227 6. 0792 5. 9219 
78 2 67. 3701 59. 9960 0. 0228 6. 4203 6. 1261 
78 3 68. 4064 61. 4129 0. 0228 6. 5777 6. 3741 
78 4 69. 9609 62. 6540 0. 0228 6. 7026 6. 5846 
79 1 72. 4976 64. 2156 0. 0228 7. 1668 6. 9742 
79 2 75. 0776 66. 4186 0. 0228 7. 4632 7. 2264 
79 3 77. 4201 68. 6111 0. 0228 7. 7812 7. 5035 
79 4 80. 1511 70. 6176 0. 0228 8. 0841 7. 8473 
80 1 83. 8753 73. 3686 0. 0228 8. 7758 8. 5516 
80 2 85. 5593 76. 0163 0. 0228 9. 1797 9. 0392 
80 3 88. 3875 77. 4539 0. 0230 9. 8607 9. 6331 
80 4 90. 4277 79. 4810 0. 0231 10. 1422 10. 1186 
81 1 93. 1264 81. 5805 0. 0235 10. 8361 10. 9416 
81 2 95. 2422 83. 4731 0. 0241 11. 5042 11. 6043 
81 3 95. 8899 85. 8622 0. 0248 12. 0885 12. 2190 
81 4 95. 7927 87. 0929 0. 0257 12. 8254 13. 0066 
82 1 96. 6023 87. 8065 0. 0343 14. 3292 14. 5277 
82 2 96. 7103 89. 1511 0. 0468 16. 5549 16. 7490 
82 3 97. 1421 90. 8369 0. 0712 19. 7043 20. 2392 
82 4 97. 2392 91. 0230 0. 0733 23. 1545 24. 4046 
83 1 97. 3040 90. 9816 0. 1020 29. 9668 30. 8412 
83 2 97. 6386 92. 1193 0. 1142 36. 3623 35. 9567 
83 3 98. 5778 93. 2259 0. 1261 41. 0413 40. 6451 
83 4 99. 0528 94. 0326 0. 1380 45. 5570 45. 7336 
84 1100. 1646 95. 0565 0. 1500 54. 2727 53. 4913 
84 2100. 8339 96. 1011 0. 1619 62. 7693 60. 3509 
84 3100. 5964 97. 1353 0. 1737 68. 0713 66. 3791 
84 4100. 3373 97. 8490 0. 1857 75. 3734 73. 3471 
85 1100. 1131 98. 4902 0. 2006 85. 0408 85. 2472 
85 2100. 2101 99. 6692 0. 2186 95. 0003 93. 5342 
85 3 99. 5314 100. 4035 0. 2748 102. 9362 103. 4215 
85 4100. 1454 101. 3033 0. 3336 117. 0227 117. 7971 
86 1 98. 6266 101. 5515 0. 4236 142. 2610 142. 0808 
86 2 96. 7846 101. 3033 0. 5222 164. 8999 165. 5581 
235 
DATE USWPI USCPI MEXRF MEXWPI MEXCPI 
86:3 96 .3322 102 .0583 0.6657 201. 6359 198. 0392 
86:4 96 .6877 102 .6375 0.8356 244. 7332 239. 2574 
87:1 97 .8187 103 .7751 1.0257 295. 5879 297. 5183 
87:2 99 .3699 105 .1300 1.2417 381. 7243 371. 3613 
87:3100 .5009 106 .3090 1.4608 488. 5039 463. 8182 
87:4100 .9856 107 .2295 1.7846 609. 7737 594. 2614 
88:1101 .5673 107 .8687 2.2494 850. 7302 825. 4464 
88:2103 .2477 109 .2317 2.2810 917. 5640 920. 0475 
The following data set corresponds to the data utilized 
in Chapter b, which were taken from the International 
Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various 
issues; and Indicadores Econômicos, Banco de Mexico (the 
central bank of Mexico), various issues. The definitions of 
the time series included are as follows. 
MIAVG is Mexico's money supply, defined as currency 
plus demand deposits (Ml), expressed as a quarterly average 
of monthly end-of-period observations, in millions of pesos; 
PCAVG is Mexico's consumer price index, expressed as a 
quarterly average of monthly observations. This index is 
base 1978 = 100. 
M2AVG is Mexico's money supply, defined as Ml plus 
banking instruments with maturity of up to one year plus 
bankers' acceptances (M2). It is expressed as a quarterly 
average of monthly end-of-period observations, in millions 
of pesos; 
M3AVG is Mexico's money supply, defined as M2 plus 
CETES, PAGAFES, BONDES and commercial paper. These 
236 
securities are non-banking liquid instruments with a minimum 
maturity of one year (M3). M3 is also expressed as a 
quarterly average of monthly end-of-period observations, in 
millions of pesos; and 
IPI is Mexico's industrial production, line 66. 
The series for IPI is taken from the International 
Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. The rest 
of the series are taken from the central bank of Mexico. 
DATE MIAVG PCAVG M2AVG M3AVG IPI 
69 1 37.6 30.3 107.7 107.7 45.80 
69 2 37.7 30.4 111.9 111.9 45.70 
69 3 37.8 30.8 116.3 116.3 44.50 
69 4 40.4 31.4 122.9 122.9 44.60 
70 1 41.6 31.8 128.8 128.8 46.00 
70 2 41.4 32.0 133.4 133.4 49.40 
70 3 41.5 32.5 137.9 137.9 47.70 
70 4 45.0 32.8 145.6 145.6 47.50 
71 1 45.0 33.5 151.5 151.5 49.20 
71 2 44.7 33.9 155.8 155.8 48.10 
71 3 44.6 34.2 159.5 159.5 48.00 
71 4 48.1 34.5 165.8 165.8 48.80 
72 1 50.4 34.9 171.5 171.5 51.40 
72 2 50.3 35.5 176.7 176.7 54.50 
72 3 51.9 36.0 185.2 185.2 53.90 
72 4 57.8 36.4 195.4 195.4 54.00 
73 1 61.5 37.4 204.8 204.8 56.50 
73 2 63.2 38.8 209.4 209.4 58.30 
73 3 65.5 40.8 214.9 214.9 59.60 
73 4 72.9 43.1 223.2 223.2 60.90 
74 1 75.1 46.8 228.5 228.5 62.80 
74 2 77.1 48.4 239.2 239.2 63.50 
74 3 78.5 50.1 247.9 247.9 62.50 
74 4 87.2 52.8 260.3 260.3 63.80 
75 1 91.2 54.5 276.6 276.6 62.50 
75 2 94.9 56.1 295.3 295.3 68.40 
75 3 96.1 58.0 309.3 309.3 66.70 
75 4 106.4 59.1 331.7 331.7 66.90 
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DATE MIAVG PCAVG M2AVG M3AVG IPX 
88:1 14531 .1 13204. 4 64965. 8 83878. 0 99. 80 
88:2 17351 .0 14718. 1 73688. 7 100919. 0 99. 20 
88:3 18426 .7 15384. 7 75958. 3 104533. 3 97. 90 
88:4 20817 .7 15857. 6 81917. 7 116400. 0 104. 50 
89:1 20445 .3 16752. 8 81593. 0 127800. 0 103. 30 
89:2 21365 .7 17430. 8 86628. 0 141533. 3 107. 10 
89:3 22717 .3 17998. 0 95604. 0 156233. 3 104. 00 
89:4 27256 .3 18821. 0 111903. 3 172333. 3 107. 60 
90:1 28655 .3 20688. 3 119467. 5 187035. 3 108. 50 
90:2 32163 .6 21814. 6 130385. 5 207039. 3 109. 70 
90:3 32899 .0 23031. 8 140494. 9 219639. 7 111. 00 
90:4 44741 .0 24931. 3 167293. 2 246342. 0 116. 17 
91:1 48619 .7 26177. 0 183969. 0 262702. 0 112. 83 
